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11.1 | The importance of curiosity
You probably all know what it is like to really want to know something. Imagine 
watching an exciting crime show and you cannot wait to find who committed the 
murder. Or think back about the days when you just finished an important test and kept 
on refreshing your inbox to find out whether you passed or failed. In other words: we 
all know what it is like to be curious about something. In fact, curiosity drives many 
of our daily pursuits and interactions. We spend an enormous amount of time seeking 
and consuming information, such as watching the news, checking our smartphone and 
browsing the World Wide Web. Also in science, major breakthroughs often happen 
as a result of the mere curiosity of researchers. Albert Einstein once famously said 
“I have no special talent. I am only passionately curious”, suggesting that curiosity 
was an important driving force for his work. Given the importance of curiosity and its 
pervasiveness in our everyday lives, it is surprising that little research has been done 
on this topic.
In the current chapter, I will introduce the topic by providing definitions of curiosity. 
To this end, I will mainly focus on the distinction between instrumental curiosity 
(curiosity with obvious purpose such as reward maximization) and non-instrumental 
curiosity (curiosity without immediate purpose, i.e. not aimed at maximizing rewards 
or increasing task performance). The latter form of curiosity is the focus of the current 
thesis. Grounded in observations that we exhibit a preference for immediate compared 
with delayed information and that curiosity helps us to better remember information, 
I will argue that this type of curiosity mainly serves to reduce uncertainty about the 
world around us. Apart from that, we also seem to be more curious about information 
that makes us feel good, whereas we aim to avoid information that makes us feel bad. 
Based on these findings, we hypothesize that there are multiple motives underlying 
non-instrumental curiosity. One of these may be the motivation to form accurate beliefs 
by means of uncertainty reduction, both for positive as well as for negative contexts. 
Another purpose might be related to the notion that humans exhibit a preference for 
positive over negative belief updating (savouring), regardless of uncertainty reduction. 
This chapter will be concluded with an overview of the experimental questions I will 
answer in the current thesis. 
1.2 | Curiosity with and without obvious purpose.
Thus far, curiosity has received little attention in the scientific literature. Probably, one 
of the reasons is that there is not one single accepted definition of the term “curiosity” 
(Kidd & Hayden, 2015). In the past, curiosity has been defined as “the impulse towards 
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better cognition” (James, 1899), meaning that it is the desire to understand what you 
do and do not know. 
Decades ago, Daniel Berlyne made a first attempt to distinguish between different 
types of curiosity (Berlyne, 1954). The first distinction he made was between 
perceptual versus epistemic curiosity. Perceptual curiosity refers to the drive to seek 
out novel or surprising stimuli and can be cast as the driving force behind visual search 
in humans and non-human animals. Epistemic curiosity, on the other hand, is more 
specific to humans and can be defined as “the desire for knowledge” (Loewenstein, 
1994). The second distinction he made, was that between specific and diversive 
curiosity, with specific curiosity relating to being curious about a particular piece of 
information (“Who of the suspects committed the murder?”) and diverivse curiosity to 
a more general seeking of stimulation (e.g. seeking out stimulation to avoid boredom). 
More contemporarily, curiosity has been defined as “intrinsically motivated information-
seeking” (Loewenstein, 1994; Oudeyer & Kaplan, 2007). According to this definition, 
curiosity should be seen as a special form of information seeking, distinguished by 
the notion that it is internally instead of externally motivated (Kidd & Hayden, 2015; 
Loewenstein, 1994; Oudeyer & Kaplan, 2007). Though it might sometimes be hard to 
determine whether somebody is internally or externally motivated to obtain a piece of 
information, it is important to distinguish between whether this information is directly 
relevant or not.  
For instance, we can seek information that we can directly use in the current context. 
An example of this, is when we check the weather report before leaving the house to 
see if we should take an umbrella. When looking for such directly relevant information, 
we basically aim to maximize reward and/or to minimize harm (i.e. not arriving at work 
completely soaked; Stigler, 1961). This type of information search that is aimed at 
reward maximization is commonly studied in literature focusing on the explore-exploit 
tradeoff or goal-directed exploration (i.e. Addicott, Pearson, Sweitzer, Barack, & Platt, 
2017; Averbeck, 2015; Daw & Doya, 2006; Daw, O’Doherty, Dayan, Seymour, & Dolan, 
2006a; Lejarraga & Hertwig, 2017; Lejarraga, Hertwig, & Gonzalez, 2012) and can be 
referred to as “instrumental curiosity”.
Critically, humans and other animals are also known to seek out information without 
such obvious purpose in mind. Think for example about situations in which we scroll 
through our Instagram feed or check our Facebook, without a specific purpose. This 
type of curiosity is often referred to as “non-instrumental curiosity” (see also Kidd 
& Hayden, 2015). Considering the amount of time we spend consuming such non-











1information that serves no direct obvious purpose. What are the psychological and 
neural mechanisms by which such apparently purpose-less curiosity is elicited? The 
current thesis will focus on this type of curiosity.
1.3 | Curiosity and uncertainty reduction
Berlyne (1966) argued that humans seek out information and stimulation for its own 
sake. Such exploration is particularly triggered in situations that include novelty, 
surprise, incongruity and complexity. In fact, people are especially curious about 
stimuli with intermediate levels of novelty (Berlyne, 1960). One reason for this 
preference might be that stimuli that are not familiar but also not completely new, 
may have the highest potential for providing learning opportunities. In other words: 
they are most likely to reduce uncertainty about the world around us. In fact, curiosity 
has been argued to play a central role in development, learning and exploration (i.e. 
Baranes, Oudeyer, & Gottlieb, 2015; Berlyne, 1954; Gottlieb, Oudeyer, Lopes, & Baranes, 
2013; Kidd & Hayden, 2015; Loewenstein, 1994). 
This view was inspired by Loewenstein, who described curiosity as a “cognitive induced 
deprivation that arises from the perception of a gap in knowledge and understanding” 
(Loewenstein, 1994). He argued that curiosity is essentially an aversive drive that 
arises when people become aware of gaps in their knowledge. People are driven to 
fill these gaps with information, which is in turn often considered to be rewarding. 
Studies into this desire for information have used several different paradigms, such as 
observing paradigms, taking advantage of the preference for immediate rather than 
delayed information (see 1.3.1) , as well as perceptual paradigms and trivia questions 
paradigms, showing that we are curious about information that will fill our knowledge 
gaps (see 1.3.2). 
1.3.1 | Preference for immediate information
One way to study the drive for information without obvious benefit, is to take 
advantage of the preference for immediate rather than delayed information (i.e. 
Blanchard, Hayden, & Bromberg-Martin, 2015; Bromberg-Martin & Hikosaka, 2009, 
2011; Kidd & Hayden, 2015; Kreps & Porteus, 1978; Stagner & Zentall, 2010; Zentall 
& Stagner, 2011). In recent studies with nonhuman primates, macaque monkeys had 
the opportunity to choose to receive information about upcoming primary rewards 
(such as water or juice; Bromberg-Martin & Hikosaka, 2009, 2011). Results showed that 
monkeys more often choose an informative than an uninformative option, even though 
this choice did not alter the likelihood of actually receiving the reward. More strikingly, 
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monkeys were even willing to give up a substantial portion of their reward in order 
to get this information (Blanchard et al., 2015). Rewards generally exert their effect 
through dopaminergic reward prediction errors: the difference between the expected 
value of the reward and the rewards that are actually received (e.g. Daw & Doya, 2006; 
Schultz, 2006; Schultz, Dayan, & Montague, 1997). Bromberg-Martin and Hikosaka 
found that information and primary reward implicate the same neural structures: 
Along with conventional reward prediction errors, cells in midbrain dopamine 
neurons (DA neurons) as well as in lateral habenula (LHb) neurons also coded for an 
information prediction error, i.e. the difference between expected information and 
received information (Bromberg-Martin & Hikosaka, 2009, 2011, see also Matsumoto & 
Hikosaka, 2007). The notion that primary reward and information are implicated in the 
same neural circuits, suggest that information and primary rewards share behavioral 
and neurobiological properties.   
These findings are are in line with earlier work in pigeons (Spetch, Belke, Barnet, Dunn, 
& Pierce, 1990; Stagner & Zentall, 2010; Zentall & Stagner, 2011) as well as human 
volunteers, showing that humans are also willing to incur considerable monetary costs 
to acquire early information that had no obvious purpose (Bennett, Bode, Brydevall, 
Warren, & Murawski, 2016; Brydevall, Bennett, Murawski, & Bode, 2018; Rodriguez 
Cabrero, Zhu, & Ludvig, 2019). In addition, Brydevall et al., (2018) found using EEG that 
feedback-related negativity independently encoded both an information prediction 
error as well as a reward prediction error. This is consistent with the hypothesis that 
information is processed in neural reward circuitries and supports the information-as-
reward hypothesis. In other words: people show a strong preference for information, 
and information might be rewarding in and of itself.
1.3.2 | Curiosity facilitates learning and memory
Further support for the information-gap hypothesis (Loewenstein, 1994) comes from 
paradigms that have a strong focus on learning and memory. For example, Jepma et 
al. (2012), showed participants blurry photos with ambiguous contents that piqued 
their curiosity. Next, participants’ curiosity was either relieved by revealing the actual 
picture or not. Curiosity was associated with activation of the anterior cingulate cortex 
(ACC) and the anterior insula, regions that are sensitive to aversive conditions (but also 
many other things, such as conflict and arousal). Resolution of curiosity was associated 
with activity in regions of the striatum that have been related to reward processing, 
while also enhancing hippocampal activation and incidental memory. Consistent 
with the proposal by Loewenstein, these data led to the conclusion that curiosity is 
marked by an aversive state of lacking information. This unpleasant state motivates 











1In addition, studies in which human volunteers were presented with trivia questions 
(Baranes et al., 2015; Gruber, Gelman, & Ranganath, 2014; Kang et al., 2009; Ligneul, 
Mermillod, & Morisseau, 2018; Marvin & Shohamy, 2016) while undergoing fMRI (Duan, 
Fernández, van Dongen, & Kohn, 2020; Gruber et al., 2014; Kang et al., 2009; Ligneul et 
al., 2018), support the notion that curiosity facilitates learning. In one of these studies, 
participants had to indicate how curious they were to learn the answer as well as 
how confident they were that they knew the answer (Kang et al., 2009). Participants 
were most curious about trivia questions with intermediate levels of confidence. 
Unsurprisingly, they were not curious about questions for which they either already 
knew the answer (when there was no information gap) or about questions for which 
they were not confident at all (when the information gap was too large). In addition, 
people were more willing to wait and pay for information about which they were 
more curious and curiosity enhanced later recall of novel information. This was 
supported by findings of Gruber and colleagues (2014) who found, using a similar 
paradigm, that participants showed better learning in states of high compared with 
low curiosity. Additionally, learning was driven by the gap between the actual value 
of the information received (quantified as satisfaction experienced upon outcome 
presentation) and the anticipated value of the information (curiosity); the so-called 
information prediction error (Marvin & Shohamy, 2016). These results support the idea 
that information functions as a reward.
Self-reported curiosity has been associated with brain activity in the caudate nucleus 
(Kang et al., 2009), the midbrain and the nucleus accumbens (Gruber et al., 2014). These 
are structures that are more generally activated by reward anticipation, suggesting 
that curiosity elicits a so-called “anticipation of reward” state (consistent with 
Loewenstein’s theory). Curiosity-driven memory benefits correlated with anticipatory 
activity in midbrain and hippocampus (Gruber et al., 2014) and when the answer to 
trivia questions was revealed, activations were found in structures associated with 
learning and memory, such as the parahippocampal gyrus and hippocampus (Kang et 
al., 2009). It should be noted that Jepma and colleagues (2012) posit curiosity to be a 
fundamentally aversive state, whereas it is conceptualized as pleasurable and linked 
to reward anticipation in studies using trivia questions (Gruber et al., 2014; Kang et al., 
2009). It is surprising that the latter studies did not find ventral striatum responses to 
curiosity relief, a classic structure that responds to reward and reward prediction error 
(Abler, Walter, Erk, Kammerer, & Spitzer, 2006; Daniel & Pollmann, 2014; Daw & Doya, 
2006; Knutson, Taylor, Kaufman, Peterson, & Glover, 2005; O’Doherty, 2004; Pessiglione, 
Seymour, Flandin, Dolan, & Frith, 2006; Schultz, Apicella, Scarnati, & Ljungberg, 1992). 
However, in another study using a stochastic trivia questions paradigm (in which it 
was unpredictable whether the answer to a trivia question would be revealed), relief 
of curiosity did activate the ventral striatum (Ligneul et al., 2018). It appears that the 
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ventral striatum might therefore not be related to reception of knowledge per se, but 
it may be selectively recruited when curiosity is relieved in a stochastic fashion (cf. 
Jepma et al., 2012) and thereby reflecting a form of a relief prediction error. 
These results suggest that curiosity is supported by mechanisms that are similar to 
those implicated in incentive motivation, reward-based learning, memory and attention 
(Gottlieb & Oudeyer, 2018). To account for the evidence that curiosity states are related 
to modulations in the dopaminergic circuits and impact memory encoding, Gruber and 
Ranganath (2019) put forward the hypothesis that curiosity is triggered by prediction 
errors that are appraised as indicators of information that might be valuable in the 
future. This enhances memory encoding by means of heightened attention, exploration 
and information seeking, as well as the consolidation of information acquired in states 
of curiosity through dopaminergic modulation of the hippocampus (see Gruber & 
Ranganath, 2019, for more detailed neuroscientific mechanisms). 
1.3.3 | Curiosity as a drive to update our current world model?
The literature reviewed here, demonstrates that obtaining information (i.e. finding out 
the outcome of a lottery or receiving the answer to a trivia question) is considered to be 
rewarding, consistent with an information-as-reward hypothesis (Loewenstein, 1994; 
Marvin & Shohamy, 2016). This is supported by findings showing that information and 
so called information prediction errors are coded in similar neural areas as reward 
prediction errors (e.g. Blanchard, Hayden, & Bromberg-Martin, 2015; Bromberg-
Martin & Hikosaka, 2009, 2011; Brydevall, Bennett, Murawski, & Bode, 2018) and 
that curiosity-driven memory benefits are linked to dopaminergic modulation of the 
hippocampus (Gruber et al., 2014; Gruber & Ranganath, 2019).  
An attractive hypothesis is that this information is likely rewarding to us, because it 
will help us to get a better idea about what is going on in the world around us. This 
proposal is reminiscent of the predictive coding framework, according to which agents 
are driven to minimize surprise and reduce uncertainty about their current world 
model (Friston et al., 2017). If this would be true, we would expect that people are 
driven by the size of the information gap and that curiosity would increase with 
uncertainty. We investigated this hypothesis in Chapter 2. We used a lottery task in 
which we independently manipulated the amount of information that could be gained 












11.3.4 | Information as reward?
At the same time, the literature reviewed above indicates that information serves as a 
reward (in accordance with the information-as-reward hypothesis; Loewenstein 1994; 
Marvin & Shohamy, 2016). This would suggest that uncertainty-dependent curiosity 
would be implicated in the same neural structures as explicit reward (see also Blanchard 
et al., 2015; Bromberg-Martin & Hikosaka, 2009, 2011; Brydevall et al., 2018; Duan 
et al., 2020; Gruber et al., 2014; Jepma, Verdonschot, van Steenbergen, Rombouts, & 
Nieuwenhuis, 2012; Kang et al., 2009; Ligneul, Mermillod, & Morisseau, 2018). Based 
on the information-as-reward hypothesis, we aimed to investigate whether curiosity 
elicited by uncertainty can be observed in similar neural structures as explicit rewards 
(Chapter 3). To this end, we used a similar lottery paradigm with explicit curiosity 
ratings to assess the neural constituents underlying curiosity using functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI). We focused on neural activity during the induction by 
curiosity by means of outcome uncertainty, as well as on neural activity elicited by the 
information updates obtained during curiosity relief. To this end, we mainly focused on 
brain-areas associated with reward and the coding of reward prediction error, such as 
the ventral striatum (Abler et al., 2006; Daniel & Pollmann, 2014; Daw & Doya, 2006; 
Knutson et al., 2005; O’Doherty, 2004; Pessiglione et al., 2006; Schultz et al., 1992). 
Furthermore, there is a well-established link between dopamine neuron firing and 
reward prediction errors (Schultz et al., 1997). For instance, prior work demonstrated 
that a considerable proportion of individual variability ventral striatal coding of 
reward prediction errors (Deserno et al., 2015; Schlagenhauf et al., 2013; Boehme et 
al., 2015), reward-based reversal learning (Cools et al., 2009), cognitive control (Aarts 
et al., 2014) and cognitive effort (Westbrook et al., 2020) is accounted for by individual 
differences in dopamine synthesis capacity. In Chapter 6 we investigated whether 
individual variability in non-instrumental curiosity (which can be seen as a different 
form of cognitive motivation) can be accounted for by variation in dopamine synthesis 
capacity. This synthesis capacity is measured with positron emission tomography 
(PET), using radiotracers such as FDOPA. Uptake of the radiotracer FDOPA provides a 
relatively stable trait index of the degree to which dopamine is synthesized in striatal 
terminals of midbrain dopamine neurons (dopamine synthesis capacity). In a separate 
session, participants performed a similar lottery task as described for Chapter 2 and 3. 
We aimed to investigate whether participant’s baseline dopamine synthesis capacity 
predicts the extent to which participants are curious in a non-instrumental setting.
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1.4 | Curiosity about positive and negative information
In addition to uncertainty reduction, people may also seek information based on affect 
(Sharot & Sunstein, 2020) or in other words, people seek information simply because 
it makes them feel good (Charpentier, Bromberg-Martin, & Sharot, 2018; Kobayashi, 
Ravaioli, Baranès, Woodford, & Gottlieb, 2019). Imagine again that you just finished an 
important test. Probably, you will be more curious about the result when you think you 
passed your exam (and the information will make you feel good), compared with when 
you think you failed your exam anyway (and the information will make you feel bad). In 
the latter situation, we even might want to avoid the information that makes us feel bad. 
A reason for this effect, might be that people tend to overestimate the probability 
of positive events and underestimate the probability of negative events (unrealistic 
optimism; Sharot, 2011; Sharot & Sunstein, 2020; Weinstein, 1980). This might increase 
information-seeking by overestimating positive and underestimating negative hedonic 
utility (Sharot & Sunstein 2020). Additionally, people tend to overestimate the duration 
and intensity of how they will feel in the future (impact bias; Wilson & Gilbert, 2005). 
This might lead to overestimating positive and negative hedonic utility, increasing 
information seeking for good news and information avoidance for bad news (Sharot & 
Sunstein 2020).
In other words: whereas we are driven by uncertainty reduction, we exhibit an 
additional preference for anticipating positive outcomes (savouring), while avoiding 
the dread that might be associated with anticipating negative outcomes (Charpentier et 
al., 2018; Iigaya, Story, Kurth-Nelson, Dolan, & Dayan, 2016; Kobayashi et al., 2019). In 
fact, most people show a combination of both drives and the mixture of motives differs 
between individuals (Kobayashi et al., 2019). 
1.4.1 | Preference for positive versus negative belief updating
Indeed, recent studies have demonstrated that people are generally more curious about 
positive information compared with negative information. This has been demonstrated 
using a trivia questions paradigm with people being more curious about questions with 
positive compared with negative valence (Marvin & Shohamy, 2016) as well as using 
more quantitative lottery tasks, showing that people are more curious about gains 
(positive information) compared with losses (negative information; Charpentier et al., 
2018). 
More strikingly, human volunteers were willing to pay for obtaining positive 











1et al., 2018). This is in line with the notion that, from time to time, we deliberately 
decide to avoid information, such as that many people prefer not to be informed about 
things such as potential negative medical test results (Dwyer, Shepperd, & Stock, 2015; 
Persoskie, Ferrer, & Klein, 2014). The observation that this preference for advance 
knowledge about positive (versus negative) information is stronger when the outcome 
is further removed in the future has led to the conclusion that people seek information 
in order to maximize the state of reward anticipation, that is, savouring (versus dread; 
Iigaya, Story, Kurth-Nelson, Dolan, & Dayan, 2016). This is grounded in the notion called 
the “utility of anticipation” (Berns et al., 2006; Loewenstein, 1987; Story et al., 2013): 
subjects consider the delay to a future reward as being appetitive (for example if you 
wait for your upcoming vacation trip to paradise).
Charpentier and colleagues (2018) demonstrated that the desire to gain knowledge 
over ignorance is accompanied by neural signals in the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC; cf. 
Blanchard et al., 2015), regardless of valence. In addition, activity in the mesolimbic 
reward circuitry (VTN/SN) was modulated by the opportunity to gain knowledge 
about positive, but not negative outcomes (by coding valence-dependent information 
prediction errors). Based on this, they propose that the nucleus accumbens integrates 
a signal from the OFC (coding for the opportunity to obtain knowledge) with a valence-
dependent value signal in the VTA/SN. In this way, greater information seeking 
is elicited when content is expected to be positive versus negative, related to the 
preference for positive over negative belief updating.
1.4.2 | Seeking out negative information
It should be noted that this preference for positive over negative belief updating 
was found in situations when participants had no influence on their payoffs. This is 
in contrast with findings from the explore-exploit literature showing that when 
participants can influence their payoffs, they show higher exploration rates for 
losses compared with gains (i.e. Lejarraga & Hertwig, 2017; Lejarraga et al., 2012). 
These findings can be explained by the notion of loss attention. That is, people show 
intensified alertness in the face of potential losses. Thus, exploration in instrumental 
contexts is greater for losses than gains, presumably because it allows participants to 
maximize the positive outcome of loss avoidance. Also in choice paradigms it has been 
found that people are more concerned with losses compared with gains (as formalized 
in prospect theory; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). This theory implies, for example, that 
someone who loses €100,- will lose more satisfaction than someone who wins €100,- 
will gain. In other words: “losses loom larger than gains” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). 
Given these observations that losses are more salient than gains, it is perhaps surprising 
that humans exhibit a preference for positive compared with negative belief updating.
CHAPTER 1
20
Also in contexts were information is not of direct benefit, people expose themselves 
to physical harm (i.e. electric shocks) to resolve curiosity (Hsee & Ruan, 2016), to 
information that will likely lead to negative feelings of regret (FitzGibbon, Komiya, & 
Murayama, 2019) or negative affect (Oosterwijk, 2017). In the latter study, participants 
chose to observe negative images (i.e. war scenes or car accidents) over neutral or even 
positive images in at least 30% of the time. In addition, choosing to view a negative 
stimulus resulted in stronger activation of the reward circuitry compared with choosing 
to view a positive stimulus (Oosterwijk, Snoek, Tekoppele, Engelbert, & Scholte, 2019). 
One motive that might explain curiosity for negative information is the desire to 
reduce uncertainty. In other words: the negative stimuli are associated with greater 
uncertainty than positive stimuli (Oosterwijk et al., 2019). Indeed, Hsee and Ruan 
(2016) used a task in which participants could click pens that would sometimes provide 
them with an electrical shock. They found that participants clicked pens more often 
when it was uncertain whether they would receive a shock, compared with when it 
was certain that the pens would or would not shock them. Thus, people preferred a 
reduction in uncertainty, even if it would lead to negative experiences. It therefore 
seems to be the case that we are curious about negative information, because it will 
help us to reduce uncertainty and provide us with information updates. 
1.4.3 | Multiple motives underlying human curiosity?
Thus, positive information seems to be preferred over negative information in some 
contexts (Charpentier et al., 2018; Sharot & Sunstein, 2020). However, information can 
have a strong motivational lure regardless of the emotional impact of the information 
(FitzGibbon, Lau, & Murayama, 2020). Based on these findings, we hypothesize that non-
instrumental curiosity serves multiple purposes. One of these purposes might reflect a 
motivation to form accurate beliefs by means of uncertainty reduction (Chapter 2 and 
Chapter 3) and that this might extent to positive as well as negative contexts. Another 
purpose might be related to the notion that humans exhibit a preference for positive 
over negative belief updating (savouring), regardless of uncertainty reduction. 
To investigate this hypothesis, we used a lottery paradigm in which participants would 
either gain or lose an uncertain amount of money in every trial in Chapter 4. As such, 
we were able to assess whether curiosity about uncertain outcomes is modulated by 
the valence of the information (gains versus losses).  Previous studies have addressed 
the existence of multiple motives for curiosity and suggested that individuals exhibit 
various mixtures of effects of uncertainty and expected value (Kobayashi et al., 2019). 
However, no prior study has investigated the interaction between uncertainty and 











1degree to which effects of uncertainty and valence represent independent or rather 
interactive mechanisms underlying curiosity. 
1.5 | The feelings associated with curiosity
In the literature reviewed above, we suggested that non-instrumental curiosity might 
be a function of positive versus negative belief updating. The notion that people 
prefer information that makes them feel good over information that makes them feel 
bad (e.g. Charpentier et al., 2018; Kobayashi et al., 2019), suggests that curiosity has 
appetitive properties related to savouring. At the same time, curiosity is also triggered 
by situations in which there is information to be gained (i.e. under conditions of high 
uncertainty; see 1.3). But what does it feel like to be in this curiosity-triggering state of 
uncertainty?
1.5.1 | Uncertainty has appetitive as well as aversive properties
In fact, previous literature suggests that the curiosity-triggering state of uncertainty 
might have appetitive as well as aversive properties. In fact, in our daily lives, we 
often seek out situations that are new, exciting or uncertain. A lot of people travel to 
unknown places, they engage in video games with uncertain outcomes, or enjoy to be 
locked up in an escape room. Given that we deliberately expose ourselves to these 
situations, these observations suggest that the curiosity-triggering state of uncertainty 
has appetitive properties. At the same time, previous studies demonstrate that 
people actually do not like to be in a state of uncertainty and consider this state to be 
aversive (Bar-Anan, Wilson, & Gilbert, 2009; Berlyne, 1957; Jepma, Verdonschot, van 
Steenbergen, Rombouts, & Nieuwenhuis, 2012; Lieberman, Cathro, Nichol, & Watson, 
1997; Loewenstein, 1994), or even anxiety-evoking (Grupe & Nitschke, 2013). 
In fact, the information-gap hypothesis introduced in paragraph 1.3, indeed suggests 
that uncertainty has aversive as well as appetitive properties. According to this 
hypothesis, curiosity is triggered when we become aware of gaps in our knowledge. 
When we focus on what we do not know, this is considered to be aversive. At the same 
time, it promotes our drive to seek information to fill these knowledge gaps, which 
is in turn considered to be rewarding, consistent with the information-as-reward 
hypothesis. This is supported by the opponent-process theory of motivation (Solomon 
& Corbit, 1978), which suggests that reward-seeking (or in this case information-
seeking) reflects a motivation to maximize the presence of reward (or information), as 




The idea that information can be rewarding, is supported by findings in monkeys 
indicating that information shares similar behavioral and neurobiological properties as 
primary reward (Blanchard et al., 2015; Bromberg-Martin & Hikosaka, 2009, 2011). Also 
Gruber and colleagues (2014) and Kang and colleagues (2009) conceptualize curiosity 
as pleasurable and liked to reward anticipation in studies using trivia questions. At the 
same time, other work posits curiosity to be a fundamentally aversive state, with the 
induction of relief being associated with brain areas linked to aversive conditions and 
curiosity relief related to brain areas related to reward (Jepma et al., 2012). 
1.5.2 | Curiosity: an appetitive or an aversive drive?
In Chapter 5, we aimed to elucidate whether curiosity is an aversive or an appetitive 
drive. To this end, we used a similar lottery task as described for Chapter 2, 3 and 4. 
Thus, every lottery was associated with more or less uncertain gains or losses. We 
asked participants how happy they were that the lottery would be played (Experiment 
1) or how curious they were about the outcome of the lottery (Experiment 2). In this
way, we were able to investigate whether both curiosity as well as happiness are a 
function of uncertainty, and whether this differs between gains (positive events) and 
losses (negative events). If the curiosity-triggering state of uncertainty has appetitive 
properties, then people would be more curious as well as happier about lotteries with 
higher outcome uncertainty. However, if the curiosity-triggering state of uncertainty 
has aversive properties, then people would be more curious, but less happy about 
lotteries with higher outcome uncertainty.  
1.6 | The current thesis
The aim of the current thesis was to elucidate the cognitive and neural mechanisms of 
non-instrumental curiosity. This was done by means of a combination of behavioral 
experiments (Chapter 2, 4 and 5), functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI; 
Chapter 3) and positron emission tomography (PET; Chapter 6). 
1.6.1 | Task
The behavioral task used in all experiments consisted of a novel lottery paradigm. 
In this task, every trial represented a lottery, consisting of a vase with 20 marbles, 
either of which could be red or blue. The differently colored marbles were associated 
with different amount of points (Chapter 2 and 3) or monetary values (Chapter 4, 5 
and 6) that participants could either gain or lose. Participants were told that in every 











1lose the money associated with the selected marble. The participants simply had to 
indicate how curious they were about the outcome of the lottery by means of explicit 
self-report ratings (in all chapters) or more implicit willingness to wait decisions (in 
Chapter 2 and 4). The task was non-instrumental, meaning that participants had no way 
of influencing which marble would be selected for them. 
We independently manipulated the expected value of the lottery (i.e. the mean reward 
value contained in a lottery), the uncertainty associated with the lottery outcome (i.e. 
the variance or “spread” around the mean) and the valence of the outcome (i.e. whether 
lottery outcomes signaled gains or losses). As such, we were able to assess the motives 
underlying curiosity in a controlled and quantitative fashion. 
1.6.2 | Outline of the thesis
In Chapter 2, we aimed to investigate whether curiosity is a function of the uncertainty 
of the outcome, and whether this drive for information could go over and above 
the drive for explicit rewards. In every lottery, participants would gain an uncertain 
amount of points and had to indicate their curiosity explicitly (give a curiosity 
rating) or implicitly (willingness to wait decision). This allowed us to assess whether 
purposeless curiosity is driven by reward maximization (and thus as a function of the 
expected value of information) or by uncertainty reduction (and thus as a function of 
the uncertainty of information). 
Next, in Chapter 3, we aimed to investigate whether uncertainty-dependent curiosity 
can be observed in similar neural structures as explicit rewards. To this end, we used a 
similar lottery paradigm with explicit curiosity ratings to assess the neural constituents 
underlying curiosity using functional MRI. We focused on neural activity during the 
induction by curiosity by means of outcome uncertainty, as well as on neural activity 
elicited by the information updates obtained during curiosity relief.
In Chapter 4 we aimed to investigate whether the drive for information serves to 
update our current model of the world and, by looking at whether people are driven by 
uncertainty both in positive and negative contexts. In addition, we assessed whether 
participants indeed exhibit a preference for positive compared with negative belief 
updating (i.e. whether participants were more curious about gains compared with 
losses). We used a lottery paradigm in which participants would either gain or lose 
an uncertain amount of money in every trial. As such, we were able to assess whether 
curiosity about uncertain outcomes is modulated by the valence of the information 
(gains versus losses).  
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In Chapter 5, we took a closer look at the feelings associated with uncertainty-dependent 
curiosity by means of two behavioral experiments. We aimed to investigate whether 
curiosity can be casted as an aversive or rather an appetitive drive.  In Experiment 1, 
we used an adapted version of the lottery task, in which we asked for each lottery how 
happy participants were that the lottery would be played. In Experiment 2 we used 
a similar lottery task asking about people’s curiosity about the outcome as described 
above. If the curiosity-triggering state of uncertainty has appetitive properties, then 
greater curiosity would be accompanied by greater liking. According to this hypothesis, 
happiness and curiosity both increase with outcome uncertainty: People would be more 
curious as well as happier about lotteries with higher outcome uncertainty. However, if 
the curiosity-triggering state of uncertainty has aversive properties, then there would 
be a dissociation between curiosity and liking. Under this hypothesis, people would be 
more curious about lotteries with higher outcome uncertainty, while at the same time 
less happy when lotteries with higher outcome uncertainty are played. This allowed us 
to investigate whether curiosity can be casted as an aversive, or rather an appetitive 
drive. 
Based on previous evidence demonstrating a link between information prediction 
errors and dopamine neuronal firing rates (Bromberg-Martin & Hikosaka, 2009, 2011), 
we asked whether the drive to seek information varies with individual differences 
in dopamine transmission in Chapter 6. In the experimental session, participants 
performed the lottery task. In a separate session, participants underwent an [18F]DOPA 
PET scan to quantify their baseline dopamine synthesis capacity. Here, we aimed to 
investigate whether participant’s baseline dopamine synthesis capacity predicts the 
extent to which participants are curious, perhaps as a function of outcome uncertainty, 
outcome valence (gain/loss) and/or expected value. 
In Chapter 7 I provide a summary of the main findings, discuss the most relevant 
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Curiosity varies with uncertainty, but 
not with expected value of information 
This chapter is adapted from: 
van Lieshout, L.L.F., Vandenbroucke, A.R.E., Müller, N.C.J., Cools, R., & de Lange, F.P. 
(2018). Induction and relief of curiosity elicit parietal and frontal activity. The Journal of 




Curiosity is a basic biological drive, but little is known about its behavioral mechanisms. 
We can be curious about several types of information. On the one hand, curiosity is a 
function of the expected value of information, serving primarily to help us maximize 
reward. On the other hand, curiosity can be a function of the uncertainty of information, 
helping us to update what we know. In the current studies, we aimed to disentangle 
the contribution of information uncertainty and expected value of rewards to curiosity 
in humans. To this end, we designed a lottery task in which uncertainty and expected 
value of trial outcomes were manipulated independently and examined how behavioral 
measures of curiosity were modulated by these factors. Curiosity increased linearly with 
increased outcome uncertainty, both when curiosity was explicitly probed as well as 
when it was implicitly tested by people’s willingness to wait. Increased expected value, 
however, did not strongly relate to these curiosity measures. These results suggest that 
curiosity is monotonically related to the uncertainty about one’s current world model. 
This shows us that humans are driven by information and that this drive can go beyond 
the drive for reward.











2.1 | Introduction 
In daily life, we consume an enormous amount of information. Curiosity, defined as 
“the impulse towards better cognition” (James, 1899), and more contemporarily as 
“intrinsically motivated information-seeking” (Loewenstein, 1994; Oudeyer & Kaplan, 
2007) appears a basic biological drive, but little is known about the underlying behavioral 
mechanisms (Gottlieb, Oudeyer, Lopes, & Baranes, 2013; Kidd & Hayden, 2015). 
A distinction can be made between instrumental and non-instrumental curiosity, in which 
instrumental curiosity is the desire to explore and seek information to reach a goal or 
to maximize rewards in the immediate or longer term (cf. goal-directed exploration; 
Daw, O’Doherty, Dayan, Seymour, & Dolan, 2006). Interestingly, also in non-instrumental 
settings, in which resolution of uncertainty is not useful or even costly, animals still 
seek information (Blanchard, Hayden, & Bromberg-Martin, 2015; Bromberg-Martin & 
Hikosaka, 2009, 2011). For instance, monkeys choose to have outcomes of risky gambles 
revealed immediately, instead of remaining in a state of uncertainty when waiting for 
the outcome (Bromberg-Martin & Hikosaka, 2009, 2011).  This is the case even though 
receiving information is not instrumental, i.e. will not help them to improve performance 
or to obtain higher rewards. In fact, monkeys are willing to sacrifice a substantial 
amount (20% - 33%) of primary reward to get advance information (Blanchard et al., 
2015). Some researchers (Dinsmoor, 1983; Shannon & Weaver, 1949) have highlighted 
this phenomenon as an exemplary departure from normatively optimal (reward-guided) 
behavior (but see Beierholm & Dayan, 2010 for an alternative account).
Here, we aimed to elucidate the cognitive constituents of curiosity in humans. We 
designed a novel lottery task in which two potential sources of curiosity are manipulated 
independently: outcome uncertainty and expected value of the outcome. Consistent with 
previous experiments on observing behavior (Bromberg-Martin & Hikosaka, 2009, 2011), 
observing the outcome was designed to not have any impact on received rewards. As 
such, this passive observation paradigm allowed us to disentangle uncertainty from value 
accounts of observing behavior. On each trial, participants received a lottery with an 
uncertain outcome and associated monetary reward (Figure 2.1). We probed participants’ 
curiosity on each trial either explicitly (Experiment 1) or implicitly (Experiment 2) by 
investigating participants’ willingness to wait for the outcome (Kang et al., 2009; Marvin & 
Shohamy, 2016). We hypothesized that participants are particularly curious in situations 
of high uncertainty, because information then leads to a large belief update (information 
prediction error).
To preview, we found robust increases in curiosity with increasing outcome uncertainty, 
whereas expected value did not robustly modulate curiosity. These findings suggest that 
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curiosity can be conceptualized as a drive for information to improve one’s current world 
model and that this drive can go over and above the drive for rewards.
2.2 | Materials and Methods
2.2.1 | Participants
Twenty-four healthy individuals participated in Experiment 1, in which we explicitly 
probed curiosity (17 women, age 23.1 ± 3.8, mean ± SD). Another twenty-five healthy 
individuals participated in Experiment 2, in which we implicitly probed curiosity by 
investigating participants’ willingness to wait. One participant was excluded due to a 
lack of variation in responding (chose to wait in > 98% of all trials). Therefore, the final 
sample of Experiment 2 consisted of twenty-four participants (17 women, age 24.6 ± 
5.5, mean ± SD). Both experiments were approved by the local ethics committee (CMO 
Arnhem-Nijmegen, The Netherlands) under the general ethics approval (“Imaging Human 
Cognition”, CMO 2014/288) and the experiments were conducted in compliance with these 
guidelines. All participants gave written informed consent according to the declaration of 
Helsinki prior to participation.
2.2.2 | Procedure
Experiment 1 
Each trial started with an image of a vase containing twenty marbles (Figure 2.1). Each of 
the marbles could be either red or blue. In total, four vase configurations were possible: 
(1) 100% vases: all marbles had the same color, (2) 95%-5% vases: 19 marbles had one
color and 1 marble had the other color, (3) 75%-25% vases: 15 marbles had one color and 
5 marbles the other color, (4) 50-50% vases: 10 marbles had one color and 10 marbles the 
other color. Both colored marbles were associated with points participants could earn. The 
points for each of the marbles varied between 10 and 90 (in steps of 10). All combinations 
of points associated with red and blue marbles were possible. The participants were 
informed that on each trial, one marble would be selected from the vase and that they 
would be awarded with the points associated with this marble. The first screen, on 
which the vase, the marbles and the points associated with the marbles were depicted, 
was presented for 3000 ms. Then a blank screen was presented for 500 ms, followed 
by a response screen during which participants could indicate how curious they were 
about seeing the outcome of that trial (“How curious are you about the outcome?”). The 
curiosity scale ranged from 1 – 4. The response screen was presented until the participant 
responded, with a response limit of 4000 ms. The response screen was followed by a 











blank screen (500 ms) and an outcome screen (2000 ms). On each trial, participants had 
a 50% chance that their curiosity would be satisfied by seeing the outcome (curiosity 
relief) and a 50% chance that the outcome was withheld. This manipulation was explicitly 
instructed to subjects and it uncoupled curiosity responses from the actual receipt of the 
outcome (thus rendering Pavlovian bias accounts of our observing behavior less likely, 
Beierholm and Dayan, 2010). In the follow-up fMRI experiment (described in Chapter 3) 
it enabled us to investigate the neural consequences of curiosity relief (Curiosity Relief 
– Yes versus Curiosity Relief – No). The outcome screen depicted the vase, the marbles
and points associated with the marbles again, together with a box in which they saw the 
Figure 2.1
A  Schematic figure of Experiment 1. Participants saw a screen on which a vase with 20 marbles 
was depicted, either of which could be red or blue, and the points associated with these 
marbles. Participants were told that one of the marbles would be selected for them and that 
they would be awarded with the points associated with this marble. Next, participants indicated 
how curious they were about seeing the outcome of the vase (1 – 4). There was a 50% chance 
of seeing the outcome, regardless of the participants’ curiosity response. Importantly, a marble 
was selected in every trial and participants were awarded with the points associated with this 
marble, also if they would not see the outcome of a trial. See text for details on the timing of the 
experiment (see Procedure). 
B  Schematic figure of Experiment 2. The task was similar to Experiment 1, except that participants 
indicated whether they wanted to see the outcome of a trial or not. If they responded “No”, the 
outcome was not presented to them and if they responded “Yes” they had to wait an additional 
3 – 6 seconds before the outcome was presented to them. Still, a marble was selected in every 
trial and participants were awarded with the points associated with this marble, also if they 

























colored marble that was selected and how many points they earned. When the outcome 
was not presented, participants saw a black marble instead of a colored marble and 
question marks at the location of the number of points. This way, the amount of visual 
input was roughly comparable between presented and not presented outcomes. After a 
trial ended, there was a blank screen with a jittered duration between 1000 and 2000 ms 
(uniformly distributed). Importantly, participants had no way of influencing whether they 
would observe the outcome of a particular trial, or what the outcome of that trial would 
be. However, participants knew that a marble would be selected in every trial and that 
they would be awarded with the points associated with that marble, even if the outcome 
was not presented. They were told that the total amount of points they earned in total 
would be converted to a monetary bonus at the end of the experiment. 
The trials were pseudo-randomized such that the same vase configuration was never 
presented more than 4 trials in a row. Each vase configuration was presented on 153 
occasions, except for the 100% vases which were only presented 18 times. These 100% 
trials were included as a control to check participants’ compliance to the task; we expected 
people not to be curious about trials of which they already knew the outcome. In total, the 
participants completed 477 trials, divided in 9 blocks of 53 trials. After each block, the 
participants were instructed to take a short break if they wanted. The experiment lasted 
~ 75 minutes in total.
Experiment 2 
In Experiment 2 we aimed to investigate participants’ curiosity more implicitly by means 
of testing their willingness to wait to see the outcome. We used willingness to wait 
because it is a well-established measure of the motivational value of an item (Frederick, 
Loewenstein, & O’Donoghue, 2002), which has been previously linked to curiosity (Kang 
et al., 2009; Marvin & Shohamy, 2016). The trial setup for Experiment 2 was similar to 
Experiment 1 (Figure 2.1). The start of the trial was identical, but instead of giving a 
curiosity response, participants indicated whether they wanted to see the outcome of that 
trial (“Do you want to see the outcome?”) by pressing either “Yes” or “No”. If they pressed 
“No”, a blank screen was presented briefly (500 ms), followed by a screen on which the 
outcome was not presented (2000 ms). If they pressed “Yes”, they saw a blank screen that 
was jittered for an additional 3000 - 6000 ms (uniformly distributed) before they saw 
a screen on which the outcome was presented (2000 ms). The outcome screens looked 
identical to the outcome screens in Experiment 1. The next trial started after a jittered 
inter-trial interval between 1000 and 2000 ms (uniformly distributed). The trials were 
again pseudo-randomized in a way that the same vase configuration was never presented 
in more than 4 trials in a row. The total willingness to wait experiment consisted of 261 
trials. Each vase configuration was presented on 81 occasions except for the 100% trials, 











which were only presented 18 times. The total duration of the experiment depended on 
for how many trials the participants indicated that they were willing to wait to see the 
outcome. Again, participants were told that that a marble would be selected on every 
trial and that they would be awarded with the points associated with that marble, also 
when they decided not to wait to see the outcome. The total amount of points they earned 
would be converted to a monetary bonus at the end of the experiment. 
2.2.3 | Experimental design and statistical analysis 
Experiment 1 
The behavioral analyses of Experiment 1 were performed using MATLAB (The MathWorks, 
RRID:SCR_001622) and SPSS (RRID:SCR_002865). We investigated whether there was 
a relationship between outcome uncertainty (OU) and the curiosity ratings, as well as 
between expected value (EV) and the curiosity ratings. In order to do so, a value of OU was 
calculated for each trial by multiplying the Shannon Entropy by the absolute difference 
between the red (x1) and blue (x2) marble points: 
OU(X) = (-∑i=1 P(xi)log2 P(xi))*|x1-x2| Equation 1
where P(xi) denotes the probability that a marble (i) would be drawn. Thereby, OU 
reflected a combination of two types of variance. The first type is the variance in the 
division of the marbles, indicated by the Shannon Entropy. The Shannon Entropy is a 
measure of the uncertainty of the variable given the probabilities and it quantifies 
the amount of information a trial contains (see Bestmann et al., 2008; Shannon, 1948). 
The second type of variance is the variance in points associated with the marbles. This 
variance is indicated by the absolute difference between the points associated with both 
marbles. In turn, EV values were calculated (Equation 2) by the sum of the probability that 
a red marble would be drawn (p1) multiplied by the number of points associated with the 
red marble (x1) and the probability that a blue marble would be drawn (p2)  multiplied by 
the number of points associated with the blue marble (x2): 
EV(X) = ∑i=1 xi pi Equation 2
Thereby, EV reflects the expected value of reward contained in a trial. We investigated 
whether there was a relationship between OU and/or EV and the curiosity ratings using a 
Univariate General Linear Model (GLM) with dependent variable “Curiosity Rating (1 – 4)” 





In order to determine whether OU is a better predictor of curiosity than entropy 
or absolute difference alone, we computed correlations between OU and curiosity, 
absolute difference and curiosity and entropy and curiosity. To formally assess whether 
both absolute difference and entropy contribute to curiosity, we performed a model 
comparison in which we compared a model in which absolute difference, entropy and 
EV were included as within-subject factors (Model 1) to a model in which only absolute 
difference and EV (Model 2) or only entropy and EV (Model 3) were included as within-
subject factors. We modeled the data using the clmm function of the ordinal package 
(Christensen, 2015) in R (R Core Team, 2013; RRID:SCR_001905). Models included all main 
effects and contained a full random effects structure (Barr, 2013; Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & 
Tily, 2013). Model comparison was conducted using the anova function in R.
Experiment 2
For Experiment 2, we investigated whether there was a relationship between OU and/or 
EV and whether participants were willing to wait to see the outcome of a trial. These data 
were analyzed using a binomial logistic regression with dependent variable “Willingness 
to wait (Yes/No)” and independent variables “Participant”, “OU” and “EV”. Statistical 
significance of the model was assessed using χ2 and the amount of variance explained 
by the model was estimated using Nagelkerke R2. The values for odds ratio (OR) for each 
independent variable were used to determine the directionality of any significant effects. 
2.2.4 | Data visualisation 
Experiment 1 
To visualise the behavioral data, the values of OU and EV were divided in percentile 
bins, such that the 10th percentile represents the 10% lowest values of either OU or EV, 
the 20th percentile represents the 10% - 20% of the lowest values, etc. This was done to 
enable us to visually compare the effects of OU and EV. To plot the data, we performed 
the same analysis on the binned data as described above (see Experimental Design and 
Statistical Analysis – Experiment 1). However, to isolate the contributions of OU and EV 
to curiosity, we added “Participant” and “EV” as covariates to visualise the effects of 
“OU” on curiosity. The same analysis was performed to visualise the effects of “EV” on 
curiosity, but this time “Participant” and “OU” were added as covariates. This provided a 
clear view of the independent effects of OU and EV, because even though OU and EV were 
manipulated independently and showed no linear correlation with each other, they did 
show a quadratic correlation such that middle values of OU were associated with higher 
values of EV. These analyses were performed for each participant separately and the 
mean curiosity scores for each percentile were calculated by averaging over participants.












To visualise the data for the willingness to wait study, the values of OU and EV were 
divided in percentile bins as described for Experiment 1. To plot the data, we used 
a Univariate General Linear Model (GLM) with dependent variable “% Willingness to 
wait”, random factor “OU” and covariates “Participant” and “EV”. The same analysis was 
performed to visualise the relationship between EV and willingness to wait, but this time 
“EV” was added as random factor and “Participant” and “OU” as covariates. Again, these 
analyses were performed for each participant separately and the mean willingness to 
wait scores for each percentile were calculated by averaging over participants.
2.3 | Results
Experiment 1  
The aim of Experiment 1 was to investigate whether and how participants’ curiosity was 
modulated by outcome uncertainty (OU) and expected value (EV). Curiosity strongly and 
monotonically increased with increasing OU (F1,15 = 103.07, p <.001). Conversely, there 
was no significant modulation of curiosity by EV (F1,87 = 1.25, p = .15; Figure 2.2). There 
was an interaction between OU and EV (F1,68 = 1.91, p < .001), such that the relationship 
between OU and curiosity was stronger for medium values of EV, compared with high 
and low values. This is likely due to the design of the experiment, which had a restricted 
range of OU values for extreme values of EV, such that extreme values of EV were always 
associated with low values of OU. 
We next investigated whether OU predicts curiosity better than entropy or the absolute 
difference between the marble points alone. The correlation between OU and curiosity 
was higher (r = .698) than the correlation between absolute difference and curiosity (r = 
.523) and the correlation between entropy and curiosity (r = .464). This suggests that OU 
is a better predictor for curiosity than absolute difference or entropy alone, each of which 
are also strongly correlated with curiosity. To formally assess whether both absolute 
difference and entropy contributed significantly to curiosity, we compared a model in 
which both absolute difference and entropy as well as EV were included as within-subject 
factors (Model 1) to a model in which only absolute difference and EV (Model 2) or entropy 
and EV (Model 3) were included as within-subject factors. Indeed, we found that Model 1 
(AIC = 19802) explained significantly more variance in the curiosity responses than Model 
2 (AIC =25702; LR.stat(5) = 5910.1, p < .001) or than Model 3 (AIC =25899; LR.stat(5) = 




 Behavioral results of the experiments. The x-axis depicts percentile bins of the values of OU 
(in red) and EV (in blue). The y-axis depicts the mean curiosity rating (A) or the percentage 
willingness to wait (B) for each percentile of OU and EV. In all panels, the effects of EV on curiosity 
are controlled for OU, and the effects of OU on curiosity are controlled for EV. In Experiment 1 (A), 
curiosity monotonically increased with increasing OU, but there was no significant modulation of 
curiosity by EV. This was confirmed by the results of Experiment 2 (B), in which the percentage 
willingness to wait increased with increasing OU, but not with increasing EV. For details on 
behavioral data visualisation see Data visualisation. Error bars depict the standard error of the 
mean (SEM). 
Experiment 2 
In Experiment 2, we investigated whether participants would be more willing to wait to 
see the outcomes of trials they indicated to be more curious about in the first experiment. 
In other words: were people willing to sacrifice time in order to satisfy their curiosity?
The results show that people were more willing to wait (χ2(3) = 2944.29, p < .001, 
Nagelkerke pseudo R2 = .505) when OU was higher (Odd’s Ratio = 1.11, p < .001), but 
that willingness to wait was not modulated by EV (Odd’s Ratio = 1.00, p = .98). These 
results are consistent with Experiment 1, showing that people not only indicated to be 
more curious when OU is higher, but that they were also more willing to wait to see 
this outcome (Figure 2.2). Similarly, people were not more willing to wait for trials with 
high compared with low EV, supporting the findings of Experiment 1. In Experiment 1, 
there was a significant interaction effect between OU and EV on curiosity. Therefore, we 
investigated whether adding the interaction in this model would improve the model-fit. 
However, the model did not get better by adding the interaction between OU and EV (χ2(4) 
= 2.48, p = .12). This indicates that the effects of OU on willingness to wait did not differ 
between different values of EV.















































2.4 | Discussion 
Here, we examined the cognitive constituents of curiosity. We found that curiosity 
and willingness to wait increased with increasing uncertainty about a lottery outcome. 
Conversely, curiosity was not related to the expected value of lotteries. As such, even though 
information did not help participants to perform better or to maximize rewards, individuals 
were more curious about outcomes that provided them with a larger information update 
(i.e. when outcome uncertainty was higher). Experiment 1 goes beyond studies on curiosity 
that indicated that humans and animals seek information to reduce their uncertainty 
(Berlyne, 1962; Bromberg-Martin & Hikosaka, 2009, 2011; Lieberman, Cathro, Nichol, & 
Watson, 1997), by showing that even in a passive observation task, humans show a drive 
towards gaining information and reducing uncertainty about what will happen. 
One might argue that the findings of Experiment 1 reflect participants’ compliance with 
task demands (i.e. showing higher curiosity about uncertain outcomes because they 
felt like this was expected of them). To minimize demand characteristics, we performed 
Experiment 2 in which curiosity was probed implicitly by means of participants’ 
willingness to wait for the outcome. We found that participants’ willingness to wait 
increased with increasing outcome uncertainty, indicating that individuals are willing to 
“pay” with time for information to satisfy their curiosity. This supports the findings of 
Experiment 1 and makes it less likely that demand characteristics explain our results. 
Critically, this suggests that a preference for information is present even when receiving 
information is costly (Roper & Zentall, 1999) and rewards have to be sacrificed (Blanchard 
et al., 2015; Stagner & Zentall, 2010). This indicates that information gain may be 
intrinsically valuable and strengthens the hypothesis that it is evolutionarily adaptive to 
reduce our uncertainty about the world (Gottlieb et al., 2013; Loewenstein, 1994).
Unlike the present study, prior work on human curiosity using trivia questions (e.g. 
Gruber, Gelman, & Ranganath, 2014; Marvin & Shohamy, 2016) suggested that individuals 
are mostly curious about information of intermediate uncertainty (Kang et al., 2009). 
Individuals appeared to be mostly curious about questions about which they exhibit 
intermediate levels of confidence compared with questions about which they were 
very confident or not confident at all. This contrasts with our observation of a linear 
relationship between uncertainty and curiosity. However, it might reflect that participants 
in previous work were not curious about questions with highest uncertainty (i.e. lowest 
confidence), because they were simply not interested in the topics of these questions. In 
other words, there might be a correlation between one’s knowledge and one’s curiosity 
about the subject, confounding the relationship between curiosity and uncertainty.  Here, 
this confound was avoided by experimentally manipulating outcome uncertainty in a 
quantitative and controlled manner. 
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Somewhat surprisingly, we found no effect of expected value on curiosity. Perhaps our 
reward manipulation was not effective and rewards did not yield sufficient interest, 
because individuals could not maximize rewards or there was no opportunity to make an 
explicit choice. Alternatively, or additionally, the expected value computation might have 
been too demanding in the behavioral experiments. 
This study sheds light on the constituents of curiosity by demonstrating that outcome 
uncertainty drives curiosity strongly. These findings point towards a fundamentally 
adaptive role of curiosity as a drive to improve one’s current world model. 
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Induction and relief of curiosity elicit 
parietal and frontal activity 
This chapter is adapted from: 
van Lieshout, L.L.F., Vandenbroucke, A.R.E., Müller, N.C.J., Cools, R., & de Lange, F.P. 
(2018). Induction and relief of curiosity elicit parietal and frontal activity. The Journal of 




Humans are curious by nature, but still little is known about the neural mechanisms 
underlying human curiosity. A strong driver of curiosity is the uncertainty of 
information, which helps us to update what we know. In the current study we aimed to 
elucidate neural constituents of curiosity in humans. To this end, we designed a lottery 
task in which uncertainty about the outcome and expected values were manipulated 
independently and we examined how neural activity and behavioural measures were 
modulated by these factors. Again, we found that curiosity increased with increased 
outcome uncertainty. Also expected value was related to these curiosity measures, 
but this relationship was markedly smaller than the relationship between outcome 
uncertainty and curiosity. Neuroimaging results showed greater BOLD response with 
increasing outcome uncertainty in parietal cortex at the time of curiosity induction. 
Outcome updating when curiosity was relieved resulted in an increased signal in 
the insula, orbitofrontal cortex, and parietal cortex. Furthermore, the insula showed 
a linear increase corresponding to the size of the information update. These results 
suggest that curiosity is monotonically related to the uncertainty about one's current 
world model, the induction and relief of which are associated with activity in parietal 
and insular cortices, respectively.











3.1 | Introduction 
We receive an enormous amount of information from our surroundings. Curiosity 
towards obtaining this information appears to be a basic biological drive, but still little 
is known about the underlying neural mechanisms (Gottlieb, Oudeyer, Lopes, & Baranes, 
2013; Kidd & Hayden, 2015). Strikingly, the drive for information can be so prevalent 
that animals seek information in non-instrumental settings (Blanchard, Hayden, & 
Bromberg-Martin, 2015; Bromberg-Martin & Hikosaka, 2009, 2011). For instance, 
monkeys choose to have outcomes of risky gambles revealed immediately, instead of 
remaining in a state of uncertainty when waiting for the outcome (Bromberg-Martin 
& Hikosaka, 2009, 2011). This is the case even though receiving information is not 
instrumental, meaning that the information will not help them to improve performance 
or to obtain higher rewards. In fact, monkeys are willing to sacrifice a substantial 
amount (20% - 33%) of primary reward to get advance information (Blanchard et al., 
2015). In Chapter 2, we demonstrated that human participants show a similar drive for 
information, by showing that curiosity is robustly modulated by outcome uncertainty. 
However, little is known about the neural mechanisms underlying this drive for 
information.
Here, we aimed to elucidate neural constituents of curiosity in humans. We used 
the same lottery task as described in Chapter 2 in which outcome uncertainty and 
expected value of the outcome were manipulated independently. Again, observing 
the outcome was designed not to have any impact on the received rewards, so that 
this passive observation paradigm allowed us to disentangle uncertainty from value 
accounts of observing behavior. On each trial, participants received a lottery with an 
uncertain outcome and associated monetary reward (Figure 3.1). As in Chapter 2, we 
hypothesized that participants are particularly curious in situations of high uncertainty, 
because information then leads to a large belief update (information prediction error). 
Furthermore, using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), we examined 
which brain areas were modulated by outcome uncertainty and expected value upon 
lottery presentation, and their updates upon outcome presentation. We hypothesized 
that during lottery presentation, brain regions associated with uncertainty or risk, 
such as insular cortex (Critchley, Mathias, & Dolan, 2001; Jepma, Verdonschot, van 
Steenbergen, Rombouts, & Nieuwenhuis, 2012; Paulus, Rogalsky, Simmons, Feinstein, 
& Stein, 2003; Preuschoff, Bossaerts, & Quartz, 2006; Preuschoff, Quartz, & Bossaerts, 
2008) and parietal cortex (Foley, Kelly, Mhatre, Lopes, & Gottlieb, 2017; Huettel, Song, 
& Mccarthy, 2005), would be modulated by outcome uncertainty. During outcome 
presentation, we expected increased activity in brain regions involved in curiosity 
relief and information updating, such as the insula (Jepma et al., 2012; Preuschoff et 
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al., 2008), orbitofrontal cortex (Blanchard et al., 2015; Jepma et al., 2012) and ventral 
striatum (Jepma et al., 2012; Wittmann, Daw, Seymour, & Dolan, 2008b). In addition, 
we expected activity in reward-related areas (e.g. ventral striatum) to be modulated 
as a function of expected value (Knutson, Taylor, Kaufman, Peterson, & Glover, 2005; 
O’Doherty, 2004) and reward prediction error (Bayer & Glimcher, 2005; Daw & Doya, 
2006; Schultz, Dayan, & Montague, 1997).
To preview, we found robust increases in curiosity with increasing outcome uncertainty, 
replicating the findings described in Chapter 2. Additionally, we found a modulation 
of curiosity by expected value, even though this modulation was markedly smaller 
than the modulation by outcome uncertainty. Curiosity induction through outcome 
uncertainty generated activity in parietal cortex, whereas its relief was associated with 
increased activity in a network comprising the insula, orbitofrontal cortex and parietal 
cortex. Furthermore, we found a parametric increase in insular activity with increasing 
information prediction error. Together, these findings suggest that curiosity can be 
conceptualized as a desire to improve one’s current world model and identify neural 
constituents that accompany this desire.
3.2 | Materials and Methods
3.2.1 | Participants
Twenty-eight healthy individuals participated in the experiment, in which we 
explicitly probed curiosity while non-invasively recording neural activity using fMRI. 
All participants were right-handed, screened for MR compatibility and had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision. Two participants were excluded due to a technical problem 
of the MRI scanner. One participant was excluded because of too many missed trials 
(> 10% of all trials) and one participant was excluded due to self-reported difficulties 
viewing the screen. The final sample consisted of 24 participants (18 women, age 
24.1 ± 3.2, mean ± SD). The experiment was approved by the local ethics committee 
(CMO Arnhem-Nijmegen, The Netherlands) under the general ethics approval (“Imaging 
Human Cognition”, CMO 2014/288) and was conducted in compliance with these 
guidelines. All participants gave written informed consent according to the declaration 
of Helsinki prior to participation.












Figure 3.1 | Schematic figure of the experiment
Participants saw a screen on which a vase with 20 marbles was depicted, either of which could 
be red or blue, and the points associated with these marbles. Participants were told that one 
of the marbles would be selected for them and that they would be awarded with the points 
associated with this marble. Next, participants indicated how curious they were about seeing 
the outcome of the vase (1 – 4). There was a 50% chance of seeing the outcome, regardless of the 
participants’ curiosity response. Importantly, a marble was selected in every trial and participants 
were awarded with the points associated with this marble, also if they would not see the outcome 
of a trial. See text for details on the timing of the experiment (see Procedure). 
The trial setup for the fMRI study was similar to the setup of Experiment 1 described in 
Chapter 2 (Figure 3.1), except that the timing was adjusted to allow for analyses based 
on the BOLD response. First, participants saw a screen on which the vase containing 
the marbles and the points associated with the marbles was presented (4000 ms). 
Next, participants saw a screen during which they could indicate their curiosity for 
the outcome on a scale from 1 – 4. This screen was presented for 2500 ms. Then there 
was a blank screen presented for a jittered duration between 2500 and 4500 ms 
(uniformly distributed). After the blank screen, participants saw a screen on which the 
outcome of a trial was either presented or not presented (50% chance) and this screen 
was displayed for 2000 ms. When the outcome was presented, they saw the colored 
marble in the middle of the screen and below that the number of points the participant 
earned. When the outcome was not presented, they saw a black marble in the middle 
of the screen with question marks at the location where otherwise the number of 
points would have been presented. Then there was an inter-trial interval consisting of 
a blank screen which was presented for a jittered duration between 3500 and 4500 
ms (uniformly distributed). After every 9 trials, the duration of the blank screen was 
prolonged to be jittered between 9500 and 10500 ms (uniformly distributed). From 
these prolonged blank screens, a baseline was estimated. Moreover, only 75%-25% 
and 50%-50% vases were used to reduce differences in visual processing between the 
different vase configurations. The participants completed a total of 180 trials divided 
in 4 sessions of 45 trials. After each session, the participants were able to take a 












participants knew that they had no way of influencing whether they would observe 
the outcome of a trial or not and what that outcome would be. Again, a marble would 
be selected in every trial and all the points would be added together and converted to 
a monetary bonus at the end of the experiment. After functional image acquisition, an 
anatomical image was acquired. 
3.2.3 | fMRI acquisition and preprocessing
Functional images were acquired using a multiband imaging sequence (TR = 769 ms, TE= 
39 ms, 54 transversal slices, voxel size of 2.4 x 2.4 x 2.4 mm, multiband acceleration 
factor 6, 52° flip angle). Using the AutoAlign head software by Siemens, we ensured 
a similar FOV tilt across participants. Anatomical images were acquired using a T1-
weigted MP-RAGE sequence, using a GRAPPA acceleration factor of 2 (TR = 2300 ms, TE 
= 3.03 ms, voxel size 1 x 1 x 1 mm, 192 transversal slices, 8° flip angle). 
fMRI data preprocessing was carried out using FSL (RRID:SCR_002823) and SPM8 (RRID: 
SCR_007037). The first seven volumes of each run were discarded to correct for T1 
equilibration. The following pre-statistics processing was applied; motion correction 
using MCFLIRT (Jenkinson, Bannister, Brady, & Smith, 2002); non-brain removal using 
BET (Smith, 2002); spatial smoothing using a Gaussian kernel of FWHM 6.0 mm; grand-
mean intensity normalisation of the entire 4D dataset by a single multiplicative factor. 
Registration to high resolution structural images was carried out using FLIRT (Jenkinson 
et al., 2002; Jenkinson & Smith, 2001). Registration from high resolution structural to 
standard space was then further refined using FNIRT nonlinear registration (Andersson, 
Jenkinson, Smith, & Andersson, 2007a, 2007b). Next, ICA-AROMA (Pruim et al., 2015) 
was used to reduce motion-induced signal variations in the fMRI data after which the 
data were high-pass filtered at 1/100 Hz. Finally, data were normalized to standard 
space and further analysed using SPM8.
3.2.4 | Experimental design and statistical analyses
Behavioural analyses 
For the behavioral data of this experiment we performed the same analyses as for 
Experiment 1 described in Chapter 2 using MATLAB (The MathWorks, RRID:SCR_001622) 
and SPSS (RRID:SCR_002865). More specifically, we investigated whether there was a 
relationship between outcome uncertainty (OU) and the curiosity ratings, as well as 
between expected value (EV) and the curiosity ratings. In order to do so, a value of 
OU was calculated for each trial by multiplying the Shannon Entropy by the absolute 
difference between the red (x1) and blue (x2) marble points: 











OU(X) = (-∑i=1 P(xi)log2 P(xi))*|x1-x2| Equation 1
where P(xi) denotes the probability that a marble (i) would be drawn. Thereby, OU 
reflected a combination of two types of variance. The first type is the variance in the 
division of the marbles, indicated by the Shannon Entropy. The Shannon Entropy is 
a measure of the uncertainty of the variable given the probabilities and it quantifies 
the amount of information a trial contains (see Bestmann et al., 2008; Shannon, 1948). 
The second type of variance is the variance in points associated with the marbles. 
This variance is indicated by the absolute difference between the points associated 
with both marbles. In turn, EV values were calculated (Equation 2) by the sum of the 
probability that a red marble would be drawn (p1) multiplied by the number of points 
associated with the red marble (x1) and the probability that a blue marble would be 
drawn (p2)  multiplied by the number of points associated with the blue marble (x2): 
EV(X) = ∑i=1 xi pi Equation 2
Thereby, EV reflects the expected value of reward contained in a trial. We investigated 
whether there was a relationship between OU and/or EV and the curiosity ratings using 
a Univariate General Linear Model (GLM) with dependent variable “Curiosity Rating (1 – 
4)” and random factors “Participant”, “OU” and “EV”. 
Behavioral data visualization 
Behavioral data visualization was done in the same way as for Experiment 1 described 
in Chapter 2 (see Data visualisation). The values of OU and EV were divided in percentile 
bins, such that the 10th percentile represents the 10% lowest values of either OU or EV, 
the 20th percentile represents the 10% - 20% of the lowest values, etc. This was done to 
enable us to visually compare the effects of OU and EV. To plot the data, we performed 
the same analysis on the binned data as described above (see Experimental Design 
and Statistical Analyses – Behavioral analyses). However, to isolate the contributions of 
OU and EV to curiosity, we added “Participant” and “EV” as covariates to visualize the 
effects of “OU” on curiosity. The same analysis was performed to visualize the effects 
of “EV” on curiosity, but this time “Participant” and “OU” were added as covariates. 
This provided a clear view of the independent effects of OU and EV, because even 
though OU and EV were manipulated independently and showed no linear correlation 
with each other, they did show a quadratic correlation such that middle values of 
OU were associated with higher values of EV. These analyses were performed for 
each participant separately and the mean curiosity scores for each percentile were 





fMRI BOLD analyses 
For each subject, data was modeled using an event-related GLM. The first regressor 
modeled the period when the vase was presented, serving to induce curiosity in the 
participants (Curiosity Induction), and had a duration of 4000 ms. The second and third 
regressor modeled the moment when the outcome of a trial was either presented or 
not presented and thereby relieved (or not) curiosity in the participants (Curiosity 
Relief – Yes / No). Both regressors had a duration of 2000 ms. The fourth regressor 
represented the moment the participants pressed a button to indicate their level of 
curiosity (Button press) and was modeled as a stick function. The fifth regressor was 
the baseline (Baseline), which started after every 9 trials when the prolonged blank 
screen was presented. The duration of this regressor was the duration that the blank 
screen was presented. All regressors were convolved with a canonical haemodynamic 
response function (HRF; Friston et al., 1998).
For each trial, values for OU and EV were calculated (see Experimental Design and 
Statistical Analyses – Behavioral analyses) and simultaneously included as parametric 
modulations of activity during the Curiosity Induction period in the GLM. To this end, 
the unit height HRF of the Curiosity Induction regressor was convolved with vectors of 
parametric weights that reflected the trial-by-trial fluctuations of OU and EV. OU and 
EV were used as parametric modulators at the moment of Curiosity Induction, because 
this was the moment when participants process the vase and when they could make 
an estimation of the uncertainty of the outcome of a trial (OU) and how much they will 
approximately earn in that trial (EV). OU was included as the first parametric modulator 
and EV as the second parametric modulator, such that EV was orthogonalized with 
respect to OU. The correlation between OU and EV was zero (by design), so the 
orthogonalization did not affect the EV regressor.
Furthermore, at the moment of trial outcome (Curiosity Relief), we looked at which 
brain areas respond more strongly to receiving information about the outcome than to 
not receiving this information and vice versa. We did so by investigating which brain 
areas were active for the Curiosity Relief contrast (Curiosity Relief – Yes > Curiosity 
Relief – No) and which brain areas were active for the opposite contrast. We used a 
primary voxel threshold of p < .001 (uncorrected). Inference was based on a cluster-
level correction of p < .05 (Family-Wise Error, FWE).
To assess residual curiosity-related activity modulations during curiosity induction, 
after controlling for OU, we modeled the data using another event-related GLM. The 
GLM was similar to the GLM described above, except that we included an additional 
parametric modulator “Curiosity Rating” during the Curiosity Induction period. This 











parametric modulator reflected the curiosity rating (1 – 4) that the participants gave 
in each trial and was included after the parametric modulator for OU. In this way, 
the parametric modulator for Curiosity Rating was orthogonalized with respect to 
the parametric modulator for OU and only reflected brain areas that encode residual 
curiosity variability over and above OU.  
ROI analyses 
Additional to the whole brain fMRI analyses, we defined regions of interest (ROIs) 
based on their significant overall activity modulation during the Curiosity Relief 
period, using the SPM toolbox MarsBaR (Brett et al., 2002; RRID:SCR_009605). The 
rationale for selecting ROIs based on the Curiosity Relief contrast (Curiosity Relief – Yes 
> Curiosity Relief – No) was that these regions responded more strongly to receiving
information about the outcome than to not receiving this information, indicating 
that they might play a role in processing information about the outcome. We aimed 
to investigate whether these regions play a role in processing the extent to which 
participants received an update of information (information prediction error) and 
reward (reward prediction error). The ROIs based on the opposite contrast (Curiosity 
Relief – No > Curiosity Relief – Yes) respond stronger to not receiving information 
about the outcome compared with receiving this information. We aimed to investigate 
whether these regions play a role in processing the extent to which participants were 
left with uncertainty about what the outcome would have been (which we refer to as 
negative information prediction error, see below).
To investigate whether there was a modulation of activity as a function of information 
and/or reward prediction error effects in these ROIs, we calculated values for the 
reward prediction error (RPE), the information prediction error when the outcome was 
presented (IPErelief) and the information prediction error when the outcome was not 
presented (IPEno relief). The RPE (Equation 3) is the discrepancy between the number of 
points the participant received (xshown) on a given trial (X) and the number of points 
the participant expected to receive (EV). The RPE was positive when the participant 
received more points than expected and negative when the participant received less 
points than expected. Note that when the outcome was not presented, there was no 
value for RPE.
RPE(X) = xshown – EV(X) Equation 3
Besides information about the reward, participants get an update of information when 
the outcome was presented (when they know which marble was selected for them; 
IPErelief; Equation 4). 
CHAPTER 3
58
IPErelief (X) = –ln(P(xshown)) * |x1-x2 | Equation 4
IPErelief reflects the amount of information that the participant received when being 
presented with the outcome of a trial. It is calculated by means of the negative 
natural log of the probability that the shown outcome would be presented P(xshown). 
This provides a measure of the information content of the outcome given the 
probabilities. Note that the outcome will lead to a larger information update when the 
probability that the shown outcome would be selected was lower (see also Shannon, 
1948). This value is than multiplied by the absolute difference between the red (x1) 
and blue (x2) marble points. The absolute difference is a reflection of the variance 
in points associated with the marbles: the higher this variance, the more uncertain 
participants were about the outcome and thus the larger the update of information 
was when participants were presented with the outcome. On the contrary, when the 
outcome is not presented, participants get no update of information and they remain 
uncertain about which marble was selected for them (IPEno relief). Therefore, the IPEno 
relief was calculated as a function of OU. It reflects that the more uncertain participants 
were at the beginning of a trial, the more uncertainty will remain after not seeing the 
outcome (Equation 5). Here, OU(X) reflects the outcome uncertainty of a given trial X 
(Equation 1).
IPEno relief (X) = OU(X) * -1 Equation 5
Note that the value of IPErelief was always positive and the value of IPEno relief was always 
negative. In other words: when the outcome was presented, IPE was positive and when 
the outcome was not presented IPE was negative. 
The values of RPE, IPErelief and IPEno relief were simultaneously included as parametric 
weights for Curiosity Relief in the GLM. The unit height of “Curiosity Relief - Yes” 
was convolved with vectors of parametric weights that reflected the trial-by-trial 
fluctuations of IPErelief and RPE. Note that IPErelief was included as the first parametric 
modulator and RPE as the second parametric modulator. As such, RPE is orthogonalized 
with respect to IPErelief. Since the correlation between IPErelief and RPE is low by design 
(r = 0.019), this orthogonalization had little influence on the results for RPE. The same 
was done for “Curiosity Relief - No”, but then with a vector of parametric weights 
reflecting the fluctuations of IPEno relief. Note again that no parametric weights for RPE 
could be calculated when no outcome is presented, since there is no update about the 
reward participants received. 
For each of the significant ROIs found for the Curiosity Relief contrast, we tested the 
parameters for RPE, IPErelief and IPEno relief against 0 using one-sample t-tests. The same 











was done for ROIs that were selected based on the opposite contrast (Curiosity Relief – 
No > Curiosity Relief - Yes).
Finally, given our specific hypothesis specified in the introduction, that reward-
related areas (e.g. ventral striatum) would be active as a function of expected value, 
reward prediction error and possibly also as a function of information updating, we 
investigated mean extracted signal from an a priori defined ROI in the ventral striatum 
(with MarsBaR, Brett et al., 2002; RRID:SCR_009605). This ROI was selected from a 
prior resting state MRI study in which the striatum was parcellated into (anatomically 
plausible) subregions in a functional data-driven manner, based on intrastriatal 
functional connectivity analyses that correlated each striatal voxel with all other 
striatal voxels (Piray et al., 2015). Within the ventral striatum, we investigated the 
parametric modulation effects of OU, EV, RPE, IPErelief and IPEno relief. We tested the 
parameters for these contrasts against 0 using one-sample t-tests.
3.3 | Results
3.3.1 | Behavioural results
Figure 3.2 | Behavioral results of the experiment
The x-axis depicts percentile bins of the values of OU (in red) and EV (in blue). The y-axis depicts 
the mean curiosity rating. Note that the effects of EV on curiosity are controlled for OU, and 
the effects of OU on curiosity are controlled for EV. Curiosity increased with increasing OU and 
also with increasing EV, although the magnitude of the modulation by EV was markedly smaller. 
curiosity increased with increasing OU, but also with increasing EV, although the magnitude of 
the modulation by EV was markedly smaller. For details on behavioral data visualisation (see 
Experimental Design and Statistical Analyses - Behavioral data visualization). Error bars depict the 
standard error of the mean (SEM). 

















As in Experiment 1 described in Chapter 2, curiosity increased with increasing OU (F1,14 
= 69.87, p < .001; Figure 3.2), replicating the finding of this experiment. In the current 
experiment, however, curiosity also increased with increasing EV (F1,30 = 3.26, p < .001; 
Figure 3.2), although the magnitude of the modulation was markedly smaller. There was 
also an interaction between OU and EV (F1,61 = 3.00, p < .001), such that the relationship 
between OU and curiosity was stronger for medium values of EV, compared with high 
and low values. Again, this is likely due to the design of the experiment, which had a 
restricted range of OU values for extreme values of EV, such that extreme values of EV 
were always associated with low values of OU.
3.3.2 | Neuroimaging results
Curiosity Induction 
First, we examined activity when curiosity was induced (during vase presentation) as 
a function of OU and EV. There was one cluster that showed a significant increase in 
activity with increasing OU, located in the left inferior parietal lobule (Table 3.1, see 3.7 
Supplement; Figure 3.3). Somewhat surprisingly, there was a large network of regions 
that showed a significant increase in activity with decreasing OU (Table 3.1, see 3.7 
Supplement; Figure 3.3), including the hippocampus, precuneus and several clusters 
within the temporal and frontal lobe. No significant positive modulation of EV was 
observed, while activity in the calcarine sulcus increased as a function of decreased 
EV (Table 3.1, see 3.7 Supplement). When examining residual curiosity-related activity 
during curiosity induction, after controlling for OU, there was one cluster that showed 
a significant increase in activity with increasing curiosity rating, located in the left pre-
supplemental motor area (left pre-SMA Table 3.1, see 3.7 Supplement). Finally, ROI 
analyses in the ventral striatum showed no significant parametric modulation effects 
of OU (t(23) = -1.44, p = . 16) and EV (t(23) = -1.75, p = .093) at the time of curiosity 
induction. 












Clusters showing a positive (red) or negative (blue) activity as a function of OU. The maps are 
dual-coded and simultaneously display the contrast estimate (x-axis) and unthresholded t-values 
for the outcome uncertainty contrast (y-axis). Thereby, the hue indicates the size of the contrast 
estimate and the opacity indicates the height of the t-value. Significant clusters (cluster-level 
corrected, FWE, p < .05) are encircled in white. One cluster in the left inferior parietal lobule 
showed a significant increase in activity with increasing OU, whereas a large network of regions 
showed a significant increase in activity with decreasing OU. The Z-coordinates correspond to 
the standard Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) brain. Neuroimaging data are plotted using a 
procedure introduced by Allen et al. (2012) and implemented by Zandbelt, (2017).
Curiosity Relief 
Next, we looked at the moment when participants’ curiosity was either relieved or not 
(i.e. when they were presented with the outcome or not). Three brain regions showed 
larger response when curiosity was relieved (Curiosity Relief – Yes > Curiosity Relief – 
No): the right insula, the right middle orbitofrontal cortex and the right inferior parietal 
lobule (Table 3.2, see 3.7 Supplement; Figure 3.4). When the outcome was withheld 
(Curiosity Relief – No > Curiosity Relief – Yes), this led to larger response in the right 
middle occipital gyrus, the left frontal superior gyrus and the right frontal middle gyrus 
(Table 3.2, see 3.7 Supplement; Figure 3.4). 
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We next investigated whether activity for nodes in these networks was linearly 
modulated by the size of the information update (i.e. IPErelief and IPEno relief). Within 
the nodes that were activated when the outcome was presented and curiosity was 
relieved, the ROI analyses showed a linearly increasing response as a function of IPErelief 
magnitude in the right insula (t(23) = 2.70, p = .013). This indicates that this region was 
involved in processing the prediction error of information when participants observed 
the outcome of a trial. No significant parametric modulation effects for IPErelief were 
found in the right middle orbitofrontal cortex region (t(23) = -1.30, p = .21) or in the 
inferior parietal lobule region (t(23) = -0.59, p = .56). For the nodes that were active 
when the outcome was withheld, there was a significant parametric modulation effect 
of negative IPE (IPEno relief) in the right middle occipital gyrus (t(23) = -2.91, p = .0079), 
such that this area showed a higher activity on trials where participants were most 
uncertain about the outcome (highest OU, resulting in the largest negative IPE). The left 
frontal superior gyrus (t(23) = 0.96, p = .35), and the right frontal middle gyrus (t(23) = 
0.91, p = .37),  were not modulated by IPEno relief. 
To summarize, the ROI analyses showed that the right insula was more active for higher 
positive information prediction errors (IPErelief), whereas the right middle occipital gyrus 
was more active for higher negative information prediction errors (IPEno relief). On the 
contrary, there was no significant parametric modulation effect of IPEno relief in the right 
insula (t(23) = -1.30, p = .21) and for IPErelief in the right middle occipital gyrus (t(23) = 
-1.66, p = .11). This indicates that the insula solely responded to prediction errors of
information when the outcome was presented to the participants, such that this region 
was more active when they received a larger update of information. Likewise, the right 
middle occipital region solely responded to prediction errors of information when the 
outcome was not presented, such that this region was more active when uncertainty 
was highest, but curiosity was not relieved.
No significant parametric modulation of BOLD activity due to RPE (t(23) = 1.48, p = .15), 
IPErelief (t(23) = -0.94, p = .36) or IPEno relief (t(23) = -1.66, p = .11) were found in the 
ventral striatum at the time of curiosity relief. 












Clusters showing a positive (red) or negative (blue) activity when comparing relieved vs. non-
relieved curiosity, at the time of the outcome presentation. Three brain regions showed larger 
response when curiosity was relieved (Curiosity Relief – Yes > Curiosity Relief – No): the right 
insula, the right middle orbitofrontal cortex and the right inferior parietal lobule. When the 
outcome was withheld (Curiosity Relief – No > Curiosity Relief – Yes), this led to larger response in 
the right middle occipital gyrus, the left frontal superior gyrus and the right frontal middle gyrus. 
Other conventions are as in Figure 3.3. 
3.4 | Discussion 
Here, we examined the cognitive and neural constituents of curiosity. Consistent 
with behavioral results described in Chapter 2, we found that curiosity increased 
with increasing uncertainty about the outcome of a lottery. Curiosity induction 
through outcome uncertainty was related to increased BOLD activity in the inferior 
parietal lobule, whereas curiosity relief elicited increased BOLD activity in the insula, 
orbitofrontal cortex and parietal cortex. Importantly, outcome-related signal in the 
insula increased linearly with increasing information prediction error provided by the 
outcome. In contrast to the results described in Chapter 2, curiosity was also related to 
the expected value of lotteries. A possible explanation for this modulation by expected 
value, might be that we used only two vase configurations in the current experiment. 
This might have made it easier for participants to encode both outcome uncertainty 
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as well as expected value. Nevertheless, the relationship between expected value and 
curiosity was markedly smaller than the relationship between outcome uncertainty 
and curiosity, strengthening the finding that uncertainty is a strong inducer of curiosity, 
beyond reward.
Investigation of the BOLD signal during curiosity induction revealed a usual suspect 
as a function of outcome uncertainty, namely the parietal cortex (Huettel et al., 2005). 
This finding is unsurprising, since prior work has implicated this region in processing 
outcome uncertainty. The key novel finding is that BOLD signal in the insula covaried 
with the information prediction error at the moment of curiosity relief, such that 
insular activity linearly increased with the amount of information participants gained 
by seeing the outcome (information prediction error). Intriguingly, insular signals have 
previously been observed to vary with risk prediction errors, which represent the 
degree to which outcomes are surprising in a gambling task (Preuschoff et al., 2008). 
This risk prediction error signal was interpreted to reflect a role for the insula in risk 
prediction learning, relevant for learning when to avoid or approach risk. While risk- 
and information prediction errors are both measures of the degree to which outcomes 
are surprising in an uncertain environment, a key difference is that the concept of risk 
is tightly linked to choice, whereas information prediction errors can be elicited in a 
passive observation task, as in the current study. As such, the current study suggest 
that the insula is not just involved in learning about risk to optimize choice, but may 
also contribute to knowledge acquisition by signaling information prediction error 
more generally. For future studies it might be interesting to investigate whether 
information prediction errors found for non-instrumental curiosity have consequences 
for learning, memory and hippocampal activity found with trivia questions (cf. Gruber, 
Gelman, & Ranganath, 2014; Marvin & Shohamy, 2016).
In addition to these insular signals, we found overall increased BOLD signal in the right 
orbitofrontal cortex and the right inferior parietal lobule at the time of curiosity relief. 
These findings generalize prior findings that the insula and orbitofrontal cortex respond 
to perceptual curiosity relief (Jepma et al., 2012) to non-perceptual curiosity relief, 
suggesting that these areas might be involved more generally in gaining information. 
The insula might do so by computing specific information prediction error signals, 
which help us to optimize our current world model. The orbitofrontal cortex, however, 
has been argued to signal information about reward, reward-learning and reward-
related cognition (Blanchard et al., 2015; Padoa-Schioppa, 2011; Rushworth, Noonan, 
Boorman, Walton, & Behrens, 2011; Wallis, 2007; Wilson, Takahashi, Schoenbaum, & 
Niv, 2014). Given this established link between orbitofrontal cortex and reward, it is 
unsurprising that this region was more active when participants saw the outcome than 
when they did not. 











Perhaps surprisingly, we found no activity modulation by reward or information 
prediction error in the ventral striatum. While this may partly reflect the lower signal-
to-noise ratio (SNR) in deep brain structures due to specific fMRI sequence we used 
(see Methods), we think the most relevant factor here could be the use of a passive 
observation task. Unlike choice tasks, participants had no means to influence their 
task performance or improve the amount of received rewards. Therefore, participants 
may be mainly driven by outcome uncertainty, instead of reward, and this might be 
reflected in the absence of activity modulations in reward-related areas such as the 
ventral striatum.
As mentioned above, we found that BOLD signal in the left inferior parietal lobule 
increased with increasing outcome uncertainty at the time of curiosity induction. This 
extends previous findings by Huettel and colleagues (2005), who found increased activity 
in parietal cortex with increasing outcome uncertainty in a decision-making task. Given 
our finding that the inferior parietal lobule is similarly involved in processing outcome 
uncertainty in a passive observation task, it could be that this area is more generally 
involved in processing outcome uncertainty, which may in turn contribute to curiosity 
induction. This might be due to requirement of more attentive control in situations of high 
outcome uncertainty. Possibly, (curiosity-driven) actions associated with acquiring new 
information might require more attentive control, whereas actions with low uncertainty are 
more habitual and require little attention (Fan, 2014; Shenhav, Botvinick, & Cohen, 2013). 
Perhaps, these curiosity-inducing signals in parietal cortex operate independently from 
signals responsible for signaling expected rewards, as previous work in macaque monkeys 
has indicated that parietal neurons may encode the expected reduction in uncertainty an 
action will bring, independent of expected reward and reward prediction errors (Foley et 
al., 2017). Finally, although a large portion of the variability in curiosity was accounted 
for by outcome uncertainty, there was also some residual variability in curiosity ratings 
not accounted for by outcome uncertainty (or expected value). Supplementary analyses 
revealed such residual (not OU-related) curiosity signals in the left pre-SMA, a region 
commonly implicated in monitoring actions (Rushworth et al., 2007) and the value of 
information in a decision-making context (Behrens, Woolrich, Walton, & Rushworth, 2007).
3.5 | Conclusion
Our study sheds light on the cognitive and neural constituents of curiosity by 
demonstrating that outcome uncertainty drives curiosity strongly. This curiosity 
induction is accompanied by BOLD signal in parietal cortex, whereas its release is 
accompanied by BOLD increases in the insula, orbitofrontal cortex and parietal cortex. 
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Most strikingly, insular activity increased linearly with increasing information update 
the outcome provided. Together, these findings point to a fundamentally adaptive role 
of curiosity as a drive to improve one’s current world model and implicate the parietal 
cortex and insula in this fundamental trait.
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Table 3.1 | Brain regions associated with OU and EV during curiosity induction 




Coordinates (x y z)
OU
Inferior Parietal Lobule Left 5.07 230 .001 -34 -50 46
OU – negative
Precuneus Right 7.20 726 < .001 0 -46 54
Postcentral Gyrus Left 6.67 288 < .001 -52 -20 60
Hippocampus Left 6.33 157 .007 -32 -18 -16
Fusiform Gyrus Left 6.11 587 < .001 -22 -42 -10
Temporal Superior Gyrus Right 6.09 890 < .001 58 -46 18
Temporal Middle Gyrus Left 5.83 249 < .001 -58 2 -20
Frontal Middle Gyrus Right 5.67 421 < .001 24 18 56
Angular Gyrus Right 5.62 286 < .001 46 -72 36
Fusiform Gyrus Right 5.44 119 .029 28 -34 -14
Frontal Middle Gyrus Left 5.26 512 < .001 -22 24 46
Calcarine Sulcus Right 5.11 255 < .001 16 -52 8
Temporal Middle Gyrus Right 5.11 211 .001 50 -20 -14
Calcarine Sulcus Left 5.03 652 < .001 -12 -60 18
Occipital Middle Gyrus Left 4.90 252 < .001 -38 -82 38
EV – negative
Calcarine Sulcus Right 5.49 130 .012 14 -60 18
Residual Curiosity - positive
pre-SMA Left 4.61 258 <.001 -8 22 46
Spatial coordinates of local maxima for regions showing activity as a function of OU or EV at the 
moment of curiosity induction. Coordinates correspond to the standard Montreal Neurological 
Institute (MNI) brain. We used a primary voxel threshold of p < .001 (uncorrected) and a cluster-level 
correction of p < .05 (FWE). 











Table 3.2 | Brain regions associated with curiosity relief
Anatomical region Hemisphere T-value Cluster size Corrected 
p-value
Coordinates (x y z)
Curiosity Relief – Yes > Curiosity Relief – No 
Insula Right 6.14 124 .018 36 12 -12
Middle orbitofrontal 
cortex
Right 5.96 118 .023 42 56 0
Inferior parietal lobule Right 5.82 204 .001 40 -54 48
Curiosity Relief – No > Curiosity Relief – Yes
Frontal superior gyrus Left 6.14 161 .005 -22 12 66
Middle occipital gyrus Right 6.05 1076 < .001 36 -74 2
Frontal middle gyrus Right 5.19 298 < .001 30 34 48
Spatial coordinates of local maxima for regions showing activity as a function of outcome presen-
tation (or not) at the moment of curiosity relief. Coordinates correspond to the standard Montreal 
Neurological Institute (MNI) brain. We used a primary voxel threshold of p < .001 (uncorrected) and 
a cluster-level correction of p < .05 (FWE).
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Curiosity is pervasive in our everyday lives, but we know little about the factors 
that contribute to this drive. In the current study, we assessed whether curiosity 
about uncertain outcomes is modulated by the valence of the information, i.e. 
whether the information is good or bad news. Using a lottery task in which outcome 
uncertainty, expected value and outcome valence (gain versus loss) were manipulated 
independently, we found that curiosity is overall higher for gains compared with losses. 
Surprisingly, curiosity increased with increasing outcome uncertainty for both gains 
and losses, contradicting models that posit that humans only seek positive and avoid 
negative information. Curiosity thus follows from multiple drives, including a drive to 
reduce uncertainty, as well as, separately, a drive to maximize positive information.












Curiosity is a strong driver of behaviour, but relatively little is known about its 
psychological and neurobiological mechanisms (Kidd & Hayden, 2015). It is often 
defined as a motivational state that stimulates exploration and information seeking 
to reduce uncertainty (Berlyne, 1966; Gottlieb & Oudeyer, 2018; Gruber & Ranganath, 
2019; Kidd & Hayden, 2015). Obtaining this information can be useful to increase 
rewards or to make better decisions, for example when we check the stock market to 
see if we should make a new investment. When looking for such information that is 
directly relevant, we aim to maximize reward and/or to minimize harm (i.e. not wasting 
your money on useless investments; Stigler, 1961). The type of information search that 
is aimed at reward maximization is commonly studied in literature focusing on the 
explore-exploit tradeoff or goal-directed exploration (i.e. Addicott, Pearson, Sweitzer, 
Barack, & Platt, 2017; Averbeck, 2015; Daw & Doya, 2006; Daw, O’Doherty, Dayan, 
Seymour, & Dolan, 2006a; Lejarraga & Hertwig, 2017; Lejarraga, Hertwig, & Gonzalez, 
2012) and can be referred to as “instrumental curiosity”. 
In contrast to maximizing rewards, humans and other animals are also curious about 
information that does not serve a direct, obvious benefit (i.e. Bromberg-Martin & 
Hikosaka, 2009, 2011; Charpentier, Bromberg-Martin, & Sharot, 2018; Kobayashi, 
Ravaioli, Baranès, Woodford, & Gottlieb, 2019; van Lieshout, Vandenbroucke, Müller, 
Cools, & de Lange, 2018, see also Chapter 2 and Chapter 3). Think for example about 
situations in which we scroll through our Instagram feed without a specific purpose. 
This type of curiosity is referred to as “non-instrumental curiosity” (see also Kidd & 
Hayden, 2015).
But why would we be curious about information that serves no obvious benefit? 
According to the information gap theory (Loewenstein, 1994), curiosity generally arises 
when we become aware of gaps in our knowledge and we are driven to fill these gaps 
with information. Indeed, recent studies have indicated that we are mainly curious 
about information, because it might reduce uncertainty about the world around us (i.e. 
Blanchard et al., 2015; Bromberg-Martin & Hikosaka, 2009, 2011; Stagner & Zentall, 
2010, van Lieshout et al., 2018). For instance, in our recent study, we used a lottery 
task in which we independently manipulated the uncertainty about the outcome of a 
lottery, as well as the expected value of that lottery. Participants had to indicate their 
curiosity about the lottery outcome, while they were instructed that the information 
provided by the outcome was non-instrumental. That means that all outcomes were 
obtained regardless of their curiosity decisions and there was no way to maximize 
their rewards during the task. The results indicated that when the uncertainty about 
lottery outcome was higher, participants exhibited higher curiosity ratings and greater 
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willingness to wait for information about those outcomes (van Lieshout et al., 2018; 
see Chapter 2 and Chapter 3). These findings suggest that the drive for information is 
a function of the size of an information gap (Loewenstein, 1994) rather than merely 
the likelihood of reward maximization. This concurs with the proposal that curiosity 
represents a drive to improve our knowledge about what is going to happen (van 
Lieshout et al., 2018). 
Recent evidence indicates that the drive to seek information might be asymmetric, 
with people exhibiting a preference for positive over negative belief updating, such 
that humans are more curious about positive than negative information (Charpentier et 
al., 2018; Marvin & Shohamy, 2016). In fact, human volunteers have been shown to be 
willing to pay for ignorance about negative information as well as for knowledge about 
positive information (Charpentier et al., 2018). This is consistent with the observation 
that people often prefer not to be informed about potential negative medical test 
results (Dwyer, Shepperd, & Stock, 2015; Persoskie, Ferrer, & Klein, 2014). It should 
be noted that this preference for positive over negative belief updating was found 
in situations when participants had no influence on their payoffs. This is in contrast 
with findings from the explore-exploit literature showing that when participants 
can influence their payoffs, they show higher exploration rates for losses compared 
with gains, reflecting intensified alertness in the face of potential losses (Lejarraga & 
Hertwig, 2017; Lejarraga et al., 2012).
These observations led us to ask whether people’s drive for information in a non-
instrumental context depends on the valence of the information gap, with greater 
curiosity for greater positive information gaps, but reduced curiosity for greater 
negative information gaps. This preference of reducing positive uncertainty, but 
accepting negative uncertainty bears resemblance to the well-known framing effect 
in prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, 1984), where people are risk averse 
for moderately probable gains, but risk seeking for moderately probable losses. 
Specifically, we aimed to investigate whether the uncertainty of the lottery outcome 
had contrasting effects on curiosity about information depending on its valence. 
4.1.1 | The present experiments
To investigate this, we designed a set of experiments by adapting a lottery task we 
used previously (van Lieshout et al., 2018; see Chapter 2 and Chapter 3). In this task, 
participants were presented with a lottery consisting of a vase containing a mix of red 
and blue marbles, which are associated with different monetary values. Participants 
were instructed that one marble would be randomly selected from the vase, and that 
they would gain/lose the money associated with the marble. By means of this lottery 











task, we independently manipulated the uncertainty and expected value of lottery 
outcomes, as well as outcome valence (whether the lottery contained gains or losses). In 
other words: each lottery was associated with more or less uncertain gains and losses. 
In Experiment 1, participants were asked to indicate how curious they were about the 
outcome of a presented lottery in terms of self-report ratings. Importantly, participants 
could not influence the actual outcome and whether they would see the outcome or 
not. Experiment 2 was conducted to verify the robustness of these explicit curiosity 
ratings by investigating curiosity more implicitly in terms of willingness to wait 
decisions. The design of Experiment 2 was similar to that of Experiment 1, but instead 
of explicitly rating their curiosity, participants had to indicate whether they wanted 
to see the lottery outcome or not. In this task, participants could control whether they 
would see the outcome, but this came with a cost: participants had to wait an additional 
3 – 6 seconds if they wanted to see the outcome. We used willingness to wait because 
it is an acknowledged measure of an item’s motivational value (Frederick, Loewenstein, 
& O’Donoghue, 2002), which has previously been linked to curiosity (Kang et al., 2009; 
Marvin & Shohamy, 2016; van Lieshout et al., 2018). This underlines the notion that 
waiting is costly, in line, for example, with the intertemporal choice literature. In both 
experiments, participants were clearly instructed that the information provided by the 
outcome was non-instrumental: all outcomes were obtained regardless of participants’ 
curiosity or willingness to wait decisions and they had no way of influencing how much 
they would gain or lose during the task.
Two hypotheses were considered. The null hypothesis is that people’s drive for 
information is independent of the valence of that information. If this is true, the effect of 
outcome uncertainty on curiosity should not be a function of gain versus loss outcome 
valence. The alternative hypothesis is that people’s drive to update their beliefs is 
positively biased, with a preference for updating positive versus negative beliefs. If this 
is the case, then any effect of outcome uncertainty should be a function of gain versus 
loss outcome valence. According to the strong version of this alternative hypothesis, 
participants would exhibit greater curiosity for more uncertain positive outcomes, but 
reduced curiosity for negative outcomes with greater uncertainty. Whereas previous 
studies have addressed the existence of multiple motives for curiosity, with different 
individuals exhibiting various mixtures of effects of uncertainty and expected value 
(Kobayashi et al., 2019), no prior study has addressed the interaction between 
uncertainty and valence on non-instrumental curiosity. It is this interaction that allows 
us to investigate the degree to which effects of uncertainty and valence represent 
independent or interactive mechanisms of non-instrumental curiosity.
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To preview, the results of the curiosity experiment (Experiment 1) demonstrated 
that while curiosity was overall higher for gains, curiosity increased with outcome 
uncertainty for both gains and losses. Valence and uncertainty affected curiosity 
largely independent from each other, given that the effect of outcome uncertainty was 
not reliably different between gains and losses. These results were replicated with 
the more implicit willingness to wait measure (Experiment 2), indicating that people 
were willing to pay with time to satisfy their curiosity. On average, participants were 
willing to wait in 45.4% of all trials. These results suggest that curiosity is elicited 
by uncertainty about what will happen and that people are driven to improve this 
model of the task, regardless of outcome valence. In addition, there is a bias towards 
information gain about positive compared with negative information, which operates 
independently of uncertainty. 
4.2 | Methods
We conducted two experiments using lottery tasks. In Experiment 1, we investigated 
participants’ curiosity about the lottery outcome explicitly by means of curiosity 
ratings. Experiment 2 was conducted to verify the robustness of these explicit curiosity 
ratings by investigating curiosity more implicitly in terms of willingness to wait 
decisions. The information provided by the outcome was non-instrumental in both 
tasks: all outcomes were obtained regardless of participants’ decisions and they had no 
way of influencing how much they would gain or lose during the task.
4.2.1 | Data & code availability and preregistration
All data and code used for stimulus presentation and analysis are freely available on 
the Donders Repository.
Experiment 1 and its analyses were preregistered on the Open Science Framework (osf.
io/h8r6f/?view_only=33a00f8a5a96497fb1f22b89131ddc61).
4.2.2 | Participants
Experiment 1: Thirty-seven healthy individuals participated in Experiment 1, involving 
curiosity ratings and gain/loss blocks. Two participants were excluded because they 
reported during the debriefing that they (falsely) believed that they could influence 
the lottery outcome. It should be noted that this crucial aspect of the task was 
stressed multiple times during instructions, so these participants evidently failed to 
understand the task. We therefore excluded them based on this preregistered criterion. 











Another participant was excluded due to a lack of variation in responses (gave the 
same curiosity rating on every trial). Though the lack of variation in responses was 
not preregistered, we decided to exclude the participant because no models could be 
fitted on the participant’s data and because we could not ensure that the participant 
was engaged with the task. The final sample of Experiment 1 consisted of thirty-four 
participants (27 women, age 21.79 ± 4.13, mean ± SD). The sample size of N = 34 was 
chosen to detect a within-subject effect of at least medium size (d>0.5) with 80% power 
using a two-tailed one-sample or paired t-test. 
Experiment 2: Thirty-seven healthy individuals participated in Experiment 2, involving 
willingness to wait decisions and randomized gain/loss trials. We used the same 
exclusion-criteria as for Experiment 1. Two participants were excluded because they 
reported afterwards that they (falsely) believed that they could influence the lottery 
outcome. Another participant was excluded due to a lack of variation in responses 
(gave the same response in > 98% of all trials). The final sample of the experiment 
consisted of thirty-four participants (22 women, age 22.59 ± 3.76, mean ± SD). 
Participants of both experiments gave written informed consent according to the 
declaration of Helsinki prior to participation. The experiments were approved by the 
local ethics committee (CMO Arnhem-Nijmegen, The Netherlands) under a general 
ethics approval protocol (“Imaging Human Cognition”, CMO 2014/288) and were 
conducted in compliance with these guidelines. 
4.2.3 | Procedures 
4.2.3.1 | Experiment 1 
Each trial of the lottery task started with an image of a vase containing twenty 
marbles, each of which could be either red or blue (Figure 4.1A). In total, three vase 
configurations were possible: (1) 90%-10% vases: 18 marbles had one color and 
2 marbles had the other color, (2) 75%-25% vases: 15 marbles had one color and 5 
marbles the other color, (3) 50%-50% vases: 10 marbles had one color and 10 marbles 
the other color. Both colored marbles were associated with a monetary value that 
participants could gain or lose. Experiment 1 consisted of gain blocks, loss blocks and 
mixed blocks. In the gain blocks, both marbles were associated with positive monetary 
values; in the loss blocks, both marbles were associated with negative monetary 
values; and in the mixed blocks, one marble was associated with a positive monetary 
value and the other marble with a negative monetary value. Whereas the gain and loss 
blocks were of primary interest, we added the mixed blocks to investigate whether 
curiosity would be enhanced with added uncertainty about the valence of the outcome 
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(i.e. whether people would actually gain or lose money). The monetary values varied 
on a trial-by-trial basis between +10 cents and +90 in gain blocks and between -90 and 
-10 cents in loss blocks (both in steps of 20 cents). All combinations of monetary values 
associated with red and blue marbles were possible, except for combinations of the 
same monetary values. In mixed blocks, the monetary value varied between -70 cents 
and +70 cents (in steps of 20 cents). One marble was always associated with a positive 
monetary value (gain) and the other marble with a negative monetary value (loss) and 
the difference between these values was never higher than 80 cents. This was done to 
match the level of outcome uncertainty (see Equation 1) between the three (gain/loss/
mixed) block types. 
The participants were informed that on each trial, one marble would be randomly 
selected from the vase and that they would gain or lose the money associated with 
this marble. The first screen, on which the vase, the marbles and the monetary values 
associated with the marbles were depicted, was presented for 3 s (Figure 4.1A). Next, 
a blank screen was presented for 0.5 s, followed by a response screen during which 
participants could indicate how curious they were about seeing the outcome of that trial 
(“How curious are you about the outcome?”). The curiosity scale ranged from 1 – 4. The 
response screen was presented until the participant responded, with a response limit 
of 4 s. Participants could give their responses on a button box, using their right index 
finger, right middle finger, right ring finger and right little finger to indicate curiosity 
responses of 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively. The response screen was followed by a blank 
screen (0.5 s) and an outcome screen (2 s). On each trial, participants had a 50% chance 
that their curiosity would be satisfied by seeing the outcome and a 50% chance that the 
outcome was withheld. This manipulation was instructed explicitly to participants and 
it uncoupled curiosity responses from the actual receipt of the outcome. This rendered 
an instrumental approach bias account of information seeking behaviour less likely 
(Beierholm and Dayan, 2010 or see van Lieshout et al., 2018). The outcome screen 
depicted the vase, the marbles and monetary values associated with the marbles again, 
together with a box in which they saw the colored marble that was randomly selected 
and the amount of money they won or lost in that trial. When the outcome was not 
presented, participants saw a black marble instead of a colored marble and question 
marks at the location of the monetary value. After a trial ended, there was a blank 
screen with a jittered duration between 1 and 2 s (uniformly distributed). 











Figure 4.1 | Schematic depiction of the task of Experiment 1 (A) and Experiment 2 (B)
A   Schematic depiction of a gain trial in Experiment 1. Participants saw a screen on which a vase 
with 20 marbles was depicted, either of which could be red or blue. Additionally, the monetary 
values associated with the red and blue marbles were depicted next to the vase. These 
monetary values could either both be positive (in gain trials, depicted here), both be negative 
(in the loss trials) or one value could be positive and the other one negative (in mixed trials). 
Participants were told that one of the marbles would be randomly selected from the vase 
and that they would be awarded the money associated with this marble. Next, participants 
indicated how curious they were about seeing the outcome (1 – 4). There was a 50% chance of 
seeing the outcome, regardless of the participants’ curiosity response. Importantly, a marble 
was randomly selected on every trial and participants were instructed that they were awarded 
the money associated with this marble, also if they would not see the outcome of a trial.  See 
Methods (2.3 Procedures) for details on the timing of Experiment 1. 
B   Schematic depiction of a loss trial in Experiment 2. Instead of giving a curiosity response, 
participants indicated whether they wanted to see the outcome of a trial or not. If they 
responded “No”, the outcome was not presented to them. If they responded “Yes”, the outcome 
would always be presented. However, they would then have to wait for an additional 3 – 6 
seconds before they saw the outcome. Importantly, a marble was randomly selected on every 
trial and participants were instructed that they were awarded the money associated with this 
marble, also if they decided not to see the outcome of a trial. See Methods (4.2.3 Procedures) 
for details on the timing of Experiment 2.
Importantly, participants had no way of influencing whether they would observe the 
outcome of a particular trial, or what the outcome of that trial would be. However, 
participants were instructed that a marble would be randomly selected on every trial 
and that they would gain or lose the money associated with that marble, even if the 



























trial would be summed and that this sum of money would be added to or subtracted 
from the money they earned for their participation. This sum of money was depicted 
on the screen after the experiment had ended.
In total, the participants completed 3 blocks of every type (gain, loss and mixed), 
resulting in a total of 9 blocks. Each vase configuration was presented on 60 occasions, 
so 20 times for each block type. In total, the participants completed 180 trials, divided 
in 9 blocks of 20 trials. The gain-, loss- and mixed blocks were pseudo-randomized 
such that the same block type was never presented twice in a row. The trials within a 
task block were also pseudo-randomized such that the same vase configuration was 
never presented more than 4 trials in a row.  After each block, the participants were 
instructed to take a short break if they wanted. The experiment lasted ~ 50 minutes 
in total and participants received a base payment of 8 euros for their participation. 
Participants were told that all the money they gained and lost would be added to or 
subtracted from this value. In the end, the task was set up in a way that participants 
would always receive a bonus of 50 cents on top of this base payment. 
4.2.3.2 | Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, we aimed to investigate participants’ curiosity more implicitly by means 
of testing their willingness to wait to see the outcome (van Lieshout et al., 2018). We 
used this willingness to wait measure because it is an acknowledged measure of an item’s 
motivational value (Frederick et al., 2002), which has previously been linked to curiosity 
(Kang et al., 2009; Marvin & Shohamy, 2016; van Lieshout et al., 2018). Time is costly, 
so by means of this willingness to wait measure, we could assess whether people would 
be willing to pay for information in terms of their time. If participants decided to wait, 
they would always see the outcome whereas they would never see the outcome if they 
decided not to wait. By means of this measure, we can assess which types of information 
people want to approach and which types of information people want to avoid.
The willingness to wait task (Figure 4.1B) was in essence the same as the curiosity task 
of Experiment 1, apart from a couple of details of no primary interest that are outlined 
below. First of all, because our primary hypotheses concerned comparing gain events 
with loss events, we did not include any mixed trials in Experiment 2. Furthermore, 
the gain and loss trials were not presented in separate blocks, but varied on a trial-
by-trial basis instead. The reason for that was to investigate whether we would find a 
similar effect of gain versus loss trials in a randomized design in which we control for 
state-related changes (i.e. mood or arousal) related to being in a gain or loss context. 
To facilitate the calculation of both outcome uncertainty as well as expected value, 
we only presented participants with two possible vase configurations: (1) 75%-25% 











vases: 15 marbles had one color and 5 marbles the other color and (2) 50%-50% vases: 
10 marbles had one color and 10 marbles the other color. Both colored marbles were 
associated with a monetary value that participants could gain or lose. In gain trials, the 
monetary values varied between 10 cents and 90 cents (in steps of 10 cents) and in 
loss trials the monetary values varied between -90 and -10 cents (in steps of 10 cents). 
In both trial types, all combinations of monetary values associated with red and blue 
marbles were possible, except for combinations of the same monetary values. 
The first screen, on which the vase, the marbles and the monetary values associated 
with the marbles were depicted, was presented for 4 s. Next, instead of giving a 
curiosity response, participants indicated whether they wanted to see the outcome 
of that trial (“Do you want to see the outcome?”) by pressing either “Yes” or “No”. 
Participants could give their responses on a button box, using their right index finger 
and right middle finger to respond “Yes” or “No” respectively. The response screen 
was presented until the participant responded, with a maximum of 4 s. If they pressed 
“No”, a blank screen was presented briefly (0.5 s), followed by a screen on which the 
outcome was not presented (2 s). If they pressed “Yes”, they saw a blank screen with 
a jittered duration between 3.5 and 6.5 s (uniformly distributed) before they saw a 
screen on which the outcome was presented (2 s). The participants had no influence 
on how long they had to wait for the outcome exactly, but they were aware that the 
waiting time varied between 3.5 and 6.5 seconds. When the outcome was presented, 
the outcome screen depicted the randomly selected marble in the middle of the screen 
and the amount of money participants won or lost in that trial below the marble. When 
the outcome was not presented, participants saw a black marble instead of a colored 
marble and question marks at the location of the monetary value. The next trial started 
after a jittered inter-trial interval between 1 and 2 s (uniformly distributed).
It should be noted that in this experiment, the outcomes were contingent on 
participants’ decisions, such that they would always see the outcome when they were 
willing to wait, and never see the outcome when they were not willing to wait. As 
such, this measure gave us the opportunity to investigate for what type of lotteries 
participants decided to see the outcome and what type of information they wanted to 
avoid. However, participants were aware that a marble would be randomly selected 
on every trial and that they would always gain or lose the money associated with that 
marble, also when they did not want to wait to see the outcome. As in Experiment 1, 
the money they won or lost on every trial would be summed and this sum of money 
would be added to or subtracted from the money they earned for their participation. 
This sum of money was depicted on the screen after the experiment had ended.
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The gain and loss trials were pseudo-randomized such that the same trial type was 
never presented more than five times in a row. The participants completed a total of 
216 trials (108 gain trials and 108 loss trials), divided in 4 blocks of 54 trials. Each 
vase configuration was presented on 108 occasions, so 54 times for each trial type. 
After each block, the participants were instructed to take a short break if they wanted. 
The total duration of Experiment 2 varied from ~60 to ~75 minutes and depended 
on the number of trials on which the participants chose to wait to see the outcome. 
Regardless of the task duration, participants received a base payment of 11.50 euros 
for their participation. They were told that all the money they gained and lost would 
be added to or subtracted from this value. In the end, the task was set up in a way that 
participants would always receive a bonus of 50 cents on top of this base payment. 
4.2.4 | Experimental Design & Primary Statistical Analyses
Our primary hypotheses (see preregistration) concerned comparing positive events 
(gain trials) with negative events (loss trials). Therefore, the primary statistical 
analyses concerned the gain and loss trials only. We investigated whether there was 
a relationship between the main effects of outcome valence (gain/loss), outcome 
uncertainty, expected value and the curiosity ratings (Experiment 1) or willingness 
to wait decisions (Experiment 2). In addition, we investigated whether the effects of 
outcome uncertainty and expected value on curiosity/willingness to wait differed 
between the gain and loss trials by assessing the significance of interaction effects 
between outcome uncertainty and outcome valence, and expected value and outcome 
valence, on curiosity or willingness to wait. We did so using a combination of mixed 
effects modeling (reported here) and more classical repeated measures ANOVAs 
(reported in Supplement 1). This allowed us to verify the robustness of our results 
and demonstrate that our conclusions do not depend on the analytical framework 
employed. 
In order to do so, a value of outcome uncertainty and expected value was calculated for 
every trial (X) as follows:  
Outcome Uncertainty(X) = ∑i=1 (xi - Expected Value(X))²pi Equation 1
Expected Value(X)=∑i=1 xi pi Equation 2
Here, xi is the monetary value associated with marble color (i) and pi the probability 
that this marble will be drawn. Hereby, outcome uncertainty (Equation 1) reflects the 
spread of the possible outcomes in trial (X) and expected value (Equation 2) reflects the 
mean expected reward contained in trial (X). 
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It should be noted that we used a different calculation for outcome uncertainty in one 
of our previous studies (van Lieshout et al., 2018; see Chapter 2 and 3), and we initially 
preregistered to use that calculation of outcome uncertainty in the current manuscript 
as well. However, both metrics are almost identical, and variance is a more common 
measure of uncertainty (see for example Preuschoff, Quartz, & Bossaerts, 2008; 
Symmonds, Wright, Bach, & Dolan, 2011). Therefore we decided to quantify outcome 
uncertainty as variance in the current manuscript.
It should also be noted that the expected value is always positive in a gain trial and 
always negative in a loss trial. To be able to compare the effects of expected value 
between the gain and loss trials, we converted the expected values by taking the 
absolute values such that - 90 cents in a loss trial would be treated the same as + 90 
cents in a gain trial etc. However, the metric of interest here is the effect of reward 
magnitude (signed expected value) on curiosity, which is reflected in the interaction 
between outcome valence (gain/loss) and absolute expected value. 
4.2.4.1 | Analyses using the BRMS package in R
Whereas we initially preregistered to perform the main statistical analyses of 
Experiment 1 using the clmm function of the ordinal package (Christensen, 2015), we 
performed the statistical analyses using the brm function of the BRMS package instead 
(Bürkner, 2017). By means of the BRMS package, we could fit Bayesian generalized 
(non-)linear multivariate multilevel models for full Bayesian inference. The main 
reason for performing the main analyses using the BRMS package, is that the BRMS 
package is robust and also suitable for assessing binomial dependent variables, such as 
the willingness to wait decisions (Experiment 2). 
The models of Experiment 1 included “curiosity rating (1 - 4)” as ordinal dependent 
variable, whereas the model of Experiment 2 included “willingness to wait (yes/
no)” as binomial dependent variable. Models for both experiments included main 
effects of “outcome valence (gain/loss)”, “outcome uncertainty” and “expected value 
(absolute)”, and interaction effects between “outcome valence (gain/loss)” and 
“outcome uncertainty” and between “outcome valence (gain/loss)” and “expected 
value (absolute)” as fixed effects. The models included a full random effects structure 
(Barr, 2013; Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & Tily, 2013), so that a random intercept and 
random slopes for all effects were included per participant. The predictors for 
outcome uncertainty and expected value (absolute) were mean centered and scaled. 
We used the default priors of the brms package (Cauchy priors and LKJ priors for 
correlation parameters; Bürkner, 2017). The models were fit using four chains with 
10000 iterations each (5000 warm up) and inspected for convergence. Coefficients 
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were deemed statistically significant if the associated 95% posterior credible intervals 
were non-overlapping with zero. 
If the interaction effects between “outcome valence (gain/loss)” and “outcome 
uncertainty” or between “outcome valence (gain/loss)” and “expected value (absolute)” 
were significant, we ran models on gain and loss trials separately. These models included 
“curiosity rating (1 - 4)” as an ordinal dependent variable, “outcome uncertainty” and 
“expected value (absolute)” as fixed factors, and a full random effects structure (Barr, 
2013; Barr et al., 2013). In this way we could assess significance of outcome uncertainty 
and expected value (absolute) on curiosity of the gain and loss trials separately.
In addition to the analyses reported here, we performed similar analyses using repeated 
measures ANOVAs in SPSS (RRID:SCR_002865) and Bayesian repeated measures 
ANOVAs in JASP (RRID:SCR_015823). These analyses were performed to accommodate 
readers that are used to interpreting frequentist statistics instead of Bayesian credible 
intervals and to verify that our conclusions do not depend on the analytical framework 
employed (Supplement 1).
4.2.5 | Data visualization
For Experiment 1, we divided the levels of outcome uncertainty in six percentile bins 
per gain/loss condition, such that the 1st bin represents 1/6th of the lowest levels of 
outcome uncertainty, the 2nd bin represents the 1/6th – 2/6th of the lowest levels, etc. 
The absolute expected values were also divided in six percentile bins, such that the 
1st bin represents 1/6th of the lowest values, the 2nd bin the 1/6th – 2/6th of the lowest 
values, etc. We did the same for Experiment 2, except that the outcome uncertainty 
levels and the absolute expected values were divided in eight percentile bins per gain/
loss condition. For each bin, we calculated a mean curiosity rating or mean percentage 
willingness to wait for gains and losses separately. Next, these mean scores per bin 
were averaged across participants and the standard error of the mean (SEM) was 
calculated for each bin of outcome uncertainty and absolute expected value of the gain 
and loss trials separately. Least squares lines illustrate the effects (Figure 4.2).
To illustrate to what extent individual participants showed sensitivity to gain 
versus loss trials, we calculated the mean curiosity ratings (Experiment 1) and mean 
percentages willingness to wait (Experiment 2) for gain and loss trials separately per 
participant (Figure 4.3A, 4.3D). Additionally, to illustrate to what extent participants 
were sensitive to the effect of outcome uncertainty, we calculated the difference in 
curiosity/willingness to wait scores between high and low outcome uncertainty for 
gain and loss trials separately per participant (Figure 4.3B, 4.3E). The same was done 











to illustrate the sensitivity to the absolute expected value effects by calculating the 
difference in curiosity/willingness to wait scores between high and low absolute 
expected value for gain and loss trials separately per participant (Figure 4.3C, 4.3F).
4.3 | Results
4.3.1 | Experiment 1
In line with the results of a previous study (van Lieshout et al., 2018; see Chapter 2 and 
3), Experiment 1 (Figure 4.2A) showed that curiosity strongly increased with outcome 
uncertainty (BRMS: 95% CI [.58,1.11]). There was also a main effect of outcome valence, 
such that curiosity was higher for gains (M = 2.69; SD = .44) compared with losses (M 
= 2.43; SD = .48; BRMS: 95% CI [.18,.51]). Crucially, there was no interaction between 
outcome uncertainty and outcome valence (BRMS: 95% CI [-.05,.09]). The absence of 
an interaction was supported by the results from the repeated measures ANOVAs 
(Supplement 1) and the Bayes Factor of .21 indicated that there is moderate evidence 
that an interaction between outcome valence and outcome uncertainty should not be 
included in the model. Scatterplots show that the effect of outcome valence (Figure 
4.3A) as well as the effect of outcome uncertainty (Figure 4.3B) were highly robust and 
consistent across participants. These results were replicated in two additional studies 
(Experiment 1B and 1C; see Supplement 4.2 and Supplementary Figure 4.1 and 4.2), in 
which we manipulated gain and loss outcome valence on a trial-by-trial basis instead 
of in a blockwise fashion. This indicates that whereas positive valence leads to higher 
curiosity, people are overall more curious when information gaps are larger. This is the 
case when these information gaps signal good news (gains) as well as when they signal 
bad news (losses; Figure 4.2A). 
There was no significant interaction between absolute expected value and outcome 
valence (BRMS: 95% CI [-.09,.12]) indicating that curiosity did not scale with reward 




Figure 4.2 | Behavioural results of Experiment 1 (A) and Experiment 2 (B) 
 In both panels, the x-axis depicts percentile bins of the levels of outcome uncertainty (left) and 
the absolute expected values (right) for both gains (in red) and losses (in blue). The y-axis depicts 
the mean curiosity ratings for each percentile of outcome uncertainty and absolute expected 
value in the gain and loss context (A) or the % of trials in which participants were willing to wait 
for the outcome in the gain and loss context (B). The error bars depict the standard error of the 
mean (SEM) for each outcome uncertainty and absolute expected value bin of the gains or loss 
trials. For other details of the data visualization, see Methods – 2.5 Data Visualization. 
A   Experiment 1 showed that curiosity was higher for gains than for losses. There was a monotonic 
increase of curiosity with increasing outcome uncertainty, which was not modulated by gain/
loss outcome valence. There was no significant modulation of curiosity by (absolute) expected 
value for gains and losses. 
B   Experiment 2 showed that willingness to wait was higher for gains than for losses. Willingness 
to wait increased monotonically with outcome uncertainty, and there was no evidence for a 
modulation of this effect by gain/loss outcome valence. People were more willing to wait for 
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4.3.2 | Experiment 2
In Experiment 2 (Figure 4.2B), we tested people’s curiosity more implicitly by means of 
assessing their willingness to wait to see the outcome. On average, participants were 
willing to wait in 45.4% of all trials (SD = 15.1). Consistent with Experiment 1, we found 
that willingness to wait increased with outcome uncertainty (BRMS: 95% CI [1.23,2.33]) 
and that the percentage willingness to wait was higher for gain (M = 55.1; SD = 23.6) 
compared with loss trials (M = 35.6; SD = 14.5; BRMS: 95% CI [.25,.98]). This shows that 
people not only indicated to be more curious (Experiment 1), but that they were also 
more willing to wait to see the outcome when outcome uncertainty was higher and for 
gains compared with losses. Both the effect of outcome valence (Figure 4.3D) as well 
as the effect of outcome uncertainty (Figure 4.3E) were robust and present in a large 
proportion of participants. We found no evidence for an interaction between outcome 
uncertainty and outcome valence on willingness to wait (BRMS: 95% CI [-.01,.43]). The 
absence of an interaction was supported by the results from the repeated measures 
ANOVAs (Supplement 1) and the Bayes Factor of .24 indicated that there is moderate 
evidence that an interaction between outcome valence and outcome uncertainty should 
not be included in the model. 
There was a significant interaction between absolute expected value and outcome 
valence (BRMS: 95% CI [.08,.27]), but no main effect of absolute expected value on 
willingness to wait (BRMS: 95% CI [-.06,.12]). This indicates that the effects of absolute 
expected value differed between gain and loss trials. Indeed, analyses of gain and loss 
trials separately revealed a positive relationship between absolute expected value and 
willingness to wait in the gain trials (BRMS: 95% CI [.06,.37]), such that participants 
were more willing to wait for higher gains than for lower gains. However, there was a 
negative relationship between absolute expected value and willingness to wait in the 
loss trials (BRMS: 95% CI [-.25,-.02]), such that participants were less willing to wait 
for higher losses compared with lower losses (see also Figure 4.3F). In other words: 
participants were less willing to wait when they would lose more money.
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Figure 4.3 | Individual variability of the outcome valence (gain/loss), outcome uncertainty (OU) 
and absolute expected value  (|EV|) effects of Experiment 1 (A,B,C) and Experiment 2 (D,E,F)
 The left panels (A and D) depict individual variability in the extent to which participants were more 
curious about gains compared with losses. In both panels, the x-axis depicts the mean curiosity/
willingness to wait for the loss trials and the y-axis depicts the mean curiosity/willingness to wait 
for gain trails. Every dot depicts one participant. In all panels, most dots are above the diagonal, 
indicating that a great majority of the participants were more curious (A) and more willing to wait 
(D) for gains compared with losses. 
 The middle panels (B and E) depict individual variability in the extent to which participants were 
driven by outcome uncertainty for gain and loss trials. In both panels, the x-axis depicts the mean 
curiosity/willingness to wait for high minus low outcome uncertainty in loss trials, with positive 
and negative values indicating a positive or negative relationship between outcome uncertainty 
and curiosity / willingness to wait in loss trials respectively. The y-axis depicts the mean curiosity 
/ willingness to wait for high minus low outcome uncertainty in gain trials, with positive and 
negative values indicating a positive or negative relationship between outcome uncertainty and 
curiosity / willingness to wait in gain trials respectively. Every dot depicts one participant. In both 
panels, the majority of participants have a positive relationship between outcome uncertainty 
and curiosity/willingness to wait for both gain and loss trials.
 The right panels (C and F) depict individual variability in the extent to which participants were 
driven by absolute expected value (absolute expected value) for gain and loss trials. In all panels, 
the x-axis depicts the mean curiosity/willingness to wait for high minus low absolute expected 
value in loss trials, with positive and negative values indicating a positive or negative relationship 
between absolute expected value and curiosity / willingness to wait in loss trials respectively. The 
y-axis depicts the mean curiosity/willingness to wait for high minus low absolute expected value in 
gain trials, with positive and negative values indicating a positive or negative relationship between 
absolute expected value and curiosity/willingness to wait in gain trials respectively. Every dot
depicts one participant. For Experiment 1 (C), most participants are clustered around 0, explaining
the lack of an effect of absolute expected value in both gain and loss trials. For Experiment 2 (F),
most participants have a positive relationship between absolute expected value and willingness
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to wait in the gain trials (as indicated by the positive y-values). However, a majority of these 
participants have a negative relationship between absolute expected value and willingness to wait 
in the loss trials (as indicated by the negative x-values). This explains the finding that participants 
are more willing to wait for higher gains, but less willing to wait for higher losses.
4.4 | Discussion
Humans are more curious when the information gap between what they know and 
what they don’t know is larger (van Lieshout et al., 2018). Here, we examined whether 
this positive relationship between the information gap and curiosity depends on 
whether the outcome will contain good or bad news. It has been reported that humans 
tend to avoid negative information, presumably because such knowledge boosts the 
anticipation of negative outcomes (Charpentier et al., 2018; Dwyer et al., 2015; Golman, 
Hagmann, & Loewenstein, 2017; Karlsson, Loewenstein, & Seppi, 2009; Persoskie et al., 
2014). Contrary to this notion, we found that curiosity increased with the uncertainty 
of information for both gains and losses. In addition to this effect, we found that people 
were overall more curious about gains compared with losses. However, the effect 
of outcome uncertainty on curiosity was not reliably different for gains and losses, 
indicating that these two effects seemed to operate largely independent from each 
other. As such, these results highlight two separate motives underlying curiosity, 
reflecting both a drive to reduce uncertainty (cf. van Lieshout et al., 2018; see Chapter 2 
and 3) as well as, separately, a drive to maximize positive versus negative information 
(cf. Charpentier et al., 2018). 
4.4.1 | Curiosity is related to uncertainty reduction
Participants were more curious about information that could reduce their uncertainty, 
in line with our previous study with a similar paradigm (van Lieshout et al., 2018; 
see Chapter 2 and 3) as well as other work (Berlyne, 1962; Blanchard et al., 2015; 
Bromberg-Martin & Hikosaka, 2009, 2011; Stagner & Zentall, 2010). Moreover, 
Experiment 2 revealed that participants were even willing to pay with time to see the 
outcome of more uncertain lotteries. The current work strengthens recent findings 
from Kobayashi and colleagues (2019) and our recent work (van Lieshout et al., 2018; 
see Chapter 2 and 3) by showing that such effects of outcome uncertainty generalize 
to the domain of losses: Participants were not only curious about uncertain gains, but 
also about more uncertain losses. This demonstrates that participants show a general 
drive to reduce uncertainty, regardless of whether the information they could obtain 
contained good news (gains) or bad news (losses).  
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4.4.2 | Positive versus negative belief updating
In addition, we found in both experiments that participants were overall more curious 
about the outcome of gain trials compared with loss trials. This is in line with recent 
evidence indicating that participants are overall more curious about gains compared 
with losses (Charpentier et al., 2018) or more generally about positive compared with 
negative information (Marvin & Shohamy, 2016). Importantly, in these studies there 
was no absence of curiosity about losses: people were curious and willing to wait 
for obtaining information about losses, albeit to a lesser degree than for gains. Here 
we demonstrate that even in a passive observation paradigm, people still exhibit a 
preference for positive versus negative belief updating. Moreover, our findings extend 
work by Charpentier and colleagues (2018) and Marvin & Shohamy (2016) by showing 
that the effect of valence is not modulated by the uncertainty of the outcome. 
Our findings concur with a recent proposal (Sharot & Sunstein, 2020) stating that people 
take “affect” into account when deciding what they want to know. This means that, all 
else being equal, people will choose to seek information when the affective response 
towards knowing is more positive than the affective response to remaining ignorant. 
In contrast to our findings using non-instrumental paradigms, studies using other 
paradigms in which rewards could be maximized by means of exploration (instrumental 
paradigms) showed that people exhibit higher exploration rates for losses compared 
with gains (Lejarraga & Hertwig, 2017; Lejarraga et al., 2012). These findings can be 
explained by the notion of loss attention. That is, people show intensified alertness in 
the face of potential losses. Thus, exploration in instrumental contexts is greater for 
losses than gains, presumably because it allows participants to maximize the positive 
outcome of loss avoidance. By contrast, curiosity in non-instrumental contexts is 
greater for gains than losses, perhaps because it allows participants to maximize the 
positive affective state associated with knowing they have won. Therefore, we should 
emphasize that our conclusions do not generalize to situations where people seek 
information to maximize reward.
4.4.3 | Multiple drives represent independent mechanisms of curiosity
In these studies, there was overall no convincing support for the notion that the effect 
of outcome uncertainty was stronger for gains than losses (see also van Lieshout, de 
Lange, & Cools, 2020 or Chapter 5). This suggests that the bias towards information 
about positive compared with negative events operates largely independently from the 
outcome uncertainty effect. These results might suggest that the information gain from 
resolving uncertainty is intrinsically valuable (i.e. Bromberg-Martin & Hikosaka, 2009, 
2011; Marvin & Shohamy, 2016), regardless of whether the information is positive 











or negative. Another possible explanation is that it reflects an active motivation to 
resolve the aversive state of not knowing (Berlyne, 1954; Jepma, Verdonschot, van 
Steenbergen, Rombouts, & Nieuwenhuis, 2012; see also van Lieshout, de Lange, & 
Cools, 2019). Future research should shed light on which of these motives is dominant 
in people’s desire for information and whether this differs between positive and 
negative contexts. Kobayashi and colleagues (2019) described in a recent paper that 
participants’ behavior can be described as a mixture of motives related to uncertainty 
reduction and anticipatory utility. Our findings extend this work by showing that an 
interaction between uncertainty and valence was not robust, suggesting that such 
multiple drives represent independent rather than interactive mechanisms of curiosity. 
Whereas the effects of outcome uncertainty and gain/loss outcome valence on 
curiosity were robust and consistent over experiments, the effects of expected value 
on curiosity were more variable. In Experiment 1, we found no effect of expected 
value on curiosity, such that participants were indifferent about the height of the gains 
and losses. This lack of an effect of expected value might reflect a failure to calculate 
expected value in Experiment 1 at all (see also van Lieshout et al., 2018). In Experiment 
2, we found that participants were more willing to wait when they would gain more 
money, but less willing to wait when they would lose more money. This finding concurs 
with recent work by Kobayashi and colleagues (2019) and Charpentier and colleagues 
(2018), who found that participants choose knowledge about future desirable 
outcomes (when gains were higher) and choose to remain ignorant about future 
undesirable outcomes (when losses were higher). Participants in the latter study were 
even willing to pay for knowledge about gains and for ignorance about losses. In other 
words: we find that in the loss domain, willingness to wait increases with the size of the 
information gap, but decreases with the magnitude of the expected loss.  Whereas we 
are driven by uncertainty reduction, there is an additional preference for anticipating 
positive outcomes (savouring), while avoiding the dread that might be associated with 
anticipating negative outcomes (Charpentier et al., 2018; Iigaya, Story, Kurth-Nelson, 
Dolan, & Dayan, 2016; Kobayashi et al., 2019).
4.4.4 | Limitations and future directions
In the current study, we used a non-instrumental lottery observation task, which 
enabled us to manipulate outcome valence, as well as outcome uncertainty and 
expected value in a quantitative and controlled fashion. Prior work on human curiosity 
has made use of a trivia questions paradigm (Gruber, Gelman, & Ranganath, 2014; 
Kang et al., 2009; Marvin & Shohamy, 2016), in which participants have to rate their 
curiosity about trivia questions. These findings suggested that individuals are mostly 
curious about information of intermediate uncertainty (Kang et al., 2009), which 
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is in contrast with our observation of a linear relationship between uncertainty and 
curiosity. However, it might reflect that participants in previous work were not curious 
about questions with highest uncertainty (i.e., lowest confidence) because they were 
simply not interested in the topics of these questions, confounding the relationship 
between curiosity and uncertainty. Whereas the tasks used in the current study 
might seem further removed from everyday situations that elicit curiosity, one of the 
benefits is that it did allow us to manipulate outcome valence and outcome uncertainty 
in a quantitative and controlled fashion. However, future studies could shed more light 
on the ecological validity of the current paradigm. This could for example be done by 
means of online studies in which performance on this task is combined with experience 
sampling of real-life fluctuating states of curiosity.  
4.5 | Conclusion
Altogether, our findings advance the understanding of the psychological mechanisms 
underlying curiosity, by suggesting that there might be separate mechanisms that 
affect curiosity, related to uncertainty reduction (knowing) and processing reward 
context (savouring). 
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4.7.1 |  Supplement 1: Analyses of Experiment 1 and 2 using repeated 
measures ANOVAs
Repeated Measures ANOVAs in SPSS
In addition to the analyses reported in the main text, we performed similar analyses 
using repeated measures ANOVAs in SPSS (RRID:SCR_002865). These analyses were 
performed to accommodate readers that are used to interpreting frequentist statistics 
instead of Bayesian credible intervals and to verify that our conclusions do not depend 
on the analytical framework employed. The conclusions derived from the repeated 
measures ANOVAs are essentially the same as the conclusions reported in the main 
text (see Supplementary Table 4.1 and 4.2). 
To this end, we divided the values of outcome uncertainty into “low outcome 
uncertainty” and “high outcome uncertainty”, such that approximately 50% of the trials 
were indicated as being low outcome uncertainty (outcome uncertainty  <= 350 in 
Experiment 1 and outcome uncertainty <= 200 in Experiment 2) and approximately 50% 
as high outcome uncertainty (outcome uncertainty > 350 in Experiment 1 and outcome 
uncertainty > 200 in Experiment 2). Additionally, we divided the values of absolute 
expected value into “low expected value” (expected value (absolute) < 50) and “high 
expected value” (expected value (absolute) > 50). Note that the trials with absolute 
expected value = 50 were omitted from the analyses. This was done because the values 
of absolute expected value are perfectly centered around expected value (absolute) 
= 50, precluding us to classify these trials as being either low or high expected value. 
We performed a 2 (outcome valence: gain, loss) x 2 (outcome uncertainty: low, high) x 2 
(expected value (absolute): low, high) repeated measures ANOVA with outcome valence 
(gain/loss), outcome uncertainty (low/high) and absolute expected value (low/high) as 
within-subject factors. The dependent variable was either mean curiosity as indicated 
by means of the curiosity ratings (Experiment 1) or mean percentage willingness to 
wait, as indicated by participants’ willingness to wait decisions (Experiment 2). If the 
interaction effects between “outcome valence (gain/loss)” and “outcome uncertainty” 
or between “outcome valence (gain/loss)” and “expected value (absolute)” were 
significant, we ran 2 (outcome uncertainty: low, high) x 2 (expected value (absolute): 
low, high) repeated measures ANOVAs on the gain and loss trials separately. This 
allowed us to assess the significance of outcome uncertainty and absolute expected 
value on curiosity or willingness to wait for the gain and loss trials separately.
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Bayesian Repeated Measures ANOVAs in JASP
In JASP (RRID:SCR_015823), we performed the Bayesian equivalent of the repeated 
measures ANOVAs reported above. This allowed us to quantify the relative evidence for 
the alternative hypothesis compared to the null hypothesis, and thereby also quantify 
evidence in favour of the null hypothesis. We used the default Cauchy prior to compute 
Bayes Factors (BF) for each effect. For interpretability in analyses with multiple factors, 
we used model averaging across matched models to get a single BF for each effect 
in the repeated measures ANOVA. This BF reflects the change from prior to posterior 
inclusion odds. It can intuitively be understood as the amount of evidence that the data 
gives for including an experimental factor in a model. The BF will converge to zero 
when the factor should not be included in the model, or to infinity when the factor 
should be included in the model. Values close to one indicate that there is not enough 
evidence for either conclusion.
Results Experiment 1
First of all, curiosity strongly increased with outcome uncertainty (RMA: F1,33 = 51.7, 
p = 3.07e-8, ηp
2 = .61, BF = 1.54e+20), such that participants were more curious about 
high (M = 2.79; SD = .43) compared with low outcome uncertainty (M = 2.21; SD = .48) 
in Experiment 1 (Supplementary Table 4.2). There was also a main effect of outcome 
valence, such that curiosity was higher for gains (M = 2.69; SD = .44) compared with 
losses (M = 2.43; SD = .48; RMA: F1,33 = 16.4, p = 2.93e-4, ηp
2  = .33, BF = 1.27e+6). 
Crucially, there was no interaction between outcome uncertainty and outcome valence 
(RMA: F1,33 = 1.7, p = .20, ηp
2  = .049, BF = .21). 
There was no significant interaction between absolute expected value and outcome 
valence (RMA: F1,33 = .38, p = .54, ηp
2  = .011, BF = .20), indicating that curiosity did not 
scale with reward magnitude. Also, curiosity did not increase with absolute expected 
value (RMA: F1,33 = 2.4, p = .13, ηp
2  = .068, BF = .44), so there was no difference in 
curiosity ratings for low gains (M = 2.59; SD = 0.44) compared with high gains (M = 
2.69; SD = 0.56) and no difference in curiosity ratings for low losses (M = 2.35; SD = 
0.47) compared with high losses (M = 2.40; SD = 0.56).  
Results Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, we tested people’s curiosity more implicitly by means of assessing 
their willingness to wait to see the outcome (Supplementary Table 4.2). Consistent with 
Experiment 1, willingness to wait increased with outcome uncertainty (RMA: F1,33 = 
63.6, p = 3.38e-9, ηp
2  = .66, BF = 5.32e+31), such that participants were willing to wait 
in a higher percentage of trials with high (M = 63.6; SD = 20.5) compared with low (M 
= 25.4; SD = 19.5) outcome uncertainty. Also, willingness to wait was higher for gain 
(M = 55.1; SD = 23.6) compared with loss trials (M = 35.6; SD = 14.5; RMA: F1,33 =18.4, 











p = 1.46e-4, ηp
2  = .36, BF = 3.27e+8). The interaction between outcome uncertainty 
and outcome valence on willingness to wait did not reach significance (RMA: F1,33 =2.9, 
p = .099, ηp
2  = .080, BF = .24). 
There was a significant interaction between absolute expected value and outcome 
valence (RMA: F1,33 =16.0, p = 3.36e-4, ηp
2 = .33, BF = 1.07), indicating that the 
effects of absolute expected value differed between gain and loss trials. Indeed, 
analyses of gain and loss trials separately revealed a positive relationship between 
absolute expected value and willingness to wait in the gain trials (RMA: F1,33 = 5.9, 
p = .021, ηp
2  = .15, BF = .61), such that participants were more willing to wait for higher 
gains (M = 54.4; SD = 25.0) than for lower gains (M = 49.1; SD = 23.8). However, there 
was a negative relationship between absolute expected value and willingness to wait 
in the loss trials (RMA: F1,33 = 9.1, p = .005, ηp
2  = .22, BF = .64), such that participants 
were less willing to wait for higher losses (M = 31.4; SD = 13.7) compared with lower 
losses (M = 36.5; SD = 14.6). There was no main effect of absolute expected value on 
willingness to wait (RMA: F1,33 =.003, p = .96, ηp
2  = 7.85e-5, BF = .14). 
Discussion
The repeated measure ANOVAs replicated the findings using linear mixed modeling 
reported in the main text.









Outcome valence (gain vs. loss) [.18,.51] p = 2.93e-4 ηp
2 = .33 BF = 1.27e+6
Outcome uncertainty [.58,1.11] p = 3.07e-8 ηp
2 = .61 BF = 1.54e+20
Expected value (absolute) [-.02,.26] p = .13 ηp
2 = .068 BF = .44
Outcome valence * Outcome uncertainty [-.05,.09] p = .20 ηp
2 = .049 BF = .21
Outcome valence * Expected value (abs) [-.09,.12] p = .54 ηp
2 = .011 BF = .20









Outcome valence (gain vs. loss) [.25,.98] p = 1.46e-4 ηp
2 = .36 BF = 3.27e+8
Outcome uncertainty [1.23,2.33] p = 3.38e-9 ηp
2 = .66 BF = 5.32e+31
Expected value (absolute) [-.06,.12] p = .96 ηp
2 = 7.85e-5  BF = .14
Outcome valence * Outcome uncertainty [-.01,.43] p = .099 ηp
2 = .080 BF = .24
Outcome valence * Expected value (abs) [.08,.27] p = 3.36e-4 ηp
2 = .33 BF = 1.07
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4.7.2 | Supplement 2: Experiment 1B and Experiment 1C
We performed two additional experiments, Experiment 1B and Experiment 1C. The aim 
of performing these experiments was to investigate whether the results of Experiment 
1 would be replicated if the gain and loss trials would not be presented in separate 
blocks, but would vary on a trial-by-trial basis instead. By manipulating gain and loss 
in a randomized design, we control for nonspecific state-related changes (i.e. mood 
or arousal) associated with the gain or loss context. Participants of both experiments 
performed the same task, with the only difference that the participants of Experiment 
1B performed the experiment in a behavioral lab, whereas participants of Experiment 
1C did the experiment while we non-invasively recorded neural activity using fMRI. 
The neural results are outside the scope of the current manuscript, so we will not 
discuss details regarding fMRI procedures.
Methods
Participants
Experiment 1B: Thirty-six healthy individuals participated in Experiment 1B, involving 
curiosity ratings and randomized gain/loss trials. In total, three participants were 
excluded. One participant was excluded because he reported during debriefing that he 
(falsely) believed that he could influence the lottery outcomes and the other participant 
because he did not give a curiosity rating in > 10% of all trials. The final sample of 
the experiment consisted of thirty-three participants (25 women, age 23.42 ± 3.40, 
mean ± SD). Conventions regarding informed consent and ethical approval are as for 
Experiment 1 and 2 (see main text – methods – participants). 
Experiment 1C: Thirty-six healthy participants took part in Experiment 1C, involving 
curiosity ratings and randomized gain/loss trials while non-invasively recording 
neural activity using fMRI. In total, three participants were excluded. One participant 
was excluded due to excessive movement, one participant was excluded due to brain-
peculiarities and another participant due to registration difficulties. The final sample 
thus consisted of thirty-three participants (25 women, age 23.14 ± 3.04, mean ± SD). 
All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and had been screened for 
MR compatibility before the experiment started. 
Procedure
The procedure of the experiments was similar to the procedure of Experiment 1. Because 
our primary hypotheses concerned comparing gain events with loss events, we did not 
include any mixed trials in the experiment. The participants were presented with only 
two vase configurations: (1) 75%-25% vases: 15 marbles had one color and 5 marbles 











the other color and (2) 50%-50% vases: 10 marbles had one color and 10 marbles the 
other color. This was done to reduce differences in visual processing between the 
different vase configurations. Both colored marbles were associated with a monetary 
value that participants could gain or lose. In gain trials, the monetary values varied 
between 10 cents and 90 cents (in steps of 10 cents) and in loss trials the monetary 
values varied between -90 and -10 cents (in steps of 10 cents). In both trial types, all 
combinations of monetary values associated with red and blue marbles were possible, 
except for combinations of the same monetary values. The first screen, on which the 
vase, the marbles and the monetary values associated with the marbles were depicted, 
was presented for 4 s. Next, the same response screen as in Experiment 1, during 
which participants could indicate their curiosity, was presented for 2.5 s. The response 
screen was followed by a blank screen with a jittered duration between 2.5 and 4.5 s 
(uniformly distributed) and an outcome screen (2 s). As in Experiment 1, participants 
had a 50% chance that their curiosity w-ould be satisfied by seeing the outcome and 
a 50% chance that the outcome was withheld. When the outcome was presented, the 
outcome screen depicted the selected marble in the middle of the screen and the 
amount of money participants won or lost in that trial below the marble. When the 
outcome was not presented, participants saw a black marble instead of a colored marble 
and question marks at the location of the monetary value. This way, the amount of 
visual input was roughly comparable between presented and not presented outcomes. 
After a trial ended, there was a blank screen with a jittered duration between 3.5 and 
4.5 s (uniformly distributed) and after every 9 trials, the duration of the blank screen 
was prolonged with an additional 16 s. As in Experiment 1, participants had no way of 
influencing whether they would observe the outcome of a particular trial, or what the 
outcome of that trial would be. Again, participants were told that a marble would be 
selected on every trial and that they would earn or lose the money associated with that 
marble, even if the outcome was not presented. All money that they won or lost would 
be summed and added to or subtracted from the money they received for participation.
In the experiment, the gain- and loss trials were pseudo-randomized such that the 
same trial type was never presented more than five times in a row. The participants 
completed a total of 216 trials (108 gain trials and 108 loss trials), divided in 4 blocks of 
54 trials. Each vase configuration was presented on 108 occasions, so 54 times for each 
trial type. After each block, the participants were instructed to take a short break if they 
wanted. The experiment itself lasted ~ 70 minutes in total. Participants of Experiment 
1B received a base payment of 12 euros and participants of the fMRI Experiment 1C 
received a base payment of 20 euros for their participation. Participants were told that 
all the money they gained and lost would be added to or subtracted from this value. 
In the end, the task was set up in a way that participants of both experiments would 
always receive a bonus of 50 cents on top of this base payment.
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Experimental Design, Primary Statistical Analyses & Data Visualization
All conventions for the experimental design and the statistical analyses are as 
described for Experiment 1 (see main text – 2. Methods – 2.4 Experimental Design 
& Primary Statistical Analyses). The analyses with repeated measures ANOVAs were 
performed as described for Experiment 1 in Supplement 1 (see Supplementary material 
– Supplement 1), except that the cut-off value of dividing outcome uncertainty into
“low outcome uncertainty” and “high outcome uncertainty” was the same as described 
for Experiment 2. This was done because Experiments 1B and 1C used the exact same 
values for outcome uncertainty as Experiment 2. All conventions for data visualization 
are as for Experiment 1 (see main text – 2. Methods – 2.5 Data Visualization).
Results
Experiment 1B:
For Experiment 1B, outcome valence (gain/loss) was manipulated on a trial-to-trial 
basis instead of in a blockwise fashion. We again found that curiosity strongly increased 
with outcome uncertainty (BRMS: 95% CI [1.17;2.60]; RMA: F1,32 = 57.5, p = 1.22e-8, ηp
2 
= .64, BF = 1.94e+19). In other words: curiosity was higher for high (M = 3.04; SD = 
0.44) than low outcome uncertainty (M = 2.24; SD = 0.40). Also, curiosity was higher 
for gain trials (M = 2.99; SD = 0.51) than loss trials (M = 2.29; SD = 0.58; BRMS: 95% 
CI [.61,1.86]; RMA: F1,32 = 19.8, p = 9.69e-5, ηp
2  = .38, BF = 3.07e+15; Supplementary 
Figure 4.1A). Again, both effects were robust and present for a large proportion of 
participants (Supplementary Figure 4.2A and 4.2B). This time, there was also evidence 
for an interaction between outcome uncertainty and outcome valence (BRMS: 95% CI 
[.08,.37]), but the effect appears to be less robust and present in a smaller proportion 
of participants (Supplementary Figure 4.2B). Moreover, the presence of this interaction 
was not supported by the results of the repeated measures ANOVA (RMA: F1,32 = 3.6, p 
= .066, ηp
2  = .10, BF = .21) and the Bayes Factor of .21 indicates that there is moderate 
evidence that the interaction term should not be included in the model. Unlike 
Experiment 1, this additional experiment revealed a significant main effect of absolute 
expected value, such that curiosity was higher for high absolute expected value 
compared with low absolute expected value (BRMS: 95% CI [.22,.47]; RMA: F1,32 = 32.8, 
p = 2.42e-6, ηp
2  = .51, BF = 1.59). However, there is also evidence for an interaction 
between absolute expected value and outcome valence (BRMS: 95% CI [.15,.51]; RMA: 
F1,32 = 12.4, p = .001, ηp
2  = .28, BF = .51), indicating that the effects of absolute expected 
value differ between gain and loss trials (Supplementary Figure 4.1). Indeed, analyses 
of the gain trials and loss trials separately, revealed a positive relationship between 
absolute expected value and curiosity in the gain trials, such that participants were 
more curious for higher (M = 3.10; SD = 0.56) compared with lower gains (M = 2.82; SD 
= 0.50; BRMS: 95% CI [.44,.94]; RMA:  F1,32 =46.72, p = 9.91e-8, ηp
2  = .59, BF = 412.3). 











However, there was no relationship between absolute expected value and curiosity on 
the loss trials (BRMS: 95% CI [-.17,.21]; RMA: F1,32 =1.8, p = .194, ηp
2  = .052, BF = .25), 
such that there was no difference in curiosity about higher losses (M = 2.29; SD = 0.64) 
compared with lower losses (M = 2.23; SD = 0.50).
Supplementary Figure 4.1 | Results of Experiment 1B and Experiment 1C
A   The additional Experiment 1B showed that curiosity was higher for gains than for losses. There 
was a monotonic increase with outcome uncertainty in both the gain and loss context, and 
this effect of outcome uncertainty tended to be greater in the gain than the loss context. An 
increase with expected value was found only in the gain context, not in the loss context.
B   Experiment 1C showed that curiosity was higher for gains and losses and that there was a 
monotonic increase with outcome uncertainty in both gain and loss context. The effect of 
outcome uncertainty on curiosity was equally strong for gains and losses. An increase with 
absolute expected value was found for both the gain and loss context.
Experiment 1C:
In Experiment 1C, outcome valence (gain/loss) was also manipulated on a trial-to-trial 
basis. We again found that curiosity strongly increased with outcome uncertainty 
(BRMS: 95% CI [1.56,2.94]; RMA: F1,32 = 135.6, p = 4.80e-13, ηp
2  = .81, BF = 5.43e+48). 
In other words: curiosity was higher for high (M = 3.17; SD = .39) compared with low 
outcome uncertainty (M = 2.16; SD = .37). Also, curiosity was higher for gain trials (M 
= 2.82; SD = .38) compared with loss trials (M = 2.49; SD = .37; BRMS: 95% CI [.25,.71]; 
RMA: F1,32 = 16.7, p = 2.75e-4, ηp



























































expected value (absolute, bins)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
outcome uncertainty (bins)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
expected value (absolute, bins)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
outcome uncertainty (bins)







Again, both effects were robust and present for a large proportion of participants 
(Supplementary Figure 4.2D and 4.2E). There was no evidence for an interaction 
between outcome uncertainty and outcome valence (BRMS: 95% CI [-.05,.16]; RMA: F1,32 
= 4.07e-5, p = .995, ηp
2  = 1.27e-6, BF = .20). 
Supplementary Figure 4.2 | Individual variability the effects of outcome valence (gain/loss; A,D), 
outcome uncertainty  (B,E) and absolute expected value (C,F) of the experiments
Experiment 1B shows that most participants are more curious about gains compared with losses 
(A) and that most participants are sensitive to outcome uncertainty (B). In Experiment 1B, most
participants have a positive relationship between absolute expected value and curiosity in the
gain trials (as indicated by the positive y-values; C), whereas the relationship between absolute
expected value and curiosity in the loss trials is more variable (as indicated by both negative and 
positive x-values). This explains the finding that participants were more curious about higher
values of absolute expected value in gain trials and the lack of an absolute expected value effect
in loss trials. 
Likewise, Experiment 1C shows that most participants are more curious about gains 
compared with losses (D) and sensitive to outcome uncertainty (E). In Experiment 1C, 
however, most participants have a positive relationship between absolute expected 
value and curiosity (F) in gain trials (as indicated by positive y-values) as well as in 
loss trials (as indicated by positive x-values). This explains the finding that participants 



































mean curiosity high - low OU (loss)

























































mean curiosity high - low |EV| (loss)














































Unlike Experiment 1, this additional experiment revealed a significant main effect of 
absolute expected value, such that curiosity was higher for high (M = 2.74; SD = .35) 
absolute expected value compared with low (M = 2.51; SD = .28) absolute expected 
value (BRMS: 95% CI [.26.55]; RMA: F1,32 = 26.3, p = 1.39e-5, ηp
2  = .45, BF = 862.7). 
However, there was no interaction between outcome valence and absolute expected 
value (BRMS: 95% CI [-.02,.15]; RMA: F1,32 = 2.5, p = .12, ηp
2  = .074, BF = .23), indicating 
that participants were more curious about higher compared with lower gains and 
losses. 
Discussion
Experiment 1B and 1C showed that the results of Experiment 1 reported in the main 
text are largely replicated if the gain and loss trials are not presented in separate 
blocks, but vary on a trial-by-trial basis. The finding that people are more curious for 
gains compared with losses is therefore not due to state-related changes (i.e. mood or 
arousal) related to being in a gain or loss context.
4.7.3 | Supplement 3: Including the mixed outcome valence condition
Furthermore, we performed additional analyses on the data of Experiment 1 that were 
not of primary interest, but relevant to understand the data. All experiments reported 
in the manuscript included gain trials (in which both monetary values are positive) 
and loss trials (in which both monetary values are negative). However, Experiment 1 
also included mixed trials, in which one monetary value is positive and one monetary 
value is negative. In these trials, there is additional uncertainty about the valence of 
the outcome (i.e. about whether people would actually gain or lose money). We aimed 
to investigate whether curiosity would be enhanced with this added uncertainty. To 
this end, we ran a model in which we compared the mixed trials with the gain trials and 
a model in which we compared the mixed trials with the loss trials.
Statistical analyses including mixed trials
To compare the mixed trials with the gain and the loss trials, we modeled the data using 
the brm function of the BRMS package (Bürkner, 2017) in a similar way as described 
before. In the first model we compared the gain trials with the mixed trials. To this 
end, “curiosity rating (1 - 4)” was included as ordinal dependent variable and the main 
effects of “outcome valence (gain/mixed)”, “outcome uncertainty” and “expected value” 
were included as fixed effects as well as the interaction effects between “outcome 
valence (gain/mixed)” and “outcome uncertainty” and between “outcome valence (gain/
mixed)” and “expected value”. The model included a full random effects structure (Barr, 
2013; Barr, et al., 2013), meaning that a random intercept and random slopes for all 
effects were included per participant. In the second model, we compared the loss trials 
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with the mixed trials. To this end, we modeled the data in a similar way as described 
above, except that the gain trials were replaced with the loss trials. 
The main difference between these analyses and the primary statistical analyses 
(see main text – 2. Methods – 2.4 Experimental Design & Primary Statistical Analyses), 
was the way in which the values for expected value were included in the analyses. 
Since expected value was always positive in the gain context, always negative in 
the loss context, and could be positive or negative in the mixed context, the exact 
expected values differed between the three contexts. In order to account for this, 
we standardized the values of expected value for the three contexts separately and 
we used these values in the models. It should be noted that the expected values in 
the gain context range from less to more positive values (from gaining less money to 
gaining more money) in the loss context from more negative to less negative values 
(from losing more money to losing less money) and in the mixed context from negative 
values to positive values (from losing money to gaining money). 
All other conventions regarding the modeling are as for the primary statistical analyses 
(see main text – 2. methods – 2.4 Experimental Design & Primary Statistical Analyses). 
Additionally, we performed similar analyses using repeated measures ANOVAs in SPSS 
and the Bayesian equivalent of the repeated measures ANOVAs in JASP. To this end, we 
divided the values of outcome uncertainty into “low outcome uncertainty” and “high 
outcome uncertainty”, such that approximately 50% of the trials were indicated as 
being low outcome uncertainty (outcome uncertainty <= 350) and approximately 50% 
as high outcome uncertainty (outcome uncertainty > 350). Additionally, we divided the 
values of expected value into “low expected value” and “high expected value” for the 
contexts separately. For the gain context this would mean that “low expected value” < 
50 and “high expected value” > 50, for the loss context, “low expected value” < -50 and 
“high expected value” > -50 and for the mixed context “low expected value”< 0 and 
“high expected value” > 0. Note again that the values of expected value are perfectly 
centered around expected value = 50 in the gain context, expected value = -50 in the 
loss context and expected value = 0 in the mixed context. This precludes us to classify 
the trials with these values of expected value as either low or high expected value and 
therefore we omitted these trials from the analyses.
We performed a 2 (outcome valence: gain, mixed) x 2 (outcome uncertainty: low, 
high) x 2 (expected value: low, high) repeated measures ANOVA with outcome valence 
(gain/mixed), outcome uncertainty and expected value as within-subject factors. The 
dependent variable was mean curiosity, as indicated by participants’ curiosity ratings. 
If the interaction effects between “outcome valence (gain/mixed)” and “outcome 











uncertainty” or between “outcome valence (gain/mixed)” and “expected value” were 
significant, we ran a 2 (outcome uncertainty: low, high) x 2 (expected value (absolute): 
low, high) repeated measures ANOVA on the gain and mixed trials separately. This 
allowed us to assess the significance of outcome uncertainty and expected value 
(absolute) on willingness to wait of the gain and mixed trials separately. To compare 
the mixed trials to the loss trials in the same way, we performed the same repeated 
measures ANOVAs with the loss instead of the gain trials. 
Data visualization
The data visualization was performed in the same way as described in the main text 
(with addition of a mixed context; see Supplementary Figure 4.3). 
Results
When comparing the mixed trials with the gain trials (Supplementary Figure 4.3), 
we found that participants were more curious about the outcome of gain trials (M 
= 2.69; SD = 0.44) compared with mixed trials (M = 2.38; SD = 0.39; BRMS: 95% CI 
[.23,.55]; RMA:  F1,33 = 25.2, p = 1.74e-5, ηp
2 = .43, BF = 5.28e+6). We again found that 
curiosity increased with outcome uncertainty (BRMS: 95% CI [.67,1.19]; RMA:  F1,33 = 
51.7, p = 3.05e-8, ηp
2 = .61, BF = 1.20e+24), but not with expected value (BRMS: 95% 
CI [-.05,.21]),; RMA:  F1,33 = .76, p = .39, ηp
2 = .023, BF = .18). Additionally, there was 
an interaction between outcome uncertainty and gain vs. mixed trials (BRMS: 95% CI 
[-.14,-.01]); RMA:  F1,33 = 5.5, p = .025, ηp
2 = .14, BF = .41), such that the effect of outcome 
uncertainty was stronger for mixed trials compared with gain trials. There was no 
interaction between expected value and gain vs. mixed trials (BRMS: 95% CI [-.06,.17]); 
RMA:  F1,33 = 2.05, p = .16, ηp
2 = .058, BF = .33). When comparing the mixed trials with 
the loss trials (Supplementary Figure 4.3), we found no difference between curiosity 
about the outcome for loss trials (M = 2.43; SD = .48) and mixed trials (M = 2.38; SD = 
0.39; BRMS: 95% CI [-.12,.22]; RMA:  F1,33 = .20, p = .66, ηp
2 = 5.87e-3, BF = .16), indicating 
that the mixed trials were evaluated in a similar way as the loss trials. We again found 
that curiosity increased with outcome uncertainty (BRMS: 95% CI [.64,1.16]; RMA:  F1,33 
= 47.1, p = 7.84e-8, ηp
2 = .59, BF = 4.54e+22), but not with expected value (BRMS: 95% 
CI [-.16,.09]); RMA: F1,33 = .61, p = .44, ηp
2 = .018, BF = .17). Additionally, there was an 
interaction between outcome uncertainty and loss vs. mixed trials (BRMS: 95% CI [-.17,-
.03]); RMA:  F1,33 = 10.2, p = .003, ηp
2 = .24, BF = .79), such that the effect of outcome 
uncertainty was stronger for mixed trials compared with loss trials. There was no 
interaction between expected value and loss vs. mixed trials (BRMS: 95% CI [-.15,.02]); 
RMA:  F1,33 = .32, p = .58, ηp
2 = .010, BF = .19).
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Supplementary Figure 4.3 | Behavioural results of Experiment 1, including the mixed condition 
The x-axes depict percentile bins of the values of outcome uncertainty (left) and of the 
standardized values of expected value (right). The y-axes depict the mean curiosity ratings for 
each percentile of outcome uncertainty and expected value for the gain trials (red), loss trials (blue) 
and mixed trials (green) separately. The results of Experiment 1 showed that curiosity was higher 
for gain trials than for mixed trials and loss trials. However, there was no difference between 
the mixed trials and loss trials. Curiosity increased monotonically with outcome uncertainty 
in all three conditions, but there was no significant modulation of curiosity by expected value. 
However, there was an interaction between outcome uncertainty and outcome valence, due to 
greater effects of outcome uncertainty for the mixed trials compared with the gain and loss trials.
Discussion
The mixed trials allowed us to investigate whether curiosity would be enhanced when 
there is additional uncertainty about the valence of the outcome (i.e. when there was 
uncertainty regarding whether people would actually gain or lose money). The results 
show that curiosity was higher for gain trials than for mixed trials, but there was no 
difference in curiosity between mixed and loss trials. These findings indicate that 
participants evaluate mixed trials in a similar way as loss trials. In other words: as soon 
as the lottery involves a loss, curiosity is decreased compared with gain trials.
4.7.4 |  Supplement 4: Effects of uncertainty: entropy or absolute 
difference?
The results of both experiments reported in the main text, show that outcome 
uncertainty is a strong driver of curiosity. However, since outcome uncertainty is a 
combination of entropy and absolute difference between the monetary values 
(Equation 1), we investigated whether entropy and absolute difference both contribute 
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Statistical analyses and model comparison 
In order to do so, we remodeled the data of the two experiments. Specifically we 
compared (i) model 1: with absolute difference, entropy, outcome valence (gain/loss) 
and absolute expected value as within-subject factors, (ii) model 2: with absolute 
difference, outcome valence (gain/loss) and absolute expected value as within-subject 
factors, and (iii) model 3: with entropy, outcome valence (gain/loss) and absolute 
expected value as within-subject factors. 
As preregistered, we modeled the data of Experiment 1 using the clmm function of 
the ordinal package (Christensen, 2015) in R (R Core Team, 2013; RRID:SCR_001905). 
Models included all main effects described above and contained a full random effects 
structure (Barr, 2013; Barr et al., 2013). First, we assessed the significance of the 
effects of absolute difference and entropy as modeled in model 1 using the summary 
command. Next, we performed model comparisons in which we compared the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC) of the models using the anova command. 
For Experiment 2 we modeled the data using the brm function of the BRMS package 
(Bürkner, 2017) in R (R Core Team, 2013; RRID:SCR_001905). Models included all main 
effects described above and contained a full random effects structure (Barr, 2013, 
Barr et al., 2013). All other conventions regarding the modeling are as for the primary 
statistical analyses (see main text – 2. Methods – 2.4 Experimental Design & Primary 
Statistical Analyses). First, we assessed the significance of the effects of absolute 
difference and entropy as modeled in model 1. These coefficients were deemed 
statistically significant if the associated 95% posterior credible intervals were non-
overlapping with zero. Next, we performed model comparisons using the loo method 
of the loo package (Vehtari, Gabry, Yao, & Gelman, 2019) for approximate leave-one-
out cross validation (LOO). The LOO Information Criterion (LOOIC) of the models are 
reported here, since they have the same purpose as the AIC, which are used for the 
model comparisons of Experiment 1. LOOIC is intended to estimate the expected log 
predictive density (ELDP) for a dataset, and the difference in ELDP between the models 
gives an indication of how well the models explain the data. 
Effects of uncertainty: entropy or absolute difference?
For Experiment 1, we found that curiosity increased with both the absolute difference 
between the monetary values (Ordinal: Estimate = .78, SD = .097, z = 8.00, p = 1.24e-
15) as well as with entropy (Ordinal: Estimate = .67, SD = .23, z = 2.99, p = 2.27e-3). This 
was confirmed by means of the model comparisons showing that the model containing 
absolute difference as well as entropy (model 1; AIC = 8139.2) explained significantly 
more variance in the curiosity responses than the model containing absolute difference 
(model 2; AIC =9533.6; LR.stat(6) = 1406.4, p = 2.2e-16) and the model containing 
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entropy (model 3; AIC =8824.8; LR.stat(6) = 697.5, p = 2.2e-16). This suggests that a 
combination of entropy and absolute difference provides a better explanation of the 
data in Experiment 1 than entropy or absolute difference alone.  
For Experiment 2, however, we found that willingness to wait increased with the 
absolute difference between the monetary values (BRMS: 95% CI [1.14,2.13]), but not 
with entropy (BRMS: 95% CI [-.69,.12]). The model comparisons showed that the model 
containing absolute difference as well as entropy (model 1; LOOIC = 5893.6, SE = 98.1) 
gives a better explanation of the data than model 3 that only includes entropy (LOOIC = 
8342.5, SE = 69.7; ELDP_diff = -1224.4, SE_diff = 42.5). Model 1 also provides a better 
explanation of the data than model 2 that only contains absolute difference (LOOIC 
= 6390.2, SE = 94.8), but to a lesser extent given the smaller difference in expected 
predictive accuracy (ELDP_diff = -248.2, SE_diff = 20). All in all, this indicates that 
whereas the model including absolute difference as well as entropy provides the best 
explanation of the willingness to wait data. Still it should be noted that the modulation 
of willingness to wait is mostly explained by the absolute difference between the 
monetary values and to a lesser degree by entropy. 
Conclusion
Overall, the results of the model comparisons show that models including both absolute 
difference as well as entropy provide a better explanation of the data than models 
including only one of these factors. 
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You probably know what kind of things you are curious about, but can you also 
explain what it feels like to be curious? Previous studies have demonstrated that we 
are particularly curious when uncertainty is high and when information provides us 
with a substantial update of what we know. It is unclear, however, whether this drive 
to seek information (curiosity) is appetitive or aversive. Curiosity might correspond 
to an appetitive drive elicited by the state of uncertainty, because we like that state, 
or rather it might correspond to an aversive drive to reduce the state of uncertainty, 
because we don’t like it. To investigate this, we obtained both subjective valence 
(happiness) and curiosity ratings from subjects who performed a lottery task that 
elicits uncertainty-dependent curiosity. We replicated a strong main effect of outcome 
uncertainty on curiosity: Curiosity increased with increasing outcome uncertainty, 
irrespective of whether the outcome represented a monetary gain or loss. By contrast, 
happiness decreased with higher outcome uncertainty. This indicates that people were 
more curious, but less happy about lotteries with higher outcome uncertainty. These 
results demonstrate that curiosity reflects an aversive drive to reduce the unpleasant 
state of uncertainty. 












Curiosity can be defined as a motivation that stimulates exploration and information 
seeking (Berlyne, 1966; Gottlieb & Oudeyer, 2018; Gruber & Ranganath, 2019; Kidd 
& Hayden, 2015). Indeed, we consume an enormous amount of information from our 
surroundings. Curiosity towards obtaining that information is generally regarded as 
intrinsically rewarding and pleasurable (Litman, 2005; Marvin & Shohamy, 2016). 
Therefore, the state of curiosity is often associated with positive feelings reflecting an 
appetitive drive towards obtaining novel information. 
However, curiosity has also been casted as “an inconsistency or a gap in our knowledge” 
(James, 1890). This knowledge gap arises when somebody is confronted with a lack of 
information or uncertainty (Berlyne, 1960). Indeed, many (recent) studies have shown 
that humans and other animals are driven to obtain information to reduce uncertainty 
about the world around us (Berlyne, 1962; Blanchard, Hayden, & Bromberg-Martin, 
2015; Bromberg-Martin & Hikosaka, 2009, 2011; Stagner & Zentall, 2010; van Lieshout, 
Traast, de Lange, & Cools, 2019; van Lieshout, Vandenbroucke, Müller, Cools, & de Lange, 
2018). For instance, we recently showed that participants were more curious when there 
was more uncertainty about the outcome of a lottery (van Lieshout, Traast, et al., 2019; 
van Lieshout et al., 2018; see also Chapter 2 - 4). This was the case even though the 
information signaled by the outcome was non-instrumental, so that participants could not 
learn or optimize behavior based on the perceived outcomes. This was the case for both 
positive information (i.e. for lotteries that signal gains) as well as for negative information 
(i.e. for lotteries that signal losses; van Lieshout, Traast, et al., 2019, see Chapter 4). 
Taken together, these studies show that curiosity reflects a drive to reduce uncertainty, 
but what does it feel like to be in this state of uncertainty? Uncertainty can have aversive 
as well as appetitive properties. We see for example that humans often seek out and 
enjoy to engage with situations of high uncertainty, e.g. traveling to unknown places, 
carrying out scientific research with unknown outcomes, or engaging in crossword or 
sudoku puzzles. However, we also know that generally, humans do not like to be in a 
state of uncertainty and consider this state to be aversive (Bar-Anan, Wilson, & Gilbert, 
2009; Berlyne, 1957; Jepma, Verdonschot, van Steenbergen, Rombouts, & Nieuwenhuis, 
2012; Lieberman, Cathro, Nichol, & Watson, 1997; Loewenstein, 1994), or even 
anxiety-evoking (Grupe & Nitschke, 2013). As a consequence, obtaining information 
and ending the unpleasant state of uncertainty might be rewarding, consistent with 
an information-as-reward hypothesis (Marvin & Shohamy, 2016). This is supported by 
opponent-process theory of motivation (Solomon & Corbit, 1978), which states that 
rewards (like drugs of abuse or, in this case, information) can have both appetitive and 
aversive properties, with reward seeking reflecting both a motivation to maximize the 
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presence of reward as well as a motivation to reduce the aversive state elicited by the 
absence of (e.g. withdrawal from) reward.
The idea that information can be rewarding is supported by findings in macaque 
monkeys indicating that primary rewards and information share similar behavioral 
and neurobiological properties (Blanchard et al., 2015; Bromberg-Martin & Hikosaka, 
2009, 2011). Work with human volunteers has also suggested that the induction of 
curiosity implicates brain regions linked to aversive conditions, such as the anterior 
cingulate cortex and the anterior insula, while curiosity relief implicates brain areas 
related to reward (Jepma et al., 2012). 
5.1.1 | The present experiments
In the current set of studies, we aimed to elucidate whether curiosity is an aversive 
or an appetitive drive by investigating whether the curiosity-triggering state of 
uncertainty is aversive or appetitive. Using similar lottery tasks as in our previous 
work (van Lieshout, Traast, et al., 2019; van Lieshout et al., 2018; see Chapter 2 - 4), 
we independently manipulated the uncertainty and magnitude of expected value of 
trial outcomes, as well as the sign of the expected value (gain versus loss). Thus, each 
lottery was associated with more or less uncertain gains or losses. Furthermore, we 
manipulated whether participants would see the outcome of a lottery at the end of the 
trial or not in a block-wise fashion. We did so to investigate the effects of knowing that 
uncertainty would be relieved versus not relieved at the end of a trial. In Experiment 
1, participants were asked to indicate how happy they were that the lottery would be 
played, whereas the participants of Experiment 2 were asked how curious they were 
about the outcome of the lottery. 
We considered two main hypotheses. If the curiosity-triggering state of uncertainty has 
appetitive properties, then greater curiosity would be accompanied by greater liking. 
According to this hypothesis, happiness (Experiment 1) and curiosity (Experiment 
2) both increase with outcome uncertainty: People would be more curious as well as
happier about lotteries with higher outcome uncertainty (van Lieshout, Traast, et al., 
2019; van Lieshout et al., 2018). However, if the curiosity-triggering state of uncertainty 
has aversive properties, then there would be a dissociation between curiosity and 
liking. Under this hypothesis, people would be more curious about lotteries with higher 
outcome uncertainty (van Lieshout, Traast, et al., 2019; van Lieshout et al., 2018), while 
at the same time less happy when lotteries with higher outcome uncertainty are played. 
To preview, we demonstrated that curiosity increased with outcome uncertainty for 
both gains and losses, replicating previous findings (van Lieshout, Traast, et al., 2019; 











van Lieshout et al., 2018; see Chapter 2 - 4). In contrast, happiness ratings decreased 
with higher outcome uncertainty. These findings indicate that people are more curious, 
but less happy when outcome uncertainty is higher. Surprisingly, there was no effect of 
outcome presentation. Thus, the effects of outcome uncertainty for both experiments 
did not depend on knowing whether the outcome would be presented and curiosity 
would or would not be relieved. These results suggest that curiosity reflects an aversive 
drive to reduce the unpleasant state of uncertainty.
5.2 | Methods
5.2.1 | Preregistration and data & code availability
Both experiments and their analyses were preregistered on the Open Science 
Framework (https://osf.io/yd9gw). All data and code used for stimulus presentation and 
analyses are freely available on the Donders Repository (https://data.donders.ru.nl/
login/reviewer-108589638/P1UqLK4fiDvW8Rlsa-TUkaE6Sd1fz1VRJJ7jG9xm0Vc).
5.2.2 | Participants
Experiment 1: Thirty-seven healthy individuals participated in Experiment 1, 
involving happiness ratings. Two participants were excluded because they falsely 
believed they could influence the lottery outcome by means of their happiness ratings. 
Another participant was excluded due to a technical problem that occurred during the 
experiment. The final sample of Experiment 1 consisted of thirty-four participants (21 
women, age 25.59 ± 6.46, mean ± SD). 
Experiment 2: Thirty-six healthy individuals participated in Experiment 2, involving 
curiosity ratings. Two participants were excluded due to technical problems that 
occurred during the experiment. The final sample of Experiment 2 consisted of thirty-
four participants (24 women, age 23.32 ± 3.34, mean ± SD). 
For both experiments, the sample size of N = 34 included participants was chosen to 
be able to detect a within-subject effect of at least medium size (d > 0.5) with 80% 
power using a two-tailed one-sample or paired t-test. All participants gave written 
informed consent according to the declaration of Helsinki prior to participation. The 
experiments were approved by the local ethics committee (CMO Arnhem-Nijmegen, 
The Netherlands) under a general ethics approval protocol (“Imaging Human Cognition”, 
CMO 2014/288) and were conducted in accordance with these guidelines. 
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5.2.3 | Procedures 
Both experiments used a similar lottery task (Figure 5.1). Each trial started with an image 
of a vase containing twenty marbles, each of which could be either red or blue. The 
vases could be configured in three possible ways: (1) 90%-10% vases: 18 marbles of one 
color and 2 marbles of the other color, (2) 75%-25% vases: 15 marbles of one color and 5 
marbles of the other color, (3) 50%-50% vases: 10 marbles of one color and 10 marbles 
of the other color. Both colors were associated with a monetary value that participants 
could either gain or lose. These monetary values varied on a trial-by-trial basis between 
+10 cents and +90 in gain trials and between -90 and -10 cents in loss trials (both in
steps of 10 cents). All combinations of monetary values associated with red and blue 
marbles were possible, except for combinations of the same monetary values. 
We informed the participants that on each trial, one marble would be selected from the 
vase and that they would gain or lose the money associated with the selected marble. 
The first screen of each trial depicted the vase, the marbles, and the monetary values 
associated with the marbles (4000 ms).  Next, a blank screen was presented (500 ms), 
followed by a response screen. On the response screen, participants of Experiment 1 
indicated how happy they were that the presented lottery would be played (“How happy 
are you that this lottery will be played?"), whereas the participants of Experiment 2 
indicated how curious they were about the presented lottery (“How curious are you 
about the outcome of this lottery?”). Participants indicated their happiness (Experiment 
1; Figure 5.1A) or curiosity (Experiment 2; Figure 5.1B) on a sliding bar (visual analogue 
scale) ranging from 0 – 10. This response screen was presented until the participant 
gave a response, with a limit of 10 seconds. The participants used a button box to adjust 
the position of the bar. The bar would always start in the middle (consistent with a 
happiness rating or a curiosity rating of 5), and participants could use their right index 
finger to slide the bar to the left, their right middle finger to slide the bar to the right 
and their right little finger to confirm and save the response. A blank screen (500 ms), 
and an outcome screen (2000 ms) followed the response screen. When the outcome 
was presented, the outcome screen depicted the vase, the marbles and monetary values 
associated with the marbles again, together with a box in which they saw the colored 
marble that was selected and the amount of money they gained or lost in that trial. 
When the outcome was not presented, the participants saw a black marble instead of a 
colored marble and question marks at the location of the monetary value. This way, the 
amount of visual input was roughly comparable between presented and not presented 
outcomes. Participants would always see the outcome of the lottery in half of the task 
blocks, whereas they would not see the outcome of the lottery in the other half of the 
task blocks. This manipulation was instructed explicitly before the start of each block 
and enabled us to investigate whether happiness or curiosity would be a function of 











knowing that the outcome would or would not presented and uncertainty would be 
either relieved or not relieved. After a trial ended, there was a blank screen (jittered 
duration, 1000 – 2000 ms, uniformly distributed), after which the next trial started. 
Figure 5.1 | Schematic depiction of the happiness task (a; Experiment 1) and the curiosity task (b; 
Experiment 2).
A   Schematic depiction of a gain trial in the happiness experiment (Experiment 1). Participants 
saw a screen on which a vase with 20 red and blue marbles was depicted and the monetary 
values associated with the marbles. These monetary values could either both be positive (in 
gain trials, depicted here) or both be negative (in the loss trials). One marble was selected 
randomly from the vase and participants would actually gain or lose the money associated 
with the selected marble. Next, participants indicated how happy they were that the selected 
lottery would be played on a sliding bar (visual analogue scale).  In half of the task blocks, 
participants would always see the outcome, and in the other task blocks they would never see 
the outcome. Importantly, participants could not influence which marble would be selected 
and they were awarded the money associated with the selected marble, regardless of outcome 
presentation.  
B   Schematic depiction of a loss trial in the curiosity experiment (Experiment 2). The task was the 
same as in Experiment 1, but instead of giving a happiness response, the participants had to 
indicate how curious they were about the outcome. See Methods (Procedure) for details on the 
timing of the experiments.
Importantly, participants were explicitly instructed that they could not influence the 
outcome of each lottery. The only thing participants had to do was to indicate how 
happy they were that the presented lottery would be played (Experiment 1) or 
how curious they were about the outcome of the presented lottery (Experiment 2), 
given that the outcome would or would not be presented at the end of the trial. In 
both experiments, participants were told that a marble would be selected on every 





























regardless of outcome presentation. The money they gained or lost in every trial would 
be summed and the sum of money would be added to or subtracted from the money 
they earned for participation. 
For both experiments, the participants completed a total of 408 trials (204 gain trials 
and 204 loss trials). Both gain and loss trials were divided in 102 trials during which the 
outcome was presented and 102 trials during which the outcome was not presented. 
In turn, each vase configuration was presented on 136 occasions (34 times for each 
trial type). The trials were divided in 8 blocks of 52 trials. During 4 of these blocks, the 
outcome would always be presented to the participants, whereas the outcome would 
never be presented in the other 4 blocks. The blocks were pseudo-randomized such 
that participants would never get the same block type more than 2 times in a row. 
Within the blocks, the trials were pseudo-randomized, such that participants were 
never presented with more than six gain trials, six loss trials or six trials with the same 
vase configuration in a row. After each block, the participants were instructed to take a 
short break if necessary. The experiment lasted ~ 105 minutes in total.
5.2.4 | Experimental Design
We investigated whether there was a relationship between the main effects of 
outcome valence (gain/loss), outcome presentation (yes/no), outcome uncertainty, 
absolute expected value and the happiness ratings (Experiment 1) or the curiosity 
ratings (Experiment 2). Furthermore, we investigated whether the effects of outcome 
uncertainty, absolute expected value and outcome presentation (yes /no) on happiness 
or curiosity differed between the gain and loss trials. This was done by assessing the 
significance of interaction-effects between outcome uncertainty, absolute expected 
value, outcome presentation (yes/no) and outcome valence (gain/loss). Likewise, we 
investigate whether the effects of outcome uncertainty, absolute expected value 
and outcome valence (gain/loss) on happiness or curiosity differed between trials 
during which the outcome was presented and trials during which the outcome was 
not presented. This was done by assessing the significance of the interaction-effects 
between outcome uncertainty, absolute expected value, outcome valence (gain/loss) 
and outcome presentation (yes/no). 
In order to do so, a value of outcome uncertainty and expected value was calculated for 
every trial (X) as follows:  
Outcome Uncertainty(X) = ∑i=1 (xi - Expected Value(X))²pi Equation 1
Expected Value(X)=∑i=1 xi pi Equation 2
2
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Here, xi is the monetary value associated with marble (i) and pi the probability that this 
marble will be drawn. Hereby, outcome uncertainty (Equation 1) reflects the spread of 
the possible outcomes in trial (X) and expected value (Equation 2) reflects the mean 
expected reward contained in trial (X). 
It should be noted that we used a different calculation for outcome uncertainty in one 
of our previous studies (van Lieshout et al., 2018; see Chapter 2 and 3), and we initially 
preregistered to use that calculation of outcome uncertainty in the current manuscript 
as well. However, both metrics are almost identical, and variance is a more common 
measure of uncertainty (see for example Preuschoff, Quartz, & Bossaerts, 2008; 
Symmonds, Wright, Bach, & Dolan, 2011). Therefore we decided to calculate outcome 
uncertainty as variance instead.
It should also be noted that the expected value is always positive in a gain trial and 
always negative in a loss trial. To be able to compare the effects of expected value 
between the gain and loss trials, we converted the expected values by taking the 
absolute values such that - 90 cents in a loss trial would be treated the same as + 90 
cents in a gain trial etc. However, the metric of interest here is the effect of reward 
magnitude (signed expected value) on curiosity, which is reflected in the interaction 
between outcome valence (gain/loss) and absolute expected value. 
5.2.5 | Statistical analyses
The data were analyzed using a combination of classical repeated measure ANOVAs 
in SPSS (RRID:SCR_002865) and mixed effects modeling using in R (R Core Team, 
2013; RRID:SCR_001905). This allowed us to verify the robustness of the results and 
to demonstrate that our conclusions do not depend on the analytical framework 
employed. The analyses were performed as preregistered, except that instead of 
running Univariate General Linear Models (GLMs) on the data, we analyzed the data 
with repeated measures ANOVAs. The motivation for this change in analytical strategy 
was to be consistent with our previous study using a similar design (van Lieshout, 
Traast, et al., 2019; see Chapter 4) and because memory requirements of the univariate 
GLM model precluded this analysis type within SPSS with the current data set. 
Analyses using repeated measures ANOVAs in SPSS
The primary statistical analyses of Experiment 1 and 2 were performed using 
repeated measures ANOVAs in SPSS. To this end, we divided the values of outcome 
uncertainty into “low outcome uncertainty” and “high outcome uncertainty”, such that 
approximately 50% of the trials were indicated as being low outcome uncertainty 
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(outcome uncertainty <= 200) and approximately 50% as high outcome uncertainty 
(outcome uncertainty > 200). Additionally, we divided the values of absolute expected 
value into “low expected value” (expected value (absolute) < 50) and “high expected 
value” (expected value (absolute) > 50). Note that the trials with absolute expected 
value = 50 were omitted from the analyses. This was done because the values of 
absolute expected value are perfectly centered around expected value (absolute) = 50, 
precluding us to classify these trials as being either low or high expected value. 
First, as main analyses we performed 2 (outcome valence: gain, loss) x 2 (outcome 
presentation: yes, no) x 2 (outcome uncertainty: low, high) x 2 (expected value 
(absolute): low, high) repeated measures ANOVAs with outcome valence (gain/loss), 
outcome presentation (yes/no), outcome uncertainty (low/high) and absolute expected 
value (low/ high) as within-subject factors. The dependent variable was either mean 
happiness as indicated by the happiness ratings (Experiment 1) or mean curiosity as 
indicated by the curiosity ratings (Experiment 2). Since not all participants used the 
full range of happiness or curiosity ratings, we z-scored the ratings per participant and 
calculated a mean of these z-scores per condition for each participant. 
If the interaction effects between “outcome valence (gain/loss)” and either “outcome 
presentation (yes/no)”, “outcome uncertainty” or “expected value (absolute)” were 
significant in the main analysis, we ran additional 2 (outcome presentation: yes, 
no) x 2 (outcome uncertainty: low, high) x 2 (expected value (absolute): low, high) 
repeated measures ANOVAs on the gain and loss trials separately. If the interaction 
effects between “outcome presentation (yes/no)” and either “outcome uncertainty” or 
“expected value (absolute)” were significant in one of these additional analyses, we ran 
2 (outcome uncertainty: low, high) x 2 (expected value (absolute): low, high) repeated 
measures ANOVAs on the trials in which the outcome was presented and not presented 
of the gain and loss trials separately. 
Similarly, if the interaction effects between “outcome presentation (yes/no)” and either 
“outcome valence (gain/loss)”, “outcome uncertainty” or “expected value (absolute)” 
were significant in the main analysis, we ran 2 (outcome valence: gain, loss) x 2 
(outcome uncertainty: low, high) x 2 (expected value (absolute): low, high) repeated 
measures ANOVAs on the trials in which the outcome was presented and not presented 
separately. If the interaction effects between “outcome valence (gain/loss)” and either 
“outcome uncertainty” or “expected value (absolute)” were significant in one of these 
additional analyses, we ran 2 (outcome uncertainty: low, high) x 2 (expected value 
(absolute): low, high) repeated measures ANOVAs on the gain and loss trials of outcome 
presented and not presented trials separately.











Analyses using the BRMS package in R
Additionally, we performed similar analyses using the brm function of the BRMS 
package (Bürkner, 2017) in R. The analyses were performed as preregistered. The main 
model of Experiment 1 included “Happiness Rating” (z-scored) as dependent variable, 
whereas the main model of Experiment 2 included “Curiosity Rating” (z-scored) as 
dependent variable. The main models included main effects of “outcome valence (gain/
loss)”, “outcome presentation (yes/no)”, “outcome uncertainty” and “expected value 
(absolute)” as fixed effects. Additionally, the main models included interaction effects 
between “outcome valence (gain/loss)” and “outcome presentation (yes/no)”, between 
“outcome valence (gain/loss)” and “outcome uncertainty”, between “outcome valence 
(gain/loss)” and “expected value (absolute)”, between “outcome presentation (yes/
no)” and “outcome uncertainty” and between “outcome presentation (yes/no)” and 
“expected value (absolute)” as fixed effects. The main models included a full random 
effects structure (Barr, 2013; Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & Tily, 2013), meaning that a 
random intercept and random slopes for all effects were included per participant. The 
predictors for outcome uncertainty and expected value (absolute) were mean centered 
and scaled. We used the default priors of the brms package (Cauchy priors and LKJ 
priors for correlation parameters; Bürkner, 2017). The main models were fit using four 
chains with 10000 iterations each (5000 warm up) and inspected for convergence. 
Coefficients were deemed statistically significant if the associated 95% posterior 
credible intervals were non-overlapping with zero.
If the interaction effects between “outcome valence (gain/loss)” and either “outcome 
presentation (yes/no)”, “outcome uncertainty” or “expected value (absolute)” were 
significant in the main model, we used the brm function of the BRMS package (Bürkner, 
2017) to model the gain and loss trials separately. The models were identical to the 
main model, except that “outcome valence (gain/loss)” as well as its interactions with 
the other factors were not included. If any of the interaction effects between “outcome 
presentation (yes/no)” and “outcome uncertainty” or “expected value (absolute)” were 
significant in these additional models, we modeled the trials in which the outcome was 
presented and not presented separately. 
Similarly, if the interaction effects between “outcome presentation (yes/no)” and either 
“outcome valence (gain/loss)”, “outcome uncertainty” or expected value (absolute)” 
were significant in the main model, we used the brm function of the BRMS package 
(Bürkner, 2017) to model trials in which the outcome was presented and not presented 
separately. If any of the interaction effects between “outcome valence (yes/no)” 
and “outcome uncertainty” or “expected value (absolute)” were significant in these 
additional models, we modeled the gain and loss trials separately. 
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5.2.6 | Data visualization
The aim of the data visualization was to provide a clear image of the effects of outcome 
uncertainty and absolute expected value on happiness (Experiment 1; Figure 5.2A) and 
curiosity (Experiment 2; Figure 5.2B)  per condition (gain – outcome presented, gain – 
outcome not presented, loss – outcome presented and loss – outcome not presented). 
To this end, we divided the levels of outcome uncertainty in eight percentile bins per 
condition, such that the 1st bin roughly represents the 1/8th of the lowest levels of 
outcome uncertainty, the 2nd bin the 1/8th  - 2/8th of the lowest levels, etc. The same was 
done for the values of absolute expected value. For each bin, a mean happiness score 
(Experiment 1) or mean curiosity score (Experiment 2) was calculated per participant 
per condition. Next, these mean scores were averaged across participants and the 
standard error of the mean (SEM) was calculated for each outcome uncertainty and 
absolute expected value bin of the gain/loss and outcome presented/not presented 
conditions separately. The results of this data visualization can be seen in Figure 5.2A 
for the happiness ratings and Figure 5.2B for the curiosity ratings.
Furthermore, to illustrate to what extent individual participants showed sensitivity to 
outcome uncertainty, we calculated the mean happiness ratings (Experiment 1, Figure 
5.3A) and curiosity ratings (Experiment 2, Figure 5.3A) for high outcome uncertainty 
and low outcome uncertainty for the gain (Figure 5.3A & 5.3B, left panels) and loss 
trials (Figure 5.3A & 5.3B, right panels) separately per participant. 
5.3 | Results
Experiment 1: As expected, participants were happier about gain lotteries compared 
with loss lotteries (Figure 5.2A; RMA: F1,33 = 1955.1, p = 5.94e-31, ηp
2 = .98; BRMS: 
95% CI [.84, .92]). Happiness ratings were not different between blocks in which people 
would either see or not see the outcome of the lottery (RMA: F1,33 = .07, p = .80, ηp
2 
=.002; BRMS: 95% CI [-.011, .012]). There was no main effect of absolute expected value 
(RMA: F1,33 = .006, p = .94, ηp
2 = 1.72e-04; BRMS: 95% CI [-.010, .0067]), but there was 
an interaction between absolute expected value and outcome valence (RMA: F1,33 = 
450.9, p = 8.16e-21, ηp
2 = .93; BRMS: 95% CI [.25, .30]). This interaction was due to 
participants being happier with higher gains compared with lower gains (RMA: F1,33 = 
466.9, p = 4.75e-21, ηp
2 = .93; BRMS: 95% CI [.25, .30]), and with lower losses compared 
with higher losses (RMA: F1,33 = 365.5, p = 2.02e-19, ηp
2 = .92; BRMS: 95% CI [-.30, -.24]). 











Figure 5.2 | Results of the happiness experiment (A; Experiment 1) and the curiosity experiment 
(B; Experiment 2) 
 In both panels, the x-axis depicts percentile bins of the values of outcome uncertainty (left) and 
the absolute values of expected value (right) for both gains (in red; magenta) and losses (in blue; 
cyan) and for trials in which the outcome was presented (in red; blue) and not presented (in 
magenta; cyan). The y-axis depicts the mean happiness ratings (A) or mean curiosity ratings (B) 
for each percentile of outcome uncertainty and absolute expected value per condition. For other 
details of the data visualization, see Methods – Data Visualization. 
 A   Experiment 1 showed that happiness was higher for gains than for losses. There was a small 
but significant decrease in happiness with outcome uncertainty, such that participants were 
happier about lotteries when outcome uncertainty was lower. There was a monotonic increase 
of happiness with absolute expected value in the gain trials and a monotonic decrease with 
absolute expected value in loss trials, such that people were happier about trials with higher 
wins and lower losses.
 B   Experiment 2 showed that curiosity was higher for gains than for losses. In contrast with 
Experiment 1, curiosity increased monotonically with outcome uncertainty in the gain and the 
loss context, such that participants were more curious about the outcome of lotteries when 
outcome uncertainty was higher. Curiosity increased with absolute expected value in the gain 
trials, but there was no effect of absolute expected value in the loss trials.
Furthermore, there was a main effect of outcome uncertainty (RMA: F1,33 = 8.2, p = .007, ηp
2 
= .20; BRMS: 95% CI [-.038, -.0095]), such that participants were happier about trials with 
low compared with high outcome uncertainty. There was no interaction between outcome 
valence and outcome uncertainty when analyzing the data with a repeated measures 
ANOVA (RMA: F1,33 = 1.2, p = .28, ηp
2 = .04), whereas we found a small but significant 
outcome uncertainty (bins)
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effect when analyzing the data with the BRMS package in R (BRMS: 95% CI [.0002, .025]). 
This indicates that the effect of outcome uncertainty did not reliably differ between gain 
and loss trials (Figure 5.3A). There were no interaction effects between outcome valence, 
outcome uncertainty, absolute expected value and outcome presentation (yes/no), 
indicating that none of the reported effects depended on outcome presentation. 
Experiment 2: Replicating our previous study (van Lieshout, Traast, et al., 2019; see 
Chapter 4), participants were more curious about gain compared with loss lotteries 
(Figure 5.2B; RMA: F1,33 = 19.6, p = 9.78e-05, ηp
2 = .37; BRMS: 95% CI [.12, .33]). 
However, curiosity ratings were not different between blocks in which people would 
either see or not see the outcome of the lottery (RMA: F1,33) = .10, p = .75, ηp
2 = .003; 
BRMS: 95% CI [-.052, .074]). Consistent with our previous study (van Lieshout, Traast, 
et al., 2019; see Chapter 4), we found a robust effect of outcome uncertainty, such 
that participants were more curious about lotteries with higher compared with lower 
outcome uncertainty (RMA: F1,33 = 80.0, p = 2.45e-10, ηp
2 = .71; BRMS: 95% CI [.27, .43]). 
There was no interaction between outcome valence and outcome uncertainty (RMA: 
F1,33 = 0.22, p = .64, ηp
2 = .007; BRMS: 95% CI [-.024, .006]), indicating that this was the 
case for gain as well as for loss trials (Figure 5.3B).
We found a significant interaction between outcome valence and absolute expected 
value (RMA: F1,33 = 5.08, p = .031, ηp
2 = .13; BRMS: 95% CI [.002, .059]). This interaction 
was due to participants being more curious for high compared with low absolute 
expected value in gain trials (RMA: F1,33 = 10.5, p = .003, ηp
2 = .24; BRMS: 95% CI [.026, 
.11]),  but not in loss trials (RMA: F1,33 = 0.078, p = .78, ηp
2 = .002; BRMS: 95% CI [-.035, 
.054]). Also in Experiment 2, there were no interaction effects between outcome 
valence, outcome uncertainty, absolute expected value and outcome presentation 
(yes/no), indicating that none of the reported effects was dependent on outcome 
presentation. 











Figure 5.3 | Individual variability in the effects of outcome uncertainty on happiness (A) and 
curiosity (B) 
A   Panel A depicts individual data points representing effects of outcome uncertainty on 
happiness, as a function of outcome valence (left: gains in red, right: losses in blue). In both 
graphs, the x-axis depicts mean happiness for low outcome uncertainty and the y-axis depicts 
mean happiness for high outcome uncertainty. Every dot depicts one participant. The majority 
of the dots are below the diagonal, indicating that participants were happier when lotteries 
with low compared with high outcome uncertainty were played. This effect was mainly present 
for the loss trials (blue, right graph) and to a lesser extent for the gain trials (red, left graph).
B   Panel B depicts individual data points representing effects of outcome uncertainty on curiosity, 
as a function of outcome valence (left: gains in red, right: losses in blue). Other conventions 
are as for panel a. In contrast with panel a, the majority of the dots are above the diagonal, 
indicating that participants are more curious about the outcome of lotteries with high compared 
with low outcome uncertainty. This was the case for gains (left, red) as well as for losses (right, 
blue).
5.4 | Discussion
We investigated whether curiosity reflects an appetitive or an aversive drive. To 
this end, we obtained both subjective valence/happiness ratings (Experiment 1) and 
curiosity ratings (Experiment 2) from subjects who performed a lottery task that 
elicits uncertainty-dependent curiosity. We found that curiosity robustly increased 
with outcome uncertainty (van Lieshout, Traast, et al., 2019; van Lieshout et al., 2018; 





























































































see Chapter 2 - 4), but that happiness decreased with outcome uncertainty. In other 
words: people are more curious, but less happy when outcome uncertainty is higher. 
Surprisingly, the effects of outcome uncertainty on happiness and curiosity did not 
depend on outcome presentation (that is, knowing whether curiosity would be relieved 
or not). Together, these results suggest that curiosity reflects an aversive drive to 
reduce the unpleasant state of uncertainty. 
Whereas we replicated the finding that curiosity increases with outcome uncertainty 
for both gains and losses (van Lieshout, Traast, et al., 2019; van Lieshout et al., 2018; 
see Chapter 2 - 4), we found that happiness decreased with outcome uncertainty for 
gains and losses.  Although the negative effect of outcome uncertainty on happiness 
seems to be smaller than the positive effect of outcome uncertainty on curiosity, both 
effects are robust and present in the majority of participants (Figure 5.3). It should 
be noted that these respective ratings live on different scales and can therefore 
not be usefully compared directly. These distinct effects of outcome uncertainty on 
happiness and curiosity are in line with findings showing that humans generally 
consider the state of uncertainty to be aversive (Bar-Anan et al., 2009; Berlyne, 1957; 
Jepma et al., 2012; Lieberman et al., 1997; Loewenstein, 1994), and even anxiety-
evoking (Grupe & Nitschke, 2013). Thus, uncertainty drives us to seek information in 
order to reduce the disliked state of ignorance. Although these findings support the 
hypothesis that curiosity is an aversive drive, they do not discard the information-as-
reward hypothesis, according to which information has appetitive properties. In line 
with opponent-process theory (Solomon & Corbit, 1978), information seeking is likely 
driven by a combination of a motivation to reduce the aversive state elicited by the 
absence of information (uncertainty) plus a motivation to maximize the presence of 
information. 
Surprisingly, we found no effect of outcome presentation. This indicates that it did 
not matter for participants whether they would be presented with the outcome or 
not, and whether uncertainty would be relieved or not. This was the case for both 
the subjective valence/happiness ratings (Experiment 1) as well as for the curiosity 
ratings (Experiment 2). These findings are especially surprising given recent findings 
demonstrating that people experienced less positive affect when the time to close 
the information gap was long compared to short (Noordewier & van Dijk, 2017). Also 
under the information-as-reward hypothesis, one would expect that people would be 
happier when they know that the information gap would be closed by being presented 
the outcome, compared with situations in which they know that the information gap 
would not be closed. In both experiments, participants were explicitly instructed that 
they had to give their happiness or curiosity rating given that the outcome would 
be presented or not. However, it might be the case that the happiness question was 











too decoupled from outcome presentation, because the question was focused on the 
lottery itself (“How happy are you that this lottery will be played?”) instead of on 
the outcome of the lottery. Another possible explanation might be that participants 
were already cognitively overloaded with processing outcome uncertainty as well as 
outcome valence and the expected value of a lottery. These values varied on a trial-
to-trial basis, whereas outcome presentation varied in a block-wise fashion instead. 
Perhaps it was easier for people to take the within-block manipulations into account, 
since they are different every trial and their changes are therefore more salient.  
As expected, both curiosity and happiness were greater for gains than for losses. 
However, these effects of outcome valence did not interact with outcome uncertainty. 
These findings strengthen prior observations that there are multiple mechanisms 
underlying curiosity (Kobayashi, Ravaioli, Baranès, Woodford, & Gottlieb, 2019; van 
Lieshout, de Lange, & Cools, 2019; van Lieshout, Traast, et al., 2019), which might 
operate independent from each other (van Lieshout, Traast, de Lange, & Cools, 2019; 
see Chapter 4). One of these mechanisms is the aversive drive to reduce uncertainty. 
The other mechanism is related to processing reward context (savouring): we are both 
more curious and happier about lotteries containing gains compared with losses. 
These studies advance our understanding of the psychological mechanisms of curiosity, 
by demonstrating that the curiosity-triggering state of uncertainty reflects an aversive 
drive. This aversive drive might well go hand in hand with an appetitive drive to 
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Supplementary Figure 5.1 | Individual variability in the effect of outcome valence and outcome 
presentation on happiness / curiosity 
A   Panel A depicts individual data points representing effects of outcome valence on happiness. 
The x-axis depicts mean happiness for loss lotteries and the y-axis mean happiness for gain 
lotteries. One dot depicts one participant. All dots are above the diagonal, indicating that all 
participants were happier when gain compared with loss lotteries would be played.
B   Panel B depicts individual data points representing effects of outcome valence on curiosity. 
Other conventions are as for panel A. The great majority of the dots are above the diagonal, 
indicating that most participants are more curious about the outcome of gain compared with 
loss lotteries.
C   Panel C depicts individual data points representing effects of outcome presentation on 
happiness. The x-axis depicts mean happiness for lotteries in which the outcome would not 
be presented and the y-axis mean happiness for lotteries in which the outcome would be 
presented. One dot depicts one participant. All dots are clustered on the diagonal, indicating 
that there was no effect of outcome presentation on happiness.
D   Panel D depicts individual data points representing effects of outcome presentation on 
curiosity. Other conventions are as for panel C. All dots are clustered around the diagonal, 
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Supplementary Figure 5.2 | Individual variability in the effects of outcome uncertainty and 
absolute expected value on happiness (A,C) and curiosity (B,D) as a function of outcome valence
A   Panel A depicts individual data points representing effects of outcome uncertainty on happiness, 
as a function of outcome valence (x-axis: losses, y-axis: gains). The x-axis depicts the mean 
happiness for high minus low outcome uncertainty in loss trials, with positive and negative 
values indicating a positive or negative relationship between outcome uncertainty and 
happiness in loss trials respectively. The y-axis depicts the mean happiness for high minus low 
outcome uncertainty in gain trials, with positive and negative values indicating a positive or 
negative relationship between outcome uncertainty and happiness in gain trials respectively. 
Every dot depicts one participant. Most participants have negative values on the x-axis, 
indicating that they are happier about low compared with high outcome uncertainty in loss 
trials. Participants vary in the extent to which extent they are sensitive to high compared with 
low outcome uncertainty in the win trials, as shown by the positive as well as negative values 
on the y-axis. However, most participants show a negative value on the y-axis, explaining the 
overall negative relationship between outcome uncertainty and happiness for both gains and 
losses.
B   Panel B has the same conventions as panel a, but this time for curiosity instead of happiness. 
Almost all participants show positive values on the x-axis (loss trials) as well as on the y-axis 
(gain trials), indicating that they are more curious about high compared with low outcome 
uncertainty in both gain and loss trials.
C   Panel C depicts individual data points representing effects of outcome uncertainty on 
happiness, as a function of outcome valence (x-axis: losses, y-axis: gains). The x-axis depicts 
the mean happiness for high minus low absolute expected value in loss trials, with positive 































































































value and happiness in loss trials respectively. The y-axis depicts the mean happiness for high 
minus low absolute expected value in gain trials, with positive and negative values indicating 
a positive or negative relationship between absolute expected value and happiness in gain 
trials respectively. Every dot depicts one participant. All dots are in the upper left quadrant, 
indicating that all participants are happier about high compared with low expected value in the 
gain trials (positive values on the y-axis), and happier about low compared with high absolute 
expected value in the loss trials (negative values on the x-axis). 
D   Panel D has the same conventions as panel c but this time for curiosity instead of happiness. 
Most participants have positive values on the y-axis, indicating that they are more curious 
about high compared with low absolute expected value in gain trials. However, participants 
vary in the extent to whether they are more curious about high compared with low absolute 




Does dopamine synthesis capacity 
predict individual variation in curiosity?
Preprint available at:
van Lieshout, L.L.F., van den Bosch, R., Hofmans, L., de Lange, F.P., & Cools, R. (2020) 




Curiosity, which can be defined as “intrinsically motivated information-seeking”, 
is an important driving force in our everyday lives. Based on previous evidence 
demonstrating a link between information prediction errors and dopamine neuronal 
firing rates, we asked whether the drive to seek information varies with individual 
differences in dopamine synthesis capacity. In order to investigate this, we let 
participants perform a lottery task in which we independently manipulated outcome 
uncertainty, outcome valence (gains versus losses) and expected value, and asked 
participants to indicate their curiosity for each presented lottery. In a separate session, 
participants underwent an [18F]DOPA PET scan to quantify their dopamine synthesis 
capacity. We replicate previous behavioral results, showing that curiosity is a function 
of outcome uncertainty as well as outcome valence (gain versus loss). However, we 
found no evidence that curiosity or the sensitivity to outcome uncertainty, outcome 
valence and expected value was related to participants’ dopamine synthesis capacity 
in the ventral striatum, the caudate nucleus or the putamen. These findings stress the 
need for further studies into the role of dopamine in (different types of) curiosity.












Curiosity is pervasive in our everyday lives and humans devote a substantial part 
of their time seeking and consuming information. On occasion, this information is 
directly relevant to us. We probably all remember the times when we were studying 
the information in our text books to increase the probability of passing our exam. In 
this type of situation, processing the information we encounter is directly relevant for 
achieving our goals or to obtain higher rewards (i.e. a higher grade for your exam). 
We call this type of information seeking “instrumental curiosity” or “goal-directed 
information seeking” (e.g. Addicott, Pearson, Sweitzer, Barack, & Platt, 2017; Averbeck, 
2015; Daw & Doya, 2006). However, curiosity appears to be a broad feature, which also 
generalizes to situations in which information cannot inform action or directly increase 
our rewards (Bromberg-Martin & Hikosaka, 2009, 2011; Charpentier, Bromberg-
Martin, & Sharot, 2018; Kobayashi, Ravaioli, Baranès, Woodford, & Gottlieb, 2019; 
van Lieshout, Vandenbroucke, Müller, Cools, & de Lange, 2018). When we are curious 
about information that serves no direct purpose, we refer to this as “non-instrumental 
curiosity” (see also Kidd & Hayden, 2015).
In fact, humans and other animals show a strong drive for information (Kreps & Porteus, 
1978; Lieberman, Cathro, Nichol, & Watson, 1997; Prokasy, 1956). For example, studies 
with macaque monkeys have revealed a preference for receiving information about 
upcoming primary rewards, even though the information did not alter the likelihood of 
actually receiving the reward (Bromberg-Martin & Hikosaka, 2009, 2011). They were 
even willing to give up a substantial proportion of their reward in order to receive 
this advance information (Blanchard, Hayden, & Bromberg-Martin, 2015). Information 
and primary reward have been demonstrated to implicate the same neural structures: 
midbrain dopamine (DA) neurons and lateral habenula (LHb) neurons coding for 
reward prediction errors (i.e. the difference between expected and received reward) 
also coded for information prediction errors, i.e. the difference between expected 
information and received information (Bromberg-Martin & Hikosaka, 2009, 2011). 
In addition to this preference for information, prior work has demonstrated that 
humans show a preference for positive versus negative belief updating (Charpentier, 
Bromberg-Martin, & Sharot, 2018; van Lieshout, Traast, de Lange, & Cools, 2019). In a 
recent study, Charpentier and colleagues (2018) demonstrated that neural activity in 
the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) signals the desire to gain knowledge over ignorance (see 
also Blanchard et al., 2015; van Lieshout et al., 2018; Chapter 3), regardless of valence. 
However, activity in the mesolimbic reward circuitry (VTN/SN) was modulated by the 
opportunity to gain knowledge about positive, but not negative outcomes. As such, it 
might be the case that dopamine modulates the desire to seek information, even in 
non-instrumental contexts. However, no direct evidence for this link exists in humans. 
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Inspired by the well-established link between dopamine neuron firing and reward 
prediction errors (Schultz, Dayan, & Montague, 1997), previous work linked dopamine 
synthesis capacity to ventral striatal coding of reward prediction errors (Deserno et al., 
2015; Schlagenhauf et al., 2013; Boehme et al., 2015), reward-based reversal learning 
(Cools et al., 2009), cognitive control (Aarts et al., 2014) and cognitive effort (Westbrook 
et al., 2020). Here we asked whether individual variability in a different form of 
cognitive motivation, namely non-instrumental curiosity, is also linked to variation 
in dopamine synthesis capacity. This question is based on prior work by Bromberg-
Martin and Hikosaka (2009, 2011) and Charpentier and colleagues (2018), who 
demonstrated that the desire for knowledge in non-instrumental settings implicates 
the mesolimbic reward circuitry. We investigated to what extent curiosity and the 
motives underlying human curiosity, such as outcome uncertainty (Kobayashi et al., 
2019; Romero Verdugo, van Lieshout, de Lange, & Cools, 2020; van Lieshout, de Lange, 
& Cools, 2020; van Lieshout et al., 2019, 2018; see Chapter 2 - 5), outcome valence 
(Charpentier et al., 2018; Marvin & Shohamy, 2016; van Lieshout et al., 2020, 2019; see 
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5) and expected value (Charpentier et al., 2018; Kobayashi et al., 
2019; Romero Verdugo et al., 2020; van Lieshout et al., 2019; see Chapter 4), correlate 
with an individual’s dopamine synthesis capacity, measured with [18F]DOPA positron 
emission tomography (PET). 
6.1.1 | The present experiment
We adapted a lottery task we used previously (van Lieshout et al., 2020, 2019, 2018; 
Chapter 2 - 5). In this task, every trial is a lottery consisting of a vase containing a mix 
of red and blue marbles, which were associated with monetary values. One marble 
would be randomly selected from every vase and participants would gain or lose the 
money associated with the marble. Participants had to indicate their curiosity about the 
outcome of a presented lottery, while they were clearly instructed that the information 
provided by the outcome was non-instrumental: all outcomes were obtained regardless 
of participants’ curiosity decisions and they had no way of influencing how much they 
would gain or lose during the task. This task enabled the independent manipulation 
of the uncertainty of the lottery outcomes, the outcome valence (whether the lottery 
contained gains or losses), and the amount of these gains and losses (expected value).  
In a separate session, participants underwent an [18F]DOPA PET scan to quantify 
their dopamine synthesis capacity. We investigated whether participants’ dopamine 
synthesis capacity predicts the extent to which participants are curious about the 
outcomes, perhaps as a function of outcome uncertainty, outcome valence (gain/
loss) and, potentially, expected value (Romero Verdugo et al., 2020; van Lieshout, de 
Lange, & Cools, 2020; van Lieshout, Traast, de Lange, & Cools, 2019; van Lieshout, 











Vandenbroucke, Müller, Cools, & de Lange, 2018). For each of these factors, the null 
hypothesis was that the extent to which people are curious, and show sensitivity to 
the effects that drive curiosity, would be independent of their dopamine synthesis 
capacity. The alternative hypotheses were that participants with higher dopamine 
synthesis capacity would be [1] overall more curious, [2] more curious about gains 
versus losses, [3] more curious about high versus low outcome uncertainty and/or 
[4] more curious about high versus low expected value than participants with lower
dopamine synthesis capacity. 
6.2 | Methods
6.2.1 | Preregistration and data & code availability
The experiment and its analyses were preregistered on the Open Science Framework 
(osf.io/9svtg/). All data and code used for stimulus presentation and analyses will be 
available on the Donders Repository.
6.2.2 | Participants
Forty-five out of a total of 94 participants in a previous [18F]DOPA PET study (protocol 
NL57538.091.16; trial register NTR6140, www.trialregister.nl/trial/5959, see also 
Hofmans et al., 2019; Westbrook et al., 2020) accepted the invitation to participate in 
the current experiment. The time between the PET scan and the current experiment 
ranged between 0.3 and 1.8 years (mean = 1.0; SD = 0.4). In the session containing the 
current experiment, the participants performed [1] a Stroop task (see Hofmans et al., 
2020), [2] an oddball detection task, [3] the current experiment and [4] were asked to 
install a smartphone application tracking their screen touches (see Westbrook, Ghosh, 
van den Bosch, & Cools, 2020).
All participants of the current experiment were Dutch native speakers and right-
handed. Following the preregistration, one participant was excluded because of too 
many missed trials (missed > 10% of all trials). Another participant was excluded due to 
a lack of variation in responses (gave the same curiosity rating on every trial). Although 
the lack of variation in responses was not a preregistered criterion, we decided to 
exclude the participant because no models could be fitted on the participant’s data 
and we could not be certain that the participant was engaged with the task. As a result, 
the final sample of the current experiment consisted of forty-three participants (22 
women, age 23.5 ± 4.78, mean ± SD). The participants gave written informed consent 
according to the declaration of Helsinki prior to participation. The experiment was 
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approved by the local ethics committee (CMO Arnhem-Nijmegen, The Netherlands) 
under a general ethics approval protocol (“Imaging Human Cognition”, CMO 2014/288) 
and was conducted in compliance with these guidelines. 
6.2.3 | Behavioral paradigm
The experiment consisted of a lottery task (Figure 6.1). Each trial started with an image 
of a vase containing twenty marbles, each of which could be either red or blue. The 
vases could be configured in two possible ways: (1) 75%-25% vases: 15 marbles had 
one color and 5 marbles the other color, (2) 50%-50% vases: 10 marbles had one color 
and 10 marbles the other color. Both colored marbles were associated with a monetary 
value that participants could either gain or lose. These monetary values varied on a 
trial-by-trial basis between +10 and +90 cents in gain trials and between -90 and -10 
cents in loss trials (both in steps of 10 cents). All combinations of monetary values 
associated with red and blue marbles were possible, except for combinations of the 
same monetary values. 
Figure 6.1 | Schematic depiction of the task and the regions of interest
 A   Schematic depiction of a gain trial in the lottery task. Participants saw a screen on which a vase 
with a mix of 20 red and blue marbles was presented and the monetary values associated with 
the colored marbles. These values could either both be positive (in gain trials as depicted here) 
or both be negative (in the loss trials). Participants were told that one of the marbles would 
be randomly selected from the vase and that they would be awarded the money associated 
with this marble. Next, participants indicated how curious they were about seeing the outcome 
(1 – 4). There was a 50% chance of seeing the outcome, regardless of the participants’ curiosity 
response. Importantly, a marble was randomly selected on every trial and participants were 
instructed that they were awarded the money associated with this marble, also if they would 
not see the outcome of a trial. See Methods (Behavioral paradigm) for details on the timing of 
the experiment.
 B   Coronal view of the regions of interest: the ventral striatum (blue), the caudate nucleus (red) 
and the putamen (green).
The participants were informed that on each trial, one marble would be selected from 
the vase and that they would gain or lose the money associated with the selected 
marble. First, the participants saw the vase, the marbles and the monetary values 
associated with the marbles (3s), followed by a blank screen (0.5s) and a response 






















about the lottery outcome (“How curious are you about the outcome?”) on a scale 
from 1 – 4 using a button box. They had to use their right index finger, middle finger, 
ring finger and little finger to give curiosity ratings of 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively. This 
response screen was presented until the participant gave a response, with a limit 
of 2.5s. The response screen was followed by a blank screen (0.5s), and an outcome 
screen (2s). When the outcome was presented, the outcome screen depicted the vase, 
the marbles and monetary values associated with the marbles again, together with a 
box in which they saw the colored marble that was selected and the amount of money 
they gained or lost in that trial. When the outcome was not presented, the participants 
saw a black marble instead of a colored marble and question marks at the location of 
the monetary value. After a trial ended, there was a blank screen (1s), after which the 
next trial started. 
Participants were informed that they had a 50% chance of seeing the outcome of a 
particular trial and that they could not influence whether the outcome would be 
presented or not. This manipulation was explicitly instructed to subjects and it 
uncoupled curiosity responses from the actual receipt of the outcome. Additionally, 
they were explicitly instructed that they could not influence which marble would be 
selected and how much money they would gain or lose. However, they were made 
aware that a marble would be randomly selected on every trial and that they would 
actually gain or lose the money associated with that marble, regardless of outcome 
presentation. The money they won or lost in every trial would be summed and the 
sum of money would be added to or subtracted from the money they earned for 
participation. In the end, the task was set up in a way that participants would always 
receive a bonus of 50 cents on top their base payment for participation.
For both experiments, the participants completed a total of 144 trials (72 gain trials 
and 72 loss trials). In turn, each vase configuration was presented on 72 occasions (36 
times for gain trials and 36 times for loss trials). The trials were divided in 2 blocks 
of 72 trials. The trials were pseudo-randomized, such that participants were never 
presented with more than 4 gain trials or 4 loss trials in a row. The experiment lasted ~ 
25 minutes in total.
6.2.4 | PET acquisition
In a separate session, all participants underwent an [18F]DOPA PET scan to quantify 
dopamine synthesis capacity. Uptake of the radiotracer [18F]DOPA indexes the rate 
at which dopamine is synthesized in (the terminals of) midbrain dopamine neurons, 
providing a relatively stable trait index of dopamine function (Egerton, Demjaha, 
McGuire, Mehta, & Howes, 2010). The PET scans were acquired on a PET/CT scanner 
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(Siemens Biograph mCT; Siemens Medical Systems, Erlangen, Germany) at the 
Department of Nuclear Medicine of the Radboudumc, using an [18F]DOPA radiotracer, 
produced by the Radboud Translational Medicine department. Participants received 
150mg of carbidopa and 400mg of entacapone 50 minutes before scanning to minimize 
peripheral metabolism of [18F]DOPA by decarboxylase and COMT, respectively, thereby 
increasing signal to noise ratio in the brain. After a bolus injection of [18F]DOPA 
(185MBq; approximately 5mCi) into the antecubital vein, a dynamic PET scan was 
collected over 89 minutes and divided into 24 frames (4x1, 3x2, 3x3, 14x5 min). 
6.2.5 | Structural MRI
A high-resolution anatomical scan, T1-weighted MP-RAGE sequence (repetition time = 
2300 ms, echo time = 3.03 ms, 192 sagittal slices, field of view = 256 mm, voxel size 
1 mm isometric) was acquired using a Siemens 3T MR scanner with a 64-channel coil. 
These were used for coregistration and spatial normalization of the PET scans. 
6.2.6 | PET analysis
The PET data (4 x 4 x 3 mm voxel size; 5mm slice thickness; 200 x 200 x 75 matrix) 
were reconstructed with weighted attenuation correction and time-of-flight recovery, 
scatter corrected, and smoothed with a 3mm full-width-at-half-maximum (FWHM) 
kernel. After reconstruction, the PET data were preprocessed and analysed using 
SPM12 (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/). All PET frames were realigned to the 
mean image, and then coregistered to the anatomical MRI scan, using the mean PET 
image of the first 11 frames, which has a better range in image contrast outside the 
striatum than a mean image over the whole scan time. Dopamine synthesis capacity 
was computed per voxel as [18F]DOPA influx constant per minute (Ki) relative to the 
cerebellar grey matter reference region, using Gjedde-Patlak graphical analysis on the 
PET frames from the 24th to 89th minute (Patlak, Blasberg, & Fenstermacher, 1983). The 
individual cerebellum grey matter masks were obtained by segmenting the individuals’ 
anatomical MRI scan, using Freesurfer (https://surfer.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu/). The 
resulting individual Ki maps were spatially normalized and smoothed using an 8mm 
FWHM kernel (see also Hofmans et al., 2019; Westbrook et al., 2020).
The Ki values were extracted from masks defining regions of interest based on an 
independent, functional connectivity-based parcellation of the striatum (Piray, den 
Ouden, van der Schaaf, Toni, & Cools, 2015). In particular, we extracted Ki values from 
3 striatal regions (Figure 6.1B) – the ventral striatum / nucleus accumbens (607 voxels), 
the caudate nucleus (817 voxels) and the putamen (1495 voxels). We averaged across 
all voxels in each region for individual difference analyses. As such, we obtained 3 Ki 











values for each participant, one for each striatal region of interest.
6.2.7 | Experimental Design
We investigated main effects of outcome valence (gain/loss), outcome uncertainty 
and (absolute) expected value on curiosity ratings. Additionally, we assessed whether 
the effects of outcome uncertainty and absolute expected value on curiosity differed 
between gain and loss trials. This was done by assessing the significance of the 
interaction effects between outcome uncertainty and outcome valence (gain/loss), and 
absolute expected value and outcome valence (gain/loss) on curiosity. 
Next, we investigated whether there was a main effect of dopamine synthesis 
capacity on curiosity and whether the effects of outcome valence (gain/loss), outcome 
uncertainty and (absolute) expected value on curiosity varied with dopamine synthesis 
capacity. This was done by assessing the significance of the interaction effects between 
dopamine synthesis capacity (Ki values) and outcome valence (gain/loss), between 
dopamine synthesis capacity and outcome uncertainty, between dopamine synthesis 
capacity and absolute expected value on the curiosity ratings, and between dopamine 
synthesis capacity, absolute expected value and outcome valence (gain/loss) on the 
curiosity ratings.
In order to do so, a value of outcome uncertainty and expected value was calculated for 
every trial (X) as follows:  
Outcome Uncertainty(X) = ∑i=1 (xi - Expected Value(X))²pi Equation 1
Expected Value(X)=∑i=1 xi pi Equation 2
where xi is the monetary value associated with marble (i), and pi the probability that 
this marble will be drawn. Hereby, outcome uncertainty (Equation 1) reflects the spread 
of the possible outcomes in trial (X), and expected value (Equation 2) reflects the mean 
expected reward contained in trial (X). It should be noted that we used a different 
calculation for outcome uncertainty in one of our previous studies (van Lieshout et 
al., 2018; see Chapter 2 and Chapter 3), and we initially preregistered to use that 
calculation of outcome uncertainty in the current manuscript as well. However, both 
metrics are almost identical, and variance is a more common measure of uncertainty 
(see for example Preuschoff, Quartz, & Bossaerts, 2008; Symmonds, Wright, Bach, & 






Expected value reflects the mean expected value of reward contained in a trial. Note 
that the expected value is always positive in a gain trial and always negative in a loss 
trial. To compare the effects of expected value between the gain and loss trials, we 
used absolute expected value in the analyses, such that - 90 cents in a loss trial is 
treated the same as + 90 cents in a gain trial etc. However, the metric of interest here is 
the effect of reward magnitude (signed expected value) on curiosity, which is reflected 
in the interaction between outcome valence (gain/loss) and absolute expected value.
6.2.8 | Primary statistical analyses
As preregistered, the data were analysed using a combination of mixed effects 
modelling in R (R Core Team, 2013; RRID:SCR_001905) and more classical repeated 
measures ANOVAs in SPSS (RRID:SCR_002865). The results of the mixed effects 
modelling in R are reported in the main text and the results of the repeated measures 
ANOVA are reported in Supplement 1. This allows the reader to verify the robustness 
of the results and demonstrate that our conclusions do not depend on the analytical 
framework employed (see also van Lieshout, Traast, de Lange, & Cools, 2019; van 
Lieshout, de Lange, & Cools, 2020).  
We performed the analyses using the brm function of the BRMS package (Bürkner, 
2017) in R. The analyses were performed as preregistered, except that we also added 
the three-way interaction between “dopamine synthesis capacity (Ki value)”, “absolute 
expected value” and “outcome valence (gain/loss)” to the models. We ran three main 
models for three striatal regions of interest separately (i.e. the ventral striatum, the 
caudate nucleus and the putamen). The main models included “curiosity rating” as 
an ordinal dependent variable. The main effects of “dopamine synthesis capacity (Ki 
value)”, “outcome valence (gain/loss)”, “outcome uncertainty” and “absolute expected 
value” were included as fixed effects. Additionally, the main models included interaction 
effects between “dopamine synthesis capacity (Ki value)” and “outcome valence (gain/
loss)”, between “dopamine synthesis capacity (Ki value)” and “outcome uncertainty”, 
between “dopamine synthesis capacity” and “absolute expected value”, between 
“dopamine synthesis capacity”, “absolute expected value” and “outcome valence (gain/
loss)”, between “outcome valence (gain/loss)” and “outcome uncertainty” and between 
“outcome valence (gain/loss)” and “absolute expected value” as fixed effects. A random 
intercept and random slopes for the main effects of “outcome valence (gain/loss)”, 
“outcome uncertainty” and “absolute expected value”, as well as for the interaction 
effects between “outcome valence (gain/loss)” and “outcome uncertainty” and 
between “outcome valence (gain/loss)” and “absolute expected value” were included 
per participant. The predictors for dopamine synthesis capacity (Ki value), outcome 
uncertainty and absolute expected value were mean centered and scaled. We used 











the default priors of the brms package (Cauchy priors and LKJ priors for correlation 
parameters; Bürkner, 2017). The main models were fit using four chains with 10000 
iterations each (5000 warm up) and inspected for convergence. Coefficients were 
deemed statistically significant if the associated 95% posterior credible intervals did 
not contain zero. 
If any of the interaction effects with “outcome valence (gain/loss)” was significant in 
the main model, we used the brm function of the BRMS package (Bürkner, 2017) to 
model the gain and loss trials separately. All other conventions were as described for 
the main models, except that all effects including “outcome valence (gain/loss)” were 
omitted from the models. 
Additionally, we ran a similar model that was set up in the same way as described 
above, except that we did not include the main and interaction effects with dopamine 
synthesis capacity (Ki value). Initially, we did not preregister to run this additional 
model, but we did so to provide one independent estimation of the task effects, instead 
of three results per task effect originating from the three models described above. It 
should be noted that the results are essentially the same when adding either one of the 
three Ki values to the model. 
6.3 | Results
6.3.1 | Main task effects
We found a main effect of outcome uncertainty, such that participants were more 
curious about high compared with low outcome uncertainty (BRMS: 95% CI [1.43, 2.06]). 
In addition, we found a main effect of outcome valence, such that participants were 
more curious about gains compared with losses (BRMS: 95% CI [.15, .74]). However, 
there was no interaction between outcome uncertainty and outcome valence (BRMS: 
95% CI [-.06, .13]), indicating that these effects operate independently (Figure 6.2; van 
Lieshout, de Lange, & Cools, 2020; van Lieshout, Traast, de Lange, & Cools, 2019). 
CHAPTER 6
150
Figure 6.2 | Behavioral results of the experiment 
The x-axis depicts percentile bins of the values of outcome uncertainty (left) and the absolute 
expected values (right) for gains (in red) and losses (in blue). To this end, we divided the levels 
of outcome uncertainty in eight percentile bins per gain/loss condition, such that the 1st bin 
represents 1/8th of the lowest levels of outcome uncertainty, the 2nd bin represents the 1/8th – 
2/8th of the lowest levels, etc. The absolute expected values were also divided in eight percentile 
bins, such that the 1st bin represents 1/8th of the lowest values, the 2nd bin the 1/8th – 2/8th of the 
lowest values, etc.  The y-axis depicts the mean curiosity rating for each percentile bin of outcome 
uncertainty and absolute expected value for gains and losses. The error bars depict the standard 
error of the mean (SEM) and least square lines illustrate the effects. The experiment showed that 
curiosity was higher for gains than for losses and that there was a monotonic increase of curiosity 
with outcome uncertainty. In addition, curiosity increased with the amount of money that could 
be gained, but there was no effect of absolute expected value on curiosity in loss trials.
There was also a main effect of absolute expected value (BRMS: 95% CI [.07, .31]), and 
evidence for an interaction between outcome valence and absolute expected value 
(BRMS: 95% CI [.009, .20]). However, the interaction effect appears to be less robust 
and was not replicated when analyzing the data with repeated measures ANOVAs 
(Supplement 6.1 and Supplementary Figure 6.1). When analyzing the gain and loss 
trials separately, we found that participants were more curious about higher compared 
with lower gains (BRMS: 95% CI [.15, 44]), but that there was no difference between 
whether participants would lose more or less money (BRMS: 95% CI [-.08, .25]).
6.3.2 | Individual differences
Next, we investigated whether the effects of outcome valence (gain/loss), outcome 
uncertainty, absolute expected value and the interaction between outcome valence and 
absolute expected value on curiosity varied with individual differences in dopamine 
synthesis capacity (Ki values) in the striatal regions of interest (ventral striatum, 
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Figure 6.3 | Individual differences
 A   To visualize the extent to which sensitivity to gain versus loss trials depended on dopamine 
synthesis capacity, we calculated the difference between mean curiosity in gain trials and mean 
curiosity in loss trials per participant. These differences were plotted against the dopamine 
synthesis capacity (Ki values) for the three striatal regions of interest separately. 
 B   The same was done for the effect of outcome uncertainty by calculating the difference between 
mean curiosity for high outcome uncertainty and low uncertainty per participant.
 C   The same was done for the effect of absolute expected value for gains and losses separately. 
We calculated the difference between mean curiosity for high absolute expected value and low 
absolute expected value for gains (in red) and losses (in blue) per participant. 
First, there were no main effects of dopamine synthesis capacity on curiosity in the 
ventral striatum (BRMS: 95% CI [-.35, .32]), the caudate nucleus (BRMS: 95% CI [-.16, 
.51]) and the putamen (BRMS: 95% CI [-.35, .32]). Thus there was no evidence for a link 


























.013 .015 .017 .019 .021
Putamen (Ki value)




























.012 .014 .016 .018 .020
Ventral Striatum (Ki value)
.012 .014 .016 .018 .020



























































.012 .014 .016 .018 .020






































































Furthermore, we found no interactions between outcome uncertainty and dopamine 
synthesis capacity on curiosity in the ventral striatum (BRMS: 95% CI [-.31, .31]), the 
caudate nucleus (BRMS: 95% CI [-.31, .31]) and the putamen (BRMS: 95% CI [-.30, .32]). 
There were also no interactions between outcome valence (gain/loss) and dopamine 
synthesis capacity on curiosity in the ventral striatum (BRMS: 95% CI [-.44, .037]) and 
the putamen (BRMS: 95% CI [-.44, .36]). However, we did find a significant interaction 
between outcome valence (gain/loss) and dopamine synthesis capacity on curiosity in 
the caudate nucleus (BRMS: 95% CI [-.51, -.056]), such that people with lower dopamine 
synthesis capacity were more curious about gains compared with losses than people 
with higher dopamine synthesis capacity. However, this effect was driven by four 
participants with unusually large differences between gain and loss trials (Figure 6.3A 
and Supplementary Figure 6.2A). 
Also, there were no interactions between absolute expected value and dopamine 
synthesis capacity on curiosity in the ventral striatum (BRMS: 95% CI [-.18, .058]), the 
caudate nucleus (BRMS: 95% CI [-.084, .15]) and the putamen (BRMS: 95% CI [-.15, .088]). 
The same was true for the three-way interaction between absolute expected value, 
outcome valence (gain/loss) and dopamine synthesis capacity in the ventral striatum 
(BRMS: 95% CI [-.15, .022]), the caudate nucleus (BRMS: 95% CI [-.15, .020]) and the 
putamen (BRMS: 95% CI [-.17, .0069]).
Figure 6.4
 Figure 6.4 depicts the association of dopamine synthesis capacity with the outcome valence (gain/
loss) effect, the outcome uncertainty effect and the interaction effect between absolute expected 
value and outcome valence (gain/loss). Voxels show a positive (red) or negative (blue) regression 
coefficient. The plots are dual-coded and simultaneously display the contrast estimate (x-axis) 
and t-values (y-axis). The hue indicates the size of the contrast estimate, and the opacity indicates 
the height of the t-value. The z-coordinates correspond to the standard M¬¬NI brain. The data are 
plotted using a procedure introduced by Allen et al. (2012) and implemented by Zandbelt, (2017). 
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We investigated whether curiosity ratings obtained from a non-instrumental lottery 
task vary with individual differences in dopamine synthesis capacity. We found no 
evidence that curiosity was related to participants’ dopamine synthesis capacity in 
the ventral striatum, the caudate or the putamen. Sensitivity to motives underlying 
curiosity, such as outcome uncertainty (Kobayashi, Ravaioli, Baranès, Woodford, & 
Gottlieb, 2019; Romero Verdugo, van Lieshout, de Lange, & Cools, 2020; van Lieshout, 
de Lange, & Cools, 2020; van Lieshout, Traast, de Lange, & Cools, 2019; van Lieshout, 
Vandenbroucke, Müller, Cools, & de Lange, 2018), outcome valence (Charpentier, 
Bromberg-Martin, & Sharot, 2018; Marvin & Shohamy, 2016; van Lieshout et al., 2020, 
2019) and expected value (Charpentier et al., 2018; Kobayashi et al., 2019; Romero 
Verdugo et al., 2020; van Lieshout et al., 2019), were also not predicted by individuals’ 
dopamine synthesis capacity.
Previous work has linked dopamine synthesis capacity to ventral striatal coding of 
reward prediction errors (Deserno et al., 2015; Schlagenhauf et al., 2013; Boehme et al., 
2015), reward-based reversal learning (Cools et al., 2009), cognitive control (Aarts et 
al., 2014) and cognitive effort (Westbrook et al., 2020). Here we obtained no support for 
the hypothesis that these findings extend to a different form of cognitive motivation, 
namely non-instrumental curiosity. The absence of such a link may be surprising 
given that prior work in macaque monkeys using single-neuron recording (Bromberg-
Martin & Hikosaka, 2009, 2011) and in humans using fMRI (Charpentier et al., 2018) 
demonstrated that the desire for knowledge in non-instrumental settings is implicated 
in the mesolimbic reward circuitry. Also, work with trivia questions has associated 
self-reported curiosity with brain activity in the caudate nucleus (Kang et al., 2009), 
the midbrain and the nucleus accumbens (Gruber et al., 2014). Similarly, receiving 
information has been associated with ventral striatum activity using trivia questions 
(Ligneul, Mermillod, & Morisseau, 2018) as well as in perceptual curiosity paradigms 
(Jepma, Verdonschot, van Steenbergen, Rombouts, & Nieuwenhuis, 2012). Here, we 
do not obtain support for the hypothesis raised by that prior work, by demonstrating 
that we have no evidence for a link between individual variability in non-instrumental 
curiosity and individual variation in dopamine synthesis capacity.  
In a previous fMRI study using a similar lottery paradigm as the current study (van 
Lieshout et al., 2018; see Chapter 3), we found no evidence for activity in striatal areas 
as a function of induction or relief of curiosity. This might be due to this particular task 
not implicating the striatum or dopamine because of its passive nature, but it might 
also be explained by lower signal-to-noise ratio in deep brain structures due to the 
specific fMRI sequence used in that study (see van Lieshout et al., 2018; Chapter 3). 
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Similarly, one possible explanation for a lack of effects in the current study might be 
a too low signal-to-noise ratio of the [18F]DOPA radiotracer, which is a substrate for 
catechol-O-methyltransferase (COMT) in the periphery. As such, metabolites can cross 
the blood-brain-barrier and will distribute throughout the brain in a uniform fashion. 
This enhances background noise relative to the use of for example [18F]FMT, which is 
not a substrate for COMT (Becker et al., 2017), leading to a lower signal-to-noise ratio. 
It should be noted that this would mainly be a concern when the regions of interests 
are located in brain areas with low dopamine levels, but less so in the dopamine-rich 
striatum. Also, the risk of a too low signal-to-noise ratio was reduced by administering 
entacapone, which inhibits peripheral COMT metabolism, before PET scanning. [18F]
DOPA and [18F]FMT also differ in their metabolic actions after decarboxylation by 
aromatic amino acid decarboxylase (AAAD), including higher affinity of [18F]DOPA 
metabolites compared with [18F]FMT metabolites for the vesicular monoamine 
transporter, leading to increased cell clearance of radiolabeled [18F]DOPA metabolites 
(Doudet et al., 1999). However, this would mostly be a concern for extended scanning 
times, as [18F]DOPA behaves as an irreversibly bound tracer in the first 90 minutes 
after tracer injection, during which their uptake rates are tightly correlated (Becker et 
al., 2017; Doudet et al., 1999). 
The lack of a relationship between dopamine synthesis capacity and curiosity does 
not necessarily mean that dopamine transmission plays no role in curiosity. Dopamine 
levels in the brain are not a function of dopamine synthesis capacity alone, but also of 
other factors not measured in the current study (i.e. dopamine receptor availability, 
transporter density, dopamine release and genetic make-up). Thus, the current study 
does not refute hypothesized correlations between curiosity levels and other measures 
of dopamine function and stresses the need for further studies. For example, it might 
be the case that we find no correlation between curiosity and dopamine synthesis 
capacity per se, but that there would be dopaminergic drug effects as a function of 
dopamine. Here, dopamine synthesis capacity can be seen as a trait index of dopamine 
which itself is not correlated with curiosity, but does heighten the potential for phasic 
dopamine to have an effect (in agreement with adaptive gain theories looking at 
norepinephrine; Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005). 
Additionally, instead of using measuring dopamine synthesis capacity, using 
radioligands that bind to dopamine D2-receptors, such as raclopride or fallypride, may 
be interesting options for future research. These enable one to measure D2-receptor 
availability and, after a pharmacological challenge (e.g. methylphenidate), to measure 
dopamine release. The extra dopamine released after drug intake will compete with the 
radioligand for binding to D2 receptors. This reduction in PET signal as a result of the 
reduced receptor binding by the radioligand provides an index of dopamine release. 











Given the well-known role of the large ascending neuromodulators (i.e. dopamine and 
noradrenaline) in the various curiosity-relevant constructs highlighted here, such as 
uncertainty-based (meta-)learning (i.e. Nassar et al., 2012; Wang et al., 2018), reward 
motivation and cognitive effort (Westbrook et al., 2020), human psychopharmacological 
interventions for studying the basis of both inter- and intra-individual variability in 
curiosity behavior might be promising.
Despite not finding a relationship between dopamine synthesis capacity and curiosity, 
the behavioral analyses provided a replication of our previous work. First of all, we 
demonstrate that curiosity is a function of outcome uncertainty, such that curiosity 
increased with increasing outcome uncertainty (Kobayashi, Ravaioli, Baranès, 
Woodford, & Gottlieb, 2019; Romero Verdugo, van Lieshout, de Lange, & Cools, 2020; 
van Lieshout, de Lange, & Cools, 2020; van Lieshout, Traast, de Lange, & Cools, 2019; van 
Lieshout, Vandenbroucke, Müller, Cools, & de Lange, 2018). Additionally, curiosity was 
greater for positive information (gains) compared with negative information (losses; 
Charpentier, Bromberg-Martin, & Sharot, 2018; Marvin & Shohamy, 2016; van Lieshout 
et al., 2020, 2019). Again, we found no interaction between outcome uncertainty 
and outcome valence on curiosity, strengthening the claim that these factors operate 
largely independent from each other (see van Lieshout et al., 2019; Chapter 4). 
To conclude, we find no evidence that individual variability in non-instrumental 
curiosity can be accounted for by individual variation in dopamine synthesis capacity. 
At the same time, the current study does not refute hypothesized correlations between 
curiosity levels and other measures of dopamine function and stresses the need for 
human psychopharmacological interventions for studying the basis of both inter- and 
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6.6 | Supplement: Analyses using Repeated Measures ANOVAs
In addition to the analyses reported in the main text, we performed similar analyses 
using repeated measures ANOVAs in SPSS (RRID:SCR_002865) and Bayesian repeated 
measures ANOVAs in JASP (RRID:SCR_015823). These analyses were performed to 
accommodate readers who are used to interpreting frequentist statistics instead of 
Bayesian credible intervals and to verify that our conclusions do not depend on the 
analytical framework employed. 
To this end, we divided the values of outcome uncertainty into “low outcome 
uncertainty” and “high outcome uncertainty”, such that approximately 50% of the 
trials were indicated as being low outcome uncertainty (outcome uncertainty <= 200) 
and approximately 50% as high outcome uncertainty (outcome uncertainty > 200). 
Additionally, we divided the values of absolute expected value into “low absolute 
expected value” (expected value (absolute) < 50) and “high expected value” (expected 
value (absolute) > 50). Note that the trials with absolute expected value = 50 were 
omitted from the analyses. This was done because the values of absolute expected 
value were perfectly centered around expected value (absolute) = 50, precluding us to 
classify these trials as being either low or high absolute expected value
First, as main analyses we performed 2 (outcome valence: gain, loss) x 2 (outcome 
uncertainty: low, high) x 2 (expected value (absolute): low, high) repeated measures 
ANOVAs with “outcome valence (gain/loss)”, “outcome uncertainty (low/high)” and 
“absolute expected value (low/high)” as within-subject factors. “Dopamine synthesis 
capacity (Ki value)” was added as covariate (z-scored). The dependent variable was 
mean curiosity as indicated by the curiosity ratings. These main analyses were 
performed for the three striatal regions of interest separately (the caudate nucleus, 
the putamen and the ventral striatum/nucleus accumbens). We report the uncorrected 
p-values, but because all p-values should be Bonferroni-corrected for the number of 
striatal regions that are statistically tested (three), the p-values are deemed significant 
if they are smaller than .017 (= .05 / 3).
Next, if any of the interaction-effects with outcome valence (gain/loss) was statistically 
significant, we ran 2 (outcome uncertainty: low, high) x 2 (expected value (absolute): 
low, high) repeated measures ANOVAs with “outcome uncertainty (low/high)” and 
“absolute expected value (low/high)” as within-subject factors on the gain and loss 
trials separately. “Dopamine synthesis capacity (Ki value)” was added as covariate 
(z-scored). The dependent variable was mean curiosity as indicated by the curiosity 
ratings.











Additionally, as for the BRMS analyses (see main text), we performed a similar repeated 
measure ANOVA without adding dopamine synthesis capacity as covariate. These 
results are reported under “main task effects”.
Results
Main task effects
When analyzing the data with repeated measures ANOVAs, we also found a main 
effect of outcome uncertainty, such that participants were more curious about high 
compared with low outcome uncertainty (RMA: F1,42 = 166.1, p = 3.47e-16, ηp
2 = .80, 
BFincl = 6.03e+48). In addition, we found a main effect of outcome valence, such that 
participants were more curious about gains compared with losses (RMA: F1,42 = 8.3, p = 
.006, ηp
2 = .17, BFincl = 2.02e+5). However, there was no interaction between outcome 
uncertainty and outcome valence (RMA: F1,42 = .082, p = .78, ηp
2 = .002, BFincl = .17), 
indicating that these effects operate independent from each other.
There was also a main effect of absolute expected value (RMA: F1,42 = 10.2, 7 = .003, 
ηp
2 = .20, BFincl = 1.33), but this time we found no interaction between outcome valence 
and absolute expected value (RMA: F1,42 = .69, p = .41, ηp
2 = .016, BFincl = .18). However, 
when we did analyse the gain and loss trials separately, as we also did using the BRMS 
package reported in the main text, we found that participants were more curious about 
higher gains compared to lower gains (RMA: F1,42 = 9.6, p = .004, ηp
2 = .19, BFincl = 3.67), 
but that there was no effect of expected value on losses (RMA: F1,42 = 3.86, p = .056, ηp
2 
= .084, BFincl = .59). 
Individual differences
Next, we investigated whether the effects of outcome valence (gain / loss), outcome 
uncertainty and absolute expected value were a function of the dopamine synthesis 
capacity (Ki values) in the striatal regions of interest (ventral striatum, putamen and 
caudate nucleus). 
First of all, there were no main effects of dopamine synthesis capacity on curiosity in 
the ventral striatum (RMA: F1,41 = 3.86e-4, p = .98, ηp
2 = 9.42e-6), the caudate nucleus 
(RMA: F1,41 = 1.1, p = .30, ηp
2 = .026) and the putamen (RMA: F1,41 = .085, p = .77, ηp
2 = 
.002). This means that the overall curiosity ratings participants gave during the task 
were not a function of their dopamine synthesis capacity. 
Furthermore, we found no interactions between outcome uncertainty and dopamine 
synthesis capacity on curiosity in the ventral striatum (RMA: F1,41 = .089, p = .77, ηp
2 
= .002), the caudate nucleus (RMA: F1,41 = .68, p = .42, ηp
2 = .016) and  the putamen 
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(RMA: F1,41 = .43, p = .52, ηp
2 = .010). In other words: the effect of outcome uncertainty 
on curiosity was not modulated by participants’ dopamine synthesis capacity. The 
same held for the interaction between outcome valence (gain / loss) and dopamine 
synthesis capacity on curiosity in the ventral striatum (RMA: F1,41 = 2.0, p = .17, ηp
2 = 
.046) and the putamen (RMA: F1,41 = 3.3, p = .077, ηp
2 = .074). It should be noted here 
that we found a significant interaction effect between dopamine synthesis capacity 
and outcome valence on curiosity in the caudate nucleus (RMA: F1,41 = 6.6, p = .014, 
ηp
2 = .14). However, this effect was driven by four participants with unusually large 
differences between gain and loss trials (Figure 6.3A and Supplementary Figure 6.1A). 
Also, there were no interactions between absolute expected value and dopamine 
synthesis capacity on curiosity in the ventral striatum (RMA: F1,41 = 1.8, p = .18, ηp
2 = 
.043), the caudate nucleus (RMA: F1,41 = .24, p = .63, ηp
2 = .006) and the putamen (RMA: 
F1,41 = 1.3, p = .26, ηp
2 = .031). The same was true for the three-way interaction between 
absolute expected value, outcome valence (gain/loss) and dopamine synthesis capacity 
in the ventral striatum (RMA: F1,41 = 1.0, p = .32, ηp
2 = .024), the caudate nucleus (RMA: 
F1,41 = 1.7, p = .20, ηp
2 = .040) and the putamen (RMA: F1,41 = 3.1, p = .088, ηp
2 = .069).
Supplementary Figure 6.1 | Behavioral results of the experiment – individual differences 
A   Panel A depicts the individual variability in the extent to which participants were more curious 
about gains compared with losses. The x-axis depicts mean curiosity for the loss trials and the 
y-axis the mean curiosity for the gain trials. Every dot represents one participant. The majority 
of the dots are above the diagonal, indicating that most participants were more curious about
gains compared with losses.
B   Panel B depicts the individual variability in the extent to which participants were driven by 
outcome uncertainty for gain and loss trials. The x-axis depicts mean curiosity for high minus 
low outcome uncertainty in loss trials, with positive and negative values indicating a positive 
or negative relationship between outcome uncertainty and curiosity respectively. The y-axis 
depicts mean curiosity for high minus low outcome uncertainty in gain trials, with positive and 
negative values indicating a positive or negative relationship between outcome uncertainty 
and curiosity respectively. Every dot depicts one participant. The majority of participants have 
a positive relationship between outcome uncertainty and curiosity for both gain and loss trials.
C   Panel C depicts the individual variability in the extent to which participants were driven by 
absolute expected value for gain and loss trials. The x-axis depicts mean curiosity for high 
minus low absolute expected value in loss trials, which positive and negative values indicating 
a positive or negative relationship between absolute expected value and curiosity respectively. 





































































  The y-axis depicts mean curiosity for high minus low absolute expected value in gain trials, which 
positive and negative values indicating a positive or negative relationship between absolute 
expected value and curiosity respectively. Every dot depicts one participant. The majority of 
participants have positive values on the y-axis, indicating that they are more curious about high 
compared with low gains. However, there is more variability in positive and negative values on 
















In our daily lives, we receive an enormous amount of information from our surroundings. 
Curiosity towards obtaining this information appears to be a basic biological drive, 
but still little is known about the underlying cognitive and neural mechanisms. The 
drive for information can be so prevalent that humans and other animals also seek out 
information, even if it does not serve any obvious immediate purpose. We call this type 
of curiosity “non-instrumental curiosity”, which is the focus of the current thesis. More 
specifically, we asked what the cognitive and neural mechanisms are by which such 
apparently purpose-less curiosity is elicited. 
To investigate this, we developed a novel lottery paradigm. This paradigm allowed us to 
independently manipulate the uncertainty about the lottery outcome, the expected value 
(mean reward) and the valence (gain or loss) of the lottery. For every lottery, participants 
had to indicate their curiosity using curiosity ratings (in Chapter 2 - 6) or more implicit 
willingness to wait decisions (Chapter 2 and Chapter 4). However, their curiosity decisions 
did not allow them to influence the lottery outcome. This paradigm enabled us to assess 
the motives underlying human curiosity in a controlled and quantitative fashion. 
The overall aim of the current thesis was to elucidate the cognitive and neural 
mechanisms of non-instrumental curiosity. This was done by means of a combination 
of behavioral experiments (Chapter 2, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5), functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI; Chapter 3) and positron emission tomography (PET; Chapter 
6). In this chapter, I will summarize the main findings, discuss and integrate the most 
relevant findings and highlight the relevance for future studies.
7.1 | Main findings
In Chapter 2 we aimed to disentangle the contribution of information uncertainty and 
expected value of rewards to non-instrumental curiosity in humans. We found that 
people are more curious and more willing to wait with higher outcome uncertainty. 
In contrast, expected value did not strongly relate to these curiosity measures. These 
results suggest that we are particularly curious about information when it reduces 
uncertainty and that this drive can even supersede the drive for explicit reward. This 
finding was replicated in our other behavioural experiments (Chapter 4 and 5) as well 
as when we combined this task with fMRI (Chapter 3) and PET (Chapter 6) measures. 
Given the robust effects of outcome uncertainty on curiosity, we asked in Chapter 3 
what the neural mechanisms are by which such uncertainty-driven curiosity is elicited. 
Using functional MRI, we found that the induction of curiosity by outcome uncertainty 
was associated with activity in the parietal cortex (Huettel, Song, & Mccarthy, 2005). 
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Relief of curiosity was associated with activity in the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC; see 
also Charpentier, Bromberg-Martin, & Sharot, 2018), the parietal cortex and the insula. 
Moreover, the insula also coded the size of the information update (information 
prediction error; see also Preuschoff, Quartz, & Bossaerts, 2008). These results suggest 
that curiosity is monotonically related to the uncertainty about one's current world 
model, the induction and relief of which are associated with activity in parietal and 
insular cortices, respectively.
In Chapter 4 we investigated whether the effects of outcome uncertainty extend to 
negative information, such that people are also more curious about more uncertain 
losses. Moreover, we investigated whether the drive for information is asymmetric, 
such that people are more curious about positive information (gains) compared with 
negative information (losses). We found that people are more curious and more willing 
to wait with higher outcome uncertainty for both gains and losses. Additionally, 
curiosity was indeed higher for gains compared with losses, independent of 
uncertainty. These findings were replicated in Chapter 5 and in Chapter 6. This suggests 
that curiosity follows from multiple drives, including a drive to reduce uncertainty 
(knowing), as well as separately, a drive to maximize positive information (savouring). 
In Chapter 5 we took a closer look at what it feels like to be curious. More specifically, 
we aimed to elucidate whether curiosity is an aversive or an appetitive drive. To 
investigate this, we obtained both subjective valence (happiness) and curiosity 
ratings from subjects who performed a lottery task that elicits uncertainty-dependent 
curiosity. We found that, whereas curiosity increased with outcome uncertainty, 
happiness decreased with outcome uncertainty. This was especially the case for loss 
trials, and to a lesser extent for gain trials. Overall, this indicates that people are more 
curious, but less happy about lotteries with higher outcome uncertainty. These results 
are in line with the notion that curiosity is essentially an aversive drive to reduce the 
unpleasant state of uncertainty. 
Lastly, based on previous evidence demonstrating a link between information 
prediction errors and dopamine neuronal firing rates (Bromberg-Martin & Hikosaka, 
2009, 2011), we asked whether the drive to seek information varies with individual 
differences in dopamine synthesis capacity (Chapter 6). In order to investigate this, 
we let participants perform the lottery task described above. In a separate session, 
participants underwent an [18F]DOPA PET scan to quantify their dopamine synthesis 
capacity. Whereas we replicated our previous behavioural results, we found no 
convincing evidence that curiosity or the sensitivity to outcome uncertainty, outcome 
valence and expected value was related to participants’ dopamine synthesis capacity 












7.2 | Interpretation of the findings
7.2.1 | Curiosity is a function of the size of the information gap
Based on the finding that humans and other animals are driven by obtaining 
information without obvious purpose (Bennett et al., 2016; Blanchard et al., 2015; 
Bromberg-Martin & Hikosaka, 2009, 2011; Brydevall et al., 2018; Stagner et al., 2010; 
Zentall & Stagner, 2011), we asked whether curiosity is a function of the size of the 
information gap. We found robust and consistent evidence that curiosity increased 
with outcome uncertainty (Chapter 2 - 6), whereas expected value did not strongly 
relate to these curiosity measures. In other words: people were more curious when the 
size of the information gap was larger.
These findings seemingly contradict prior work on human curiosity using trivia 
questions (e.g. Gruber, Gelman, & Ranganath, 2014; Kang et al., 2009). That work 
suggested that individuals are mostly curious about information of intermediate 
levels of confidence compared with questions about which they were very confident 
or not confident at all to already know the answer (Baranes et al., 2015; Kang et al., 
2009). Other studies using trivia questions even demonstrated that curiosity is 
strongest when one feels close to filling a knowledge gap (Litman et al., 2005; Metcalfe 
et al., 2017; Wade & Kidd, 2019). These findings contrast with our observation of a 
linear relationship between uncertainty and curiosity. However, it might reflect that 
participants in previous work were not curious about questions with highest uncertainty 
(i.e. lowest confidence), because they were simply not interested in the topics of these 
questions. In other words, there might be a correlation between one’s disinterest and 
one’s curiosity about the subject, confounding the relationship between curiosity and 
uncertainty. Here, this confound was avoided by experimentally manipulating outcome 
uncertainty in a quantitative and controlled manner.  
Another explanation for these differences might come from the field of developmental 
robotics. According to the learning progress hypothesis (Oudeyer et al., 2007), curiosity 
is high when there are opportunities to make learning progress. Specifically, curiosity 
is argued to increase, not with uncertainty or information prediction error (i.e. surprise) 
per se, but rather with the minimization of the derivative of (i.e. difference between 
two successive) prediction errors. The learning progress proposal is reminiscent of 
the predictive coding framework, according to which agents are driven to minimize 
surprise, and thus also information prediction errors (Friston et al., 2017). This was 
reflected in the behavior of the robots: they first focus on situations that are easy 
to learn, before shifting attention to more difficult situations. At the same time, the 
robots avoided situations that were too complex and in which nothing could be 
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learned. Similarly, recent work has argued that an individual should explore stimuli 
that maximally increase the usefulness of its knowledge (Dubey & Griffiths, 2019). 
Perhaps in trivia questions, we are mostly curious about questions of intermediate 
confidence because most learning progress can be made for those questions. On the 
other hand, in our quantitative lottery paradigm, where uncertainty is independent 
of prior knowledge, knowledge updates are largest for lotteries with high uncertainty. 
Our findings demonstrate that we possess a drive to reduce uncertainty. This is in line 
with evidence from work in cognitive and computational neuroscience, suggesting 
that the human brain is built to minimize prediction error signals (i.e. by encoding the 
difference between actual and expected sensory stimulations; Clark, 2018). However, 
it has been argued that the most efficient way to escape new sources of uncertainty, 
is to avoid stimulation and novel information altogether (known as “the dark room 
problem”; Friston, Thornton, & Clark, 2012). However, we see in the world around 
us that people actually seek out unexpected and surprising information. It has been 
argued that this is the case because leaving a dark room will indeed increase short-
term prediction errors, but it will maximize our prediction skills on the long term (Sun 
& Firestone, 2020). As such, surprise and uncertainty are actually the gateway towards 
better internal model of the world. It allows us to update our models and to learn new 
things. In that sense, curiosity can be viewed as an exceptionally useful trait. 
7.2.2 | Multiple motives underlying human curiosity
We demonstrate in Chapter 4, 5 and 6 that participants were not only curious about 
uncertain gains, but also about more uncertain losses. This indicates that participants 
show a general drive to reduce uncertainty, regardless of whether the information 
they could obtain contained good news (gains) or bad news (losses). In addition to 
uncertainty reduction, we found in in these chapters that humans are more curious 
about positive compared with negative information (gains versus losses). Thus, there 
are multiple motives underlying human curiosity (Kobayashi et al., 2019). In the 
current thesis, we extend prior work by demonstrating that the effect of outcome 
uncertainty on curiosity was not reliably different for gains and losses. This indicates 
that the mechanisms that affect curiosity, related to uncertainty reduction (knowing) 
and processing reward context (savouring) are independent. 
First, we find that people are driven by uncertainty, also when it concerns negative 
information (losses). In other words: people were curious and willing to wait for 
information about losses (albeit to a lesser degree than for gains), and more so when 
the uncertainty about these losses was higher. This resonates with the notion that we 












(FitzGibbon et al., 2019; Hsee & Ruan, 2016; Oosterwijk, 2017; Oosterwijk et al., 
2019). As such, humans seem to exhibit a general desire to reduce uncertainty, which 
might dominate feelings of unpleasantness upon receiving the outcome (Hsee & Ruan, 
2016; Lieberman et al., 1997; Niehoff & Oosterwijk, 2020; Oosterwijk et al., 2019). 
This finding might be related to the notion that people are likely to overestimate the 
probability of positive events happening to them (e.g. getting a promotion at your job) 
and underestimating the probability of negative events (e.g. getting divorced). This is 
called the “optimism bias” or “unrealistic optimism” (Sharot, 2011; Sharot & Sunstein, 
2020; Weinstein, 1980). Due to this optimistic view on what will happen, people 
tend to overestimate the positive feelings associated with positive information, and 
underestimate the negative feelings associated with negative information. This will 
in turn lead to information seeking, both for positive as well as for negative events 
(Sharot & Sunstein, 2020).  
In addition, we demonstrate that people exhibit a preference for positive versus 
negative belief updating, such that they were more curious about gains compared with 
losses. This is in line with recent work using a lottery paradigm containing gains and 
losses (Charpentier et al., 2018) and work with trivia questions showing that people 
are mostly curious about questions of positive valence (Marvin & Shohamy, 2016). In 
other words: we prefer to seek out information from which we expect that it will make 
us feel good, compared to information that will make us feel bad.  From time to time, 
we even deliberately decide to ignore information when we know that it will make 
us feel bad. Charpentier and colleagues (2018) demonstrate that human volunteers 
were willing to pay for obtaining positive information (information with high expected 
value) as well as to avoid knowledge about negative information (information with low 
expected value). In the willingness to wait experiment in Chapter 4  we found similar 
effects as a function of expected value, such that participants were more often willing 
to wait to see the outcome for lotteries involving higher gains, but less often willing 
to wait for lotteries involving higher losses. This avoidance behavior for losses is in 
line with the notion that we sometimes deliberately decide to avoid certain pieces 
of negative information, such as potential negative medical test results (Dwyer et 
al., 2015; Persoskie et al., 2014). These findings can be explained by regret aversion 
theories, that state that people avoid information if they anticipate to experience 
regret upon obtaining it (Gigerenzer & Garcia-Retamero, 2017). Also, people tend to 
overestimate the duration and intensity of how they will feel in the future, known 
as the “impact bias” (Wilson & Gilbert, 2005). Due to this bias, we overestimate how 
good positive information will make us feel, as well as how bad negative information 
will make us feel. This might lead to increased information seeking for good news, 
but to the avoidance of bad news (Sharot & Sunstein 2020). As such, whereas we are 
driven by uncertainty reduction, there is an additional preference for anticipating 
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positive outcomes (savouring), while avoiding the dread that might be associated with 
anticipating negative outcomes (Charpentier et al., 2018; Iigaya, Story, Kurth-Nelson, 
Dolan, & Dayan, 2016; Kobayashi et al., 2019).
It should be noted that the experiments described in the current thesis, as well as 
other experiments demonstrating that people are more curious about gains compared 
with losses (Charpentier et al., 2018), use non-instrumental lottery paradigms. That is, 
there is no way of maximizing rewards or increasing task performance by means of 
exploration. In these situations, curiosity is possibly greater for gains compared with 
losses because it allows participants to maximize the positive affective state associated 
with that they have won (see Sharot & Sunstein, 2020). However, studies using 
paradigms in which rewards could be maximized (instrumental paradigms) showed that 
people exhibit higher exploration rates for losses compared with gains (Lejarraga et al., 
2012; Lejarraga & Hertwig, 2017). Because the apparent differences in results and task 
demands, we should emphasize that our conclusions do not generalize to situations 
where people seek information to maximize reward. Given this interesting discrepancy, 
future work might focus on comparing how motives underlying information seeking 
in humans differ between situations when the information is directly useful for the 
task at hand (“instrumental curiosity”) and situations in which the information does not 
have an obvious benefit (“non-instrumental curiosity”). 
7.2.3 | Curiosity as an aversive drive
We discussed before that curiosity reflects a drive to reduce uncertainty. In Chapter 5, 
we asked what it feels like to be in this curiosity-triggering state of uncertainty. More 
specifically, we aimed to elucidate whether curiosity is an aversive or an appetitive 
drive. To this end, we obtained subjective valence (happiness) ratings (Experiment 
1) and curiosity ratings (Experiment 2) from subjects who performed a lottery task 
that elicits uncertainty-dependent curiosity. The results show that people were more 
curious, but less happy about lotteries with higher outcome uncertainty. These findings 
indicate that curiosity can be cast as an aversive drive to reduce the unpleasant state 
of uncertainty. 
Indeed, previous work demonstrated that uncertainty can have aversive as well 
as appetitive properties. In the world around us, we see that humans often seek out 
situations of high uncertainty, such as travelling to unknown places or engaging in 
complex Sudoku puzzles or escape rooms. However, in line with the results of Chapter 
5, we know from previous work that humans generally do not like to be in a state 
of uncertainty and consider this to be aversive (Bar-Anan et al., 2009; Berlyne, 1957; 












evoking (Grupe & Nitschke, 2013). In fact, a number of studies have shown that 
curiosity is often associated with a feeling of deprivation (Litman, 2005; Litman et 
al., 2005), which promotes information seeking to end the disliked state of ignorance. 
This is in line with literature arguing that incentive salience plays an important role in 
reward learning. Incentive salience refers to the motivational feeling of ‘wanting’ in 
anticipation of an outcome that can be separated from the hedonic response of ‘liking’ 
to the outcome itself (Berridge, 2012; FitzGibbon et al., 2020; Pool et al., 2016; Zhang 
et al., 2009). Furthermore, prior work has suggested that the induction of curiosity 
implicates brain regions linked to aversive conditions, such as the anterior cingulate 
cortex and the anterior insula, while curiosity relief implicates brain areas related to 
reward (Jepma et al., 2012).
Although the findings of Chapter 5 are in support of the hypothesis that curiosity is an 
aversive drive, they do not discard the information-as-reward hypothesis (Loewenstein, 
1994; Marvin & Shohamy, 2016), according to which information also has appetitive 
properties. The idea that information has appetitive properties is supported by 
findings in macaque monkeys indicating that primary rewards and information share 
similar behavioral and neurobiological properties (Blanchard et al., 2015; Bromberg-
Martin & Hikosaka, 2009, 2011). This is also in line with the opponent-process theory 
of motivation (Solomon & Corbit, 1978), that states that rewards (like drugs of abuse 
or, in the current experiments, information) can have appetitive as well as aversive 
properties. For the current thesis, this would mean that information seeking is likely 
driven by a combination of a motivation to reduce the aversive state elicited by the 
absence of information (uncertainty) plus a motivation to maximize the presence of 
information. All in all, this demonstrates that information can act as a motivationally 
salient reward (FitzGibbon et al., 2020). 
However, the experiments described in Chapter 5 have some limitations that should be 
mentioned here. First, it is surprising that we find no differences in happiness ratings 
between blocks in which the outcome would always be revealed (and curiosity would be 
relieved) and blocks in which the outcome would never be revealed. If curiosity would 
have appetitive properties that are related to receiving information, we would expect 
there to be a difference in happiness ratings between these blocks. However, it might 
be the case that the happiness question was too decoupled from outcome presentation, 
because the question was focused on the lottery itself (“How happy are you that this 
lottery will be played?”). Future studies could overcome this by either varying outcome 
presentation on a trial-by-trial basis (making the reception of the outcome more 
salient) or by additionally asking a question that is more targeted towards the outcome 
phase (e.g. “How happy are you that you will (not) see the outcome of this lottery?”). 
Furthermore, it should be noted that the happiness scale ranged from “not happy at 
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all” to “very happy”. As such, it is not clear whether participants who indicate to be not 
happy at all, actually consider the lottery to be aversive. It might also indicate that they 
are simply less happy about these compared with other lotteries. Future studies could 
measure aversion more directly, by ranging the scale from “very aversive” to “very 
happy”, with the neutral point meaning “not aversive nor happy”. 
Chapter 5 also strengthens the notion that there might be separate mechanisms that 
affect curiosity, related to uncertainty reduction (knowing) and processing reward 
context (savouring). Specifically, we demonstrate that the curiosity-triggering state 
of uncertainty is aversive, since people were more curious but less happy when 
uncertainty was higher. However, people were both more curious and happier about 
gain compared with loss lotteries, suggesting that curiosity also has appetitive 
properties. However, future work is needed to shed more light on the conditions under 
which curiosity is considered to be appetitive or aversive. 
7.2.4 | Neural mechanisms of human curiosity
In Chapter 3 we investigated the neural constituents of uncertainty-dependent 
curiosity using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Consistent with the 
information-as-reward hypothesis, we expected that uncertainty-dependent curiosity 
would be implicated in similar neural structures as explicit reward (see also Blanchard 
et al., 2015; Bromberg-Martin & Hikosaka, 2009, 2011; Brydevall et al., 2018; Duan 
et al., 2020; Gruber et al., 2014; Jepma, Verdonschot, van Steenbergen, Rombouts, 
& Nieuwenhuis, 2012; Kang et al., 2009; Ligneul, Mermillod, & Morisseau, 2018). 
Specifically, we examined which brain areas were modulated by outcome uncertainty 
and expected value upon lottery presentation (curiosity induction), and their updates 
upon curiosity relief during outcome presentation (i.e. information prediction error and 
reward prediction error). 
7.2.4.1 | Curiosity and attention
During curiosity induction, we found that the BOLD signal in the parietal cortex 
increased with outcome uncertainty. This finding extends previous findings by Huettel 
and colleagues (2005), who implicated this region in processing outcome uncertainty in 
a decision-making context. At the same time, we found no evidence for signals related 
to the expected value of information in the parietal cortex, suggesting that these 
parietal signals operate independently from signaling expected rewards. This is in line 
with previous work with macaque monkeys, indicating that parietal neurons encode 
the expected reduction in uncertainty, independent of reward and reward prediction 












more attentive control, whereas actions with low outcome uncertainty are more 
habitual and require little attention (Fan, 2014; Shenhav et al., 2013).  More broadly, 
the parietal cortex is part of the larger frontoparietal attention network of the human 
brain, responsible for deploying attention, processing saliency and the selection of 
relevant environmental information (Ptak, 2012), as well as value-based modulation 
of cognitive control (Parro et al., 2018). Consistent with this attentional account of 
curiosity, prior work using trivia questions indicated that indicated that states of high 
compared with low curiosity were associated with earlier anticipatory gaze towards 
the expected location of the trivia answer (Baranes et al., 2015). By means of our 
findings, we suggest that people pay more attention when they become aware of gaps 
in their knowledge (Loewenstein, 1994) and more so when these information gaps are 
larger. As such, our findings strengthen the notion that the induction of curiosity by 
uncertainty is at least partially related to neural signals in the frontoparietal attention 
network.
Also during curiosity relief, we found activity in the frontoparietal attention network. 
More specifically, we found that the BOLD signal in the insula, orbitofrontal cortex and 
parietal cortex increased as a function of outcome presentation during curiosity relief 
(outcome presented versus not presented). The key novel finding of Chapter 3, was 
insular activity increased with the amount of information participants gained when 
they were presented with the lottery outcome during curiosity relief (i.e. information 
prediction error). A prior study found that insular signals vary with risk prediction 
errors, representing the degree to which gambling outcomes are surprising when there 
is a choice involved (Preuschoff et al., 2008). The current study suggest that the insula 
is not just involved in learning about risk to optimize choice, but may also contribute 
to knowledge acquisition by signaling information prediction error more generally. 
Similar results were found in the insula and orbitofrontal cortex during relief of 
perceptual curiosity (Jepma et al., 2012), suggesting that these areas might be involved 
more generally in gaining information. The insula might do so by computing specific 
information prediction error signals, which help us to optimize our current world 
model. The orbitofrontal cortex, on the other hand, might do so by responding more 
generally to receiving information. Prior studies also linked the orbitofrontal cortex to 
reward processing (Blanchard et al., 2015; Padoa-Schioppa, 2011; Rushworth, Noonan, 
Boorman, Walton, & Behrens, 2011; Wallis, 2007; Wilson, Takahashi, Schoenbaum, & 
Niv, 2014). As such, our findings extend this by demonstrating that the orbitofrontal 
cortex responds more generally to the opportunity to receive knowledge over 
ignorance (see also Charpentier et al., 2018).
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7.2.4.2 | Curiosity as a reward?
It should be noted that we found no evidence for the involvement of other 
(dopaminergic) reward-related areas (i.e. the ventral striatum) during induction or 
relief of curiosity. The ventral striatum is a classic structure that responds to reward 
and reward prediction error (Abler et al., 2006; Daniel & Pollmann, 2014; Daw & Doya, 
2006; Knutson et al., 2005; O’Doherty, 2004; Pessiglione et al., 2006; Schultz et al., 
1992). Our findings are surprising, especially given previous findings that demonstrate 
that information is processed in similar neural structures as explicit rewards (Blanchard 
et al., 2015; Bromberg-Martin & Hikosaka, 2009, 2011; Brydevall et al., 2018) and 
that curiosity-driven memory benefits are linked to dopaminergic modulation of the 
hippocampus (Gruber et al., 2014; Gruber & Ranganath, 2019).
In Chapter 3, we find no evidence that information (i.e. uncertainty or information 
prediction errors) are encoded in similar brain areas as explicit reward (i.e. expected 
value or reward prediction errors). One possible explanation might be that uncertainty, 
eliciting curiosity in the current task, is perceived as aversive rather than appetitive 
(see Chapter 5; Jepma et al., 2012). In other words: the state elicited by outcome 
uncertainty is not considered pleasant or rewarding, which might be reflected in an 
absence of activation in reward-related areas during curiosity induction. However, also 
during curiosity relief, we found no activity modulation of the ventral striatum as a 
function of reward prediction error or information prediction error. Whereas previous 
studies using trivia questions also found no evidence of activity modulations in the 
ventral striatum during curiosity relief (Gruber et al., 2014; Kang et al., 2009), other 
studies did (Jepma et al., 2012; Ligneul et al., 2018). The main difference between these 
findings is that in the latter studies curiosity was relieved in a stochastic fashion, such 
that it was unpredictable whether curiosity would or would not be relieved. This was 
also the case in the lottery task used in Chapter 3. The difference between our findings 
and the findings by Jepma and colleagues (2012) and Ligneul and colleagues (2018) 
might be explained by the passive nature of our task, or due to the lower signal-to-noise 
ratio in deep brain structures due to the specific fMRI sequence used (see Chapter 3). 
However, there is a well-established link between dopamine firing and reward 
prediction errors (Schultz, Dayan, & Montague, 1997). For instance, prior work 
demonstrated that a considerable proportion of individual variability ventral striatal 
coding of reward prediction errors (Deserno et al., 2015; Schlagenhauf et al., 2013; 
Boehme et al., 2015), reward-based reversal learning (Cools et al., 2009), cognitive 
control (Aarts et al., 2014) and cognitive effort (Westbrook et al., 2020) is accounted 
for by individual differences in dopamine synthesis capacity. Therefore, we asked in 












namely non-instrumental curiosity. More specifically, based on evidence demonstrating 
a link between information prediction errors and dopamine neural firing rates 
(Bromberg-Martin & Hikosaka, 2009; 2011), we asked whether curiosity varies with 
individual differences in dopamine synthesis capacity. In the experimental session, 
participants performed the lottery task used in Chapter 4 and 5. In a separate session, 
participants underwent an [18F]DOPA PET scan to quantify their dopamine synthesis 
capacity. However, we found no convincing evidence that curiosity was related to 
participants’ dopamine synthesis capacity in the ventral striatum, the caudate or the 
putamen.
Perhaps these findings reflect fundamental differences between uncertainty-
dependent curiosity and states associated with reward motivation. For example, reward 
delivery generally motivates future behavior that leads to the same reward, whereas 
information that resolves our uncertainty no longer promotes future exploratory 
behavior (Gruber & Ranganath, 2019). Prior work also indicated that reward has 
been shown to undermine curiosity and its effect on memory (Murayama et al., 2010; 
Murayama & Kuhbandner, 2011). Thus, curiosity can be seen as a motivational state 
that is at least partially distinct from states that motivate the acquisition of primary 
reward (Gruber & Ranganath, 2019).  
7.3 | Limitations and future directions
One of our main findings indicates that we are driven by uncertainty to update our 
current model of the world. A related, but not mutually exclusive hypothesis comes 
from the learning progress hypothesis, derived from work in the field of developmental 
robotics (Oudeyer et al., 2007). Generally, this hypothesis states that we should be 
maximally curious when there are opportunities to make learning progress. Future 
work is needed to address this hypothesis, for example, using experimental designs 
where curiosity ratings and/or behaviors are measured on a trial-by-trial basis as a 
function of changes in the difference between the predicted and the obtained amount 
of information. 
A second focus for future work might be to study neuromodulatory drug effects on 
human curiosity behavior. This is pertinent, given the well-known role of the large 
ascending neuromodulators, such as dopamine and noradrenaline, in the various 
curiosity-relevant constructs highlighted here, such as uncertainty-based (meta-)
learning (i.e. Nassar et al., 2012; Wang et al., 2018; Jepma et al., 2016; Marshall et al., 
2016) reward motivation and cognitive effort (Westbrook et al., 2020). By addressing 
the neuromodulation of non-instrumental curiosity, such hypotheses go beyond 
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most existing models of neuromodulator function, which are commonly grounded 
in a primary drive to maximize reward rather than information. However, prior 
evidence demonstrating that the firing of single dopamine neurons in the midbrain 
correlates with the size of the information prediction error in a non-instrumental 
framework (Bromberg-Martin & Hikosaka, 2009, 2011), underscores the promise of 
human psychopharmacological interventions for studying inter- and intra-individual 
variability in curiosity behavior. Such progress will open avenues for advancing our 
understanding of the psychological and neurobiological mechanisms of curiosity and, 
perhaps, ultimately also our ability to enhance it.
The current study focused on state curiosity using a passive non-instrumental 
observation task. An apparent benefit of the lottery paradigm used here, is that it 
allowed us to manipulate outcome uncertainty, expected value and outcome valence in 
a quantitative and controlled fashion. However, the task might seem further removed 
from everyday situations that elicit curiosity, such as the trivia questions paradigm (i.e. 
Baranes et al., 2015; Duan et al., 2020; Gruber et al., 2014; Kang et al., 2009; Ligneul 
et al., 2018; Marvin & Shohamy, 2016). Also, people performing this task were largely 
insensitive to expected value, which is hard to reconcile with their strong sensitivity 
to outcome valence (gain versus loss). Future studies could shed more light on the 
ecological validity of the current paradigm, for example with online studies in which 
performance on this task is combined with experience sampling of real-life fluctuating 
states of curiosity. Likewise, it might be relevant to compare curiosity and the motives 
underlying curiosity between instrumental and non-instrumental contexts to explore 
whether and how task performance differs as a function of the ability to maximize 
rewards. 
7.4 | Conclusion
In the current thesis, we demonstrate that uncertainty is an important driver for non-
instrumental curiosity. The induction of this uncertainty-driven curiosity is implicated 
in brain areas related to attention, such as the parietal cortex. The information updates 
obtained when the outcome was revealed are processed in the insula (i.e. information 
prediction errors). 
In addition to uncertainty, curiosity is also driven by the valence of the outcome, such 
that participants are more curious about positive compared with negative information 
(gains versus losses). As such, we demonstrate that curiosity is a combination of 
multiple drives, related to knowing (higher curiosity when uncertainty is higher) and 












independent from each other. This distinction is further underlined by the notion 
that the curiosity-triggering state of uncertainty is aversive, since people were more 
curious but less happy when uncertainty was higher. 
We found no robust evidence that dopamine plays a vital role in non-instrumental 
curiosity, but future work should shed more light on the role of ascending 
neuromodulators, such as dopamine and noradrenaline for curiosity. All in all these 
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De mens is van nature nieuwsgierig. We spenderen enorm veel tijd aan het zoeken 
en consumeren van informatie. Denk bijvoorbeeld aan hoe vaak we elke dag onze 
smartphone checken, het nieuws lezen, of op het internet aan het surfen zijn. Soms 
is het direct duidelijk naar wat voor informatie we op zoek zijn en hebben we een 
duidelijk doel voor ogen. Als we bijvoorbeeld het weerbericht bekijken voordat we 
het huis verlaten, doen we dit waarschijnlijk omdat we willen weten of het die dag zal 
gaan regenen. Deze informatie is direct relevant om je dag op een positieve manier te 
beginnen en negatieve ervaringen te vermijden, gerelateerd aan het maximaliseren 
van beloningen en/of het vermijden van straffen. We willen bijvoorbeeld niet het risico 
lopen dat we compleet doorweekt op ons werk aankomen. Als we op zoek zijn naar dit 
soort direct relevante informatie wordt dat “instrumentele nieuwsgierigheid” genoemd.
Aan de andere kant zijn we vaak ook op zoek naar informatie zonder dat dit direct 
relevant is. Denk bijvoorbeeld aan alle momenten waarop je doelloos door je Instagram 
feed of Facebook app aan het scrollen bent. We noemen dit type nieuwsgierigheid 
ook wel “niet-instrumentele nieuwsgierigheid”. Gezien de hoeveelheid tijd die we 
spenderen aan het zoeken en consumeren van informatie zonder duidelijk doel, 
is een belangrijke vraag waarom we zo nieuwsgierig zijn naar deze informatie. Wat 
zijn de cognitieve en neurale mechanismen die samenhangen met niet-instrumentele 
nieuwsgierigheid? 
Eerdere studies hebben aangetoond dat we nieuwsgierig zijn naar informatie, omdat 
deze informatie van zichzelf aantrekkelijk of belonend zal zijn. Dit is geformaliseerd 
in de “information gap” hypothese, die stelt dat onze nieuwsgierigheid gedreven wordt 
door het verschil tussen wat je op dat moment weet en wat je nog niet weet. Wanneer 
we ons bewust worden van de gaten in onze kennis (de “information gaps”), wordt onze 
nieuwsgierigheid getriggerd en willen we informatie zoeken om deze gaten in onze 
kennis op te vullen. In recente studies werd bijvoorbeeld aangetoond dat makaken een 
sterke voorkeur hadden voor het verkrijgen van informatie over de grootte van een 
beloning (bijvoorbeeld druppels water of sap) die ze later zouden krijgen. Dit was het 
geval, ondanks dat de apen deze informatie op geen enkele manier konden gebruiken 
om hogere beloningen te krijgen. Een vervolgstudie liet zelfs zien dat deze apen ook 
bereid waren om een substantieel deel van de beloning op te geven om deze informatie 
te kunnen krijgen. In het brein van de apen werd gevonden dat dezelfde neuronen die 
actief waren tijdens het krijgen van beloningen, ook actief waren tijdens het krijgen van 
informatie. Dit illustreert het idee dat informatie van zichzelf als belonend beschouwd 
kan worden.  
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Worden we gedreven door informatie?
Een hypothese die dit werk oproept is dat we nieuwsgierig zijn naar informatie, omdat 
het als belonend wordt gezien om de onzekerheid die we hebben over de wereld om ons 
heen te verminderen. Als dit het geval is, zouden we verwachten dat nieuwsgierigheid 
toe zou nemen als het gat in onze kennis (het verschil tussen wat we weten en wat we 
nog niet weten) groter is. Met andere woorden: onzekerheid maakt ons nieuwsgierig. 
Deze hypothese hebben we experimenteel getest in Hoofdstuk 2 en Hoofdstuk 3.
We hebben een nieuwe loterij taak ontwikkeld om deze hypothese te testen. Tijdens 
de taak kregen proefpersonen verschillende loterijen te zien. Elke loterij bestond 
uit een vaas met een mix van rode en blauwe knikkers. Beide kleuren knikkers 
waren geassocieerd met een verschillend aantal punten wat proefpersonen konden 
verdienen. We vertelden aan de proefpersonen dat er één knikker per loterij getrokken 
zou worden en dat ze het aantal punten geassocieerd met de getrokken knikker zouden 
verdienen. 
In Experiment 1 van Hoofdstuk 2 vroegen we voor elke loterij hoe nieuwsgierig de 
proefpersoon was om de uitkomst te zien (“Hoe nieuwsgierig ben je naar de uitkomst?”). 
Vervolgens had de proefpersoon 50% kans om de uitkomst ook daadwerkelijk gezien. 
Een belangrijk aspect van deze taak was dat proefpersonen geen manier hadden om te 
beïnvloeden welke knikker getrokken zou worden en of ze de uitkomst al dan niet te 
zien zouden krijgen. Op deze manier was de taak niet-instrumenteel. Dat wil zeggen: 
de proefpersonen hadden geen manier om hun beloning te maximaliseren door middel 
van hun nieuwsgierigheid. 
In Experiment 2 van Hoofdstuk 2 vroegen we voor elke loterij of de proefpersoon de 
uitkomst wilde zien (“Wil je de uitkomst van deze loterij zien?”). De proefpersoon kon 
hierop antwoorden met “ja” of “nee”. Indien zij “nee” zeiden kregen ze de uitkomst 
niet te zien en gingen ze direct door naar de volgende loterij. Indien zij “ja” zeiden 
kregen ze de uitkomst wel te zien. De uitkomst werd echter niet zomaar getoond: de 
proefpersonen wisten dat zij 3 tot 6 seconden moesten wachten voordat de uitkomst 
ook daadwerkelijk op hun beeld verscheen. Op deze manier konden we door middel 
van een meer impliciete nieuwsgierigheids-maat onderzoeken of mensen ook wilden 
“betalen” door middel van tijd om de uitkomst van loterijen te kunnen zien. Ook hier 
was het al dan niet zien van de uitkomst niet-instrumenteel: proefpersonen hadden 
geen manier om hun beloning te maximaliseren door middel van hun beslissing om de 
uitkomst te zien. 
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Het gebruik van dit soort loterijen gaf ons de mogelijkheid om de onzekerheid over 
de uitkomst van de loterij en de hoogte van de beloningen op een kwantitatieve en 
onafhankelijke manier van elkaar te manipuleren. De hoogte van de beloningen werd 
gemanipuleerd door middel van de punten geassocieerd met de rode en blauwe 
knikkers. De beloning is bijvoorbeeld hoger in een loterij waarin een rode knikker 90 
punten waard is en een blauwe knikker 80 punten, dan een loterij waarin een rode 
knikker 10 punten waard is en een blauwe knikker 20 punten. De onzekerheid van de 
uitkomst werd gemanipuleerd door middel van de verdeling rode en blauwe knikkers in 
de vaas. Zo is het onzekerder wat de uitkomst van de loterij zal zijn wanneer er 10 rode 
en 10 blauwe knikkers in een vaas zitten, dan wanneer er 19 rode en maar 1 blauwe 
knikker in de vaas zit. Ook werd de onzekerheid gemanipuleerd door middel van het 
verschil tussen de punten geassocieerd met de knikkers. Het is bijvoorbeeld lastiger 
in te schatten en dus onzekerder hoe groot de beloning zal zijn als de punten ver van 
elkaar af liggen (bijvoorbeeld 10 punten voor een rode knikker en 90 punten voor 
een blauwe knikker), dan wanneer de punten dichter bij elkaar liggen (bijvoorbeeld 
40 punten voor een rode knikker en 60 punten voor een blauwe knikker). Op deze 
manier konden we de gemiddelde hoogte van de beloningen en de spreiding rondom 
dit gemiddelde (de onzekerheid) onafhankelijk van elkaar manipuleren. Vervolgens 
hebben we onderzocht of onze expliciete (Experiment 1) en impliciete (Experiment 2) 
maten van nieuwsgierigheid samenhangen met de hoogte van de beloningen en/of de 
onzekerheid over wat de uitkomst gaat zijn. 
In beide experimenten vonden we sterke effecten van onzekerheid. Dat wil zeggen 
dat mensen aangaven nieuwsgieriger te zijn en vaker wilden wachten op de uitkomst, 
naarmate de onzekerheid in de loterij hoger was. Daarnaast waren mensen niet 
nieuwsgieriger en wilden ze niet vaker wachten naarmate de loterij hogere beloningen 
bevatte. Hiermee hebben we aangetoond dat niet-instrumentele nieuwsgierigheid 
vooral gedreven wordt door de onzekerheid van de informatie en niet of in mindere 
mate door de hoogte van expliciete beloningen. 
Is het krijgen van informatie vergelijkbaar met het krijgen van een 
beloning?
Gebaseerd op bevindingen die suggereren dat informatie en beloningen geassocieerd 
worden met vergelijkbare hersengebieden, hebben we in Hoofdstuk 3 onderzocht 
wat de neurale mechanismen zijn die te maken hebben met niet-instrumentele 
nieuwsgierigheid. 
Hiervoor hebben we dezelfde taak gebruikt als in Hoofdstuk 2, waarin we expliciet 
vroegen hoe nieuwsgierig mensen waren naar de uitkomst voor elke loterij. Het 
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grootste verschil was dat de proefpersonen dit keer in een fMRI scanner lagen terwijl 
ze de taak uitvoerden. 
Voor de analyses hebben we ons gefocust op het moment waarop nieuwsgierigheid 
werd opgewekt (het moment waarop de loterij aan de proefpersonen getoond werd). 
Voor dat moment keken we naar de effecten van onzekerheid en expliciete beloning 
in het brein. We onderzochten specifiek of activiteit in breingebieden die te maken 
hebben met beloningen gemoduleerd werd door onzekerheid en/of de hoogte van de 
beloning. Verder hebben we ons gefocust op het moment waarop de uitkomst van de 
loterij wel of niet op het scherm te zien was. Voor dat moment onderzochten we welke 
breingebieden betrokken waren bij het zien versus het niet zien van de uitkomst (en 
dus te maken hebben met het al dan niet verkrijgen van informatie).
De resultaten laten zien dat de onzekerheid over de uitkomst samenhing met activiteit 
in de pariëtaal cortex. Dit is een gebied dat vaak geassocieerd wordt met het richten 
van je aandacht op een stimulus. We vonden geen activiteit als een functie van 
onzekerheid en de hoogte van de beloning in belonings-gerelateerde hersengebieden. 
Dit was waarschijnlijk het geval omdat nieuwsgierigheid vooral werd opgewekt door 
de onzekerheid, en niet of in mindere mate door expliciete beloningen (zoals ook 
aangetoond in Hoofdstuk 2). 
Verder was de hersenactiviteit in de pariëtaal cortex, de insula en de orbitofrontale 
cortex hoger wanneer de uitkomst getoond werd vergeleken met wanneer deze niet 
getoond werd. Het meest interessante hieraan, was dat de hoogte van het signaal van 
de insula samenhing met de grootte van de informatie-update. Met andere woorden: 
hoe meer informatie de proefpersoon verkreeg door het zien van de uitkomst (dus: 
hoe onzekerder de loterij was), hoe hoger de activiteit in de insula. Verder tonen 
deze resultaten aan dat het zien van de uitkomst van de loterij activiteit verhoogd in 
gebieden die met aandacht te maken hebben (zoals de pariëtaal cotex) en in gebieden 
die te maken hebben met de verwerking van beloningen (orbitofrontale cortex). 
Verrassend genoeg vonden we geen activiteit in het ventrale striatum, een van de 
belangrijkste gebieden in het brein die samenhangt met beloningen. We concluderen 
op basis van deze bevindingen dat niet-instrumentele nieuwsgierigheid die sterk 
samenhangt met onzekerheid op zijn minst deels is gebaseerd op andere neurale 
mechanismen dan expliciete beloningen. 
Zijn we nieuwsgieriger naar positieve dan naar negatieve informatie?
Naast onzekerheid zijn er nog meer factoren die onze nieuwsgierigheid bepalen. Een 
voorbeeld hiervan is dat men vaak nieuwsgieriger is naar positieve informatie in 
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vergelijking met negatieve informatie. Denk bijvoorbeeld terug aan de dagen wanneer 
je net een belangrijk examen achter de rug had. Waarschijnlijk zul je nieuwsgieriger zijn 
naar de uitslag wanneer je denkt dat je het examen goed gemaakt hebt en waarschijnlijk 
zult slagen (en positieve informatie verwacht), dan wanneer je het gevoel hebt dat je 
de toets niet hebt gehaald (en negatieve informatie verwacht). In dat laatste geval wil 
je het checken van de uitslag misschien zelfs het liefste zo lang mogelijk uitstellen of 
zelfs vermijden. In Hoofdstuk 4 hebben we onderzocht of het inderdaad het geval is 
dat we nieuwsgieriger zijn naar positieve dan naar negatieve informatie. Tegelijkertijd 
hebben we hierbij gekeken of dit samenhangt met de onzekerheid van de informatie.
Om dit te kunnen onderzoeken hebben we eenzelfde loterij taak gebruikt als in 
Hoofdstuk 2 en Hoofdstuk 3. Het grootste verschil was dat de taak dit keer bestond 
uit verschillende loterijen waarin proefpersonen een onzeker bedrag konden winnen 
(en dus positieve informatie zouden krijgen) of een onzeker bedrag zouden verliezen 
(en dus negatieve informatie zouden krijgen). Zoals in Hoofdstuk 2, vroegen we in 
Experiment 1 aan de proefpersonen hoe nieuwsgierig ze waren naar de uitkomst van 
elke loterij, terwijl we in Experiment 2 een meer impliciete maat gebruikten (door te 
kijken naar of ze bereid waren om te wachten om de uitkomst te zien). 
Allereerst vonden we in beide experimenten dat mensen nieuwsgieriger en vaker 
bereid waren om te wachten naarmate de onzekerheid van de loterijen hoger was. 
Dit was het geval wanneer ze geld zouden winnen (en de uitkomst positief zou zijn), 
maar ook als ze geld zouden verliezen (en de uitkomst negatief zou zijn). Dit laat zien 
dat mensen gedreven worden door onzekerheid en informatie willen krijgen over wat 
er gaat gebeuren, zelfs als het om negatieve informatie gaat. Daarnaast vonden we 
ook dat de proefpersonen over het algemeen nieuwsgieriger waren naar de uitkomst 
van loterijen waarin ze geld zouden winnen, dan naar loterijen waarin ze geld zouden 
verliezen. Met andere woorden: mensen waren nieuwsgieriger naar positieve dan naar 
negatieve informatie. Dit laatste effect stond los van het effect van onzekerheid. 
Hiermee tonen we aan dat er twee aparte effecten zijn die samenhangen met 
nieuwsgierigheid. Het ene effect heeft te maken met het verminderen van onzekerheid 
over wat er gaat gebeuren en het andere effect is gerelateerd aan een voorkeur voor 
positieve versus negatieve informatie. 
Is nieuwsgierigheid een aversieve of een appetitieve drijfveer?
Gebaseerd op deze twee effecten, vroegen we ons af welke emoties er ten grondslag 
liggen aan nieuwsgierigheid. We zagen in Hoofdstuk 4 dat mensen nieuwsgieriger 
zijn naar positieve informatie dan naar negatieve informatie. Dit is waarschijnlijk 
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het geval omdat positieve informatie ons een goed gevoel geeft. Aan de andere kant 
hangt nieuwsgierigheid ook sterk samen met onzekerheid, zoals we gezien hebben in 
Hoofdstuk 2, Hoofdstuk 3 en Hoofdstuk 4. Maar vinden mensen het eigenlijk wel zo 
leuk om in deze staat van onzekerheid te verkeren?
We weten dat onzekerheid plezierige elementen heeft. Mensen vinden het bijvoorbeeld 
leuk om Sudoku puzzels op te lossen in hun vrije tijd en kiezen er soms zelfs voor om 
zich op te laten sluiten in escape rooms. Aan de andere kant laat de literatuur ook zien 
dat we onzekerheid eigenlijk helemaal niet zo leuk vinden en het zelfs als aversief 
of angst-opwekkend beschouwen. In Hoofdstuk 5 wilden we daarom onderzoeken of 
deze onzekerheids-gerelateerde nieuwsgierigheid appetitieve (plezierige) of aversieve 
(onplezierige) eigenschappen heeft. 
We voerden twee experimenten uit, waarin we eenzelfde loterij taak gebruikten als 
in de eerdere experimenten (Hoofdstuk 2, Hoofdstuk 3 en Hoofdstuk 4). Het grootste 
verschil was dat we in Experiment 1 niet vroegen hoe nieuwsgierig mensen waren, 
maar hoe blij ze waren dat de loterij gespeeld werd. Als de nieuwsgierigheid die 
samenhangt met onzekerheid appetitieve eigenschappen heeft, dan zouden we 
verwachten dat blijheid en nieuwsgierigheid beiden hoger zijn wanneer onzekerheid 
hoger is.  Aan de andere kant, als deze nieuwsgierigheid aversieve eigenschappen 
heeft zouden we een ander patroon zien. Dat wil zeggen, we zouden verwachten dat 
mensen nieuwsgieriger zijn naar loterijen met hogere onzekerheid (zoals aangetoond 
in de vorige hoofdstukken), maar dat zij tegelijkertijd minder blij zijn wanneer deze 
loterijen gespeeld worden. 
We vonden bewijs voor deze laatste hypothese: terwijl er een sterke positieve relatie 
was tussen onzekerheid en nieuwsgierigheid, vonden we een negatieve relatie tussen 
onzekerheid en blijheid. Dit laat zien dat nieuwsgierigheid, die gedreven wordt door 
onzekerheid, vooral beschreven kan worden als aversief. Waarschijnlijk zoeken we 
naar informatie om deze onplezierige staat van onzekerheid te verminderen, wat als 
belonend beschouwd kan worden. 
Is er een link tussen niet-instrumentele nieuwsgierigheid en dopa-
mine?
In Hoofdstuk 6 keken we naar de rol van dopamine in niet-instrumentele 
nieuwsgierigheid. We deden dit door te onderzoeken of de mate waarin we gedreven 
worden door informatie, en dus nieuwsgierig zijn, samenhangt met individuele 
verschillen in dopamine synthese capaciteit. Dit is een interessante vraag, omdat 
eerder werk heeft laten zien dat dopamine synthese capaciteit samenhangt met 
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individuele verschillen in belonings-gerichte motivatie. In Hoofdstuk 6 onderzochten 
we of dopamine synthese capaciteit ook samenhangt met een andere vorm van 
cognitieve motivatie, namelijk niet-instrumentele nieuwsgierigheid. 
Om dit de onderzoeken lieten we onze proefpersonen in een experimentele sessie 
de loterij taak doen. In een aparte sessie ondergingen proefpersonen een [18F]DOPA 
PET scan om hun baseline dopamine synthese capaciteit te kwantificeren. Het doel 
was om te onderzoeken of individuele verschillen in dopamine synthese capaciteit 
samenhangen met de mate waarin de proefpersonen nieuwsgierig zijn, wellicht als een 
functie van onzekerheid, winst versus verlies, en/of de hoogte van de beloningen. 
De resultaten lieten een replicatie van onze eerdere effecten zien: proefpersonen waren 
nieuwsgieriger naarmate de onzekerheid over de uitkomst van de loterij hoger was en 
waren nieuwsgieriger naar de uitkomst van loterijen waarin ze zouden winnen dan 
waarin ze zouden verliezen. We vonden geen relatie tussen de individuele verschillen 
in dopamine synthese capaciteit en nieuwsgierigheid in belonings-gerelateerde 
gebieden (het ventrale striatum, de caudate nucleus en het putamen). 
Conclusie
Kortom, in deze thesis hebben we aangetoond dat nieuwsgierigheid sterk gedreven 
wordt door de onzekerheid over wat er gaat gebeuren (Hoofdstuk 2 – 6). Daarnaast 
zijn mensen nieuwsgieriger naar positieve dan naar negatieve informatie (Hoofdstuk 
4 – 6). Hiermee tonen we aan dat er twee aparte effecten zijn die samenhangen met 
nieuwsgierigheid. Het ene effect heeft te maken met het verminderen van onzekerheid 
en het andere effect is gerelateerd aan een voorkeur voor positieve versus negatieve 
informatie. In Hoofdstuk 5 vonden we dat nieuwsgierigheid die gedreven wordt 
door onzekerheid voornamelijk als aversief gezien wordt. Waarschijnlijk worden 
we gedreven door informatie om deze onzekerheid op te lossen, wat als belonend 
beschouwd kan worden.
Daarnaast hebben we onderzocht of het verkrijgen van informatie en het verkrijgen 
van een beloning samenhangen met dezelfde breingebieden. Door middel van een 
fMRI studie (Hoofdstuk 3) vonden we dat onzekerheid samenhangt met activiteit in de 
pariëtaal cortex (een gebied betrokken bij aandachts-gerelateerde processen). Op het 
moment dat de uitkomst getoond werd, vonden we activiteit in hersengebieden die 
te maken hebben met aandacht (de pariëtaal cortex) en het verwerken van beloning 
(de orbitofrontale cortex). We hebben echter geen overtuigend bewijs gevonden 
dat nieuwsgierigheid samenhangt met activiteit in andere hersengebieden die sterk 
samenhangen met het verwachten of het ontvangen van een beloning (zoals het 
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ventrale striatum). Ook individuele verschillen in dopamine synthese capaciteit hingen 
niet samen met nieuwsgierigheid in het ventrale striatum, de caudate nucleus en het 
putamen (Hoofdstuk 6). We concluderen op basis van deze bevindingen dat niet-
instrumentele nieuwsgierigheid op zijn minst deels is gebaseerd op andere neurale 
mechanismen dan expliciete beloningen. 
Hoewel het onderzoek naar niet-instrumentele nieuwsgierigheid nog in de 
kinderschoenen staat, hebben we met dit onderzoek een belangrijke bijdrage geleverd 
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